22 Gratt. 833 | Va. | 1872
I do not concur in the opinion just delivered. I do not concur either in the reasoning or the conclusions to which a majority of the court have arrived. It is not my intention, however, to attempt any elaborate discussion of the questions arising in this case. Eegarding it in all its bearings and results as by far the most important that ever engaged the attention of this court, I deem it proper and becoming to state the reasons which influence my judgment. The first point
The constitution of Iowa contains a provision that certain designated funds, and such other means as the Legislature may provide, shall be inviolably appropriated ■to the support of common schools throughout the State. The Supreme court of that State, in construing that provision, decided “that whenever the Legislature raises-a ■fund, by taxation or otherwise, for the support of common schools, it cannot, by any contemporaneous or subsequent legislation, divert the fund to a different purpose.” City of Dubuque v. County Judge of Dubuque County, 13 Iowa R. 250. In Crosby v. Lyon, 37 Cal. R. 240, the Supreme court says: The Legislature .provided that the board of supervisors shall have power to levy a tax not to exceed a specific sum, for the support of common schools in their respective counties, and by force of the constitutional provision in question, the money, when collected, becomes inviolably appropriated -to school purposes. It would hardly be considered a valid answer to these objections to say, that as the identical bank notes received were not appropriated, it was -competent for the Legislature to devote the money to -other objects, and supply the deficiency by a resort to other objects of taxation. The language of our constitution is much stronger. The tax must be imposed and collected, and when collected, must be appropriated in the specific way designated. The practical operation of the funding bill is to defeat these objects, to divert the •fund before it reaches the treasury, and apply it to the payment of the public debt, in plain contravention of tbe express language of the .constitution.
These are some of iny objections to the funding bill, as affected by the constitution of Virginia. It can hardly be necessary to adduce argument or authority to show that no valid contract can be founded on a law which violates the constitution of a State. No binding obli
Conceding, however, the constitutionality of the funding act, I propose to consider the question of the power of the Legislature to repeal it.
The interest upon the public debt is estimated in round numbers at two millions of dollars annually. To meet this sum, coupons will be issued and used, to a large extent each year, in the payment of the public dues. To what extent they will be so used, it is impossible, in the nature of 'things, even to anticipate. The Legislature must, therefore, impose annually, a tax sufficient to ■pay the entire interest. It must also lay a tax’Sufficient to defray the ordinary expenses of government and to carry on the system of public schools provided for in the constitution. It is, therefore, clear, whatever else may happen, provision must be made for the creditors of the State, or the government will fall to pieces for the want of means to sustain it. It is substantially, and in its practical effects, an appropriation by the Legislature of 1870-71 of the public revenues to the amount of two millions of dollars each year for the next thirty-four years, and probably longer. It is claimed that the act imposing this obligation constitutes an inviolable contract, which this court, may compel the Legislature -to ■ perform. In support of this, as it seems to me, alarming and extraordinary doctrine, certain cases decided by th’e Supreme court of the United States are much relied on. I do not mean to discuss the question, whether in construing our own, constitution and laws we are bound to follow, with blind submission, the decisions of the Supreme court of the United States, however erroneous and unjust we may consider them.
This may be said, however, our own books contain the report of a celebrated case, in. which this court unani
The cases of Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. U. S. R. 190, and Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 224, are those principally relied on here. They present substantially the ■same points, and I shall content myself with a brief reference to the last mentioned decision. It appeared in that case that the Bank of Tennessee was essentially a State institution. The State owned the capital and received all the profits. The Legislature, in its anxiety to increase the circulation of the notes, provided they should ■be received in payment of all public dues. The effect of this provision was to prevent the return of the notes for redemption, and thus the State was enabled to realize a -clear profit from the interest on its loans, and from the notes which were never returned for payment. In this way the State of Tennessee became, in fact, a bank, assuming all the obligations and reaping all the advantages that appertain to these corporations. In the present case, if-the State will derive any benefit from the funding bill—if that enactment is founded upon a valuable consideration—I am unable to perceive it. It is ■said that the creditor has released one-third of his debt. I do not so understand it, and I will hazard the assertion, the creditor does not so construe the law. If this was the intention of the framers of the act, they have adopted an obscure and equivocal mode of expressing a
But the material distinction between the cases lies in the fact, that the notes of the Tennessee bank were entirely valueless to the holders, unless they were permitted to use them in the payment of State dues. In this case, the coupons, although they may not bejreeeivable in discharge of taxes and other demands of the State, constitute, nevertheless, a subsisting obligation as valid and binding on the State as the original bond ¡.held by the creditor. As the bondholder gave no consideration for the privilege of using the coupons in the payment of bis taxes, so he will lose nothing to which he is justly entitled by the withdrawal of that privilege He may, perhaps, lose the opportunity of speculating in these coupons ; and he will be required to pay his share or proportion of the taxes in the currency exacted from every other citizen. The State does not seek to repudiate the debt, or deny its validity, but simply postpones the pe
This court held, in Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Gratt. 470, that the Congress of the Confederate States could not, by any agreement with a private citizen to exempt him from military duty, create an obligation which the same, or any future Congress might not disregard, if the public interest demanded it. Judge Robinson, in delivering the opinion of the court, said : “By the term contract in the constitution is not meant to include rights and interests growing out of measures of public policy. Acts in reference to such measures are to be regarded as rather in the nature of legislation, than of contract; and although rights .and interests may have been acquired under them, those rights and interests cannot be considered as violated by subsequent legislative changes which may destroy them. Whatever in the nature of a contract could be considered to exist, there must be implied in it a condition that the power is reserved to the Legislature to change the law thereafter, as the public interest may, from time to time, appear to require,” Every word that is here said applies with peculiar force to the subject of taxation. What is taxation but the tribute paid by the citizen for the protection which he receives. It is not asked, but demanded, exacted by the government to fill the public coffers, that the general welfare may be promoted and the rights and the liberties of the people protected. In particular specific instances, it may be the subject of contract, and may be surrendered by the government. And this is all that was claimed or asserted in the opinion just quoted, which was delivered by me in the case of the City of Richmond v. Richmond and Danville Railroad Co., 21 Gratt. 604. And this is as far as the courts have gone in any case—that for a consideration received, the State may exempt from taxation certain rights and franchises ; but if the exemption
It is impossible to imagine a stronger instance of an attempt, by an irrepealable law, to diminish the powers of succeeding Legislatures in respect to the subject of taxation and the public revenue—powers inherent in all governments, and important to the well being of every organized society.
In the case of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company v. Debolt, 10 How. U. S. R. 416, Chief Justice Taney, in discussing this subject, said :
“ They (the Legislature) cannot, therefore, by contract, deprive a future Legislature of the power of imposing any tax it may deem necessary for the public service, or of exercising any other act of sovereignty-confided to one legislative body, unless, indeed, the power to make such contract is conferred upon them by the constitution of the State.”
In Virginia it has been the uniform practice for each Legislature to impose the taxes necessary for the purposes of the government during the existence of such Legislature; and this attempt, thirty years in advance, to appropriate the sum of two millions yearly to a specific purpose, beyond the control of every power in the State, is believed to be without precedent in the history of this or any other State. If there be any advantage in the frequent recurrence of popular elections, it is only in the fact, that the burdens annually laid upon the people are imposed by those fresh from their midst, and familiar with their condition, wants and circumstances. An irrepealable law, therefore, imposing taxes to a large
In Woodruff v. Trapnall, the Supreme court of the United States went so far as to hold that a defaulting collector, against whom a judgment had been rendered, had the right, even after the rendition of the judgment, to buy up the worthless notes of an insolvent bank, and with them discharge a judgment for gold. It is gratifying to know that this case was decided by a majority of one only, in a court consisting of nine judges. Mr. Justice Greer, with whom Justices Catron, Daniel and Helson concurred, delivered a very able dissenting opinion. He protested against the assumption that the Supreme court had the power to compel a State of the Union, who repudiates her debts, to pay them, upon any idea that such refusal or repudiation impaired the obligation of a contract. He protested against the decision, because under it, so long as any portion of the three millions of dollars of notes issued by the bank before 1845 remained unpaid, the State of Arkansas could not collect a dollar of taxes of citizens in lawful money. He denied that when a State published to the world its willingness to accept payment of its notes in the issues of a bank, it amounted to a contract by implication, with the public and each individual comprising it, to guarantee the notes held by said banks; that this contract was with and is attached to said notes in the hands of the bearer, provided the notes were issued before such offer was withdrawn. How, whether the majority or minority of the court was right—with such
Upon this question of public faith I will say this : that for four years Virginia bore upon her bosom the burden of a civil conflict as great as any recorded in history. She came out of the struggle presenting a lamentable
After the decision of the court was announced, the attorney-general moved the court for a rehearing of the case. This question was, according to the practice of the court, submitted to the judges who had concurred in the decision.
When the decision of the court in these causes was announced a few days ago, I briefly stated orally the grounds of my opinion. And as they are brought before us again, on the petition of the attorney-general, for a rehearing, I deem it proper to state the reasons which have conducted me to the conclusion to which I have arrived.
It is the practice of this court to grant a rehearing if any one of the judges who united in the decision is in doubt as to its correctness. And considering the importance which has been attached to this decision, and
The whole case is.embraced in this one inquiry, did the State contract, in the sense in which the word is used, in both the Federal and State constitutions, to receive these coupons from the holders thereof in payment of taxes or other dues to the Commonwealth ? If so, the act of 1872 in question annuh a contract, and consequently impairs its obligation, and falls within the prohibition of the Federal constitution, art. I., section 10, which declares that no State shall “ pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts and of the Virginia constitution, article V., section 14, which declares that “the General Assembly shall not pass any bill of ¡'attainder or any ex post facto law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts,” &c.
That a State may make a contract with an individual, which is binding on the State, will hardly be questioned by any one whose opinions are entitled to respect, or who has any self-respect. And that a State law impairing the obligation of such a contract is unconstitutional, is no longer an open question. If any doctrine of law can be said to be settled, this has been since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, R. 87, 187, decided in 1810, upon the unanswerable reasoning of C. J. Marshall, and which afterwards, in the case of Stale of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, R. 164, was recognized, and by all the courts since, State and Federal, as far as I am informed, as the settled doctrine on that subject.
But it is said that one Legislature cannot bind a future Legislature. That is not fairly the question here. It
The argument that the contracts are not binding, because not for valuable consideration, can hardly require an answer. The plainest understanding will comprehend that if I owe you a debt, upon which interest has accumulated, which I have not been prepared to pay, and I give you a new bond for the principal and accrued interest, and you surrender my old bond, it is a contract for valuable consideration. And not only that, but the consideration is sufficient to support a deed of trust on property, to secure its payment, Exchange Bank for, &c., v. Knox & al., 19 Gratt. 739, 747 ; citing 13 Gratt. 427 and 15 Gratt. 153. If the receivability provision be re-regarded as security for payment, the pre-existing debt was sufficient consideration.
It matters not whether the State is released from one-third of the debt or not; if the new bond had been given for the whole of the debt, it would have been a valid obligation for a valuable consideration. Whether the State is released or not for one-third of the debt, it is very clear that in this^transaction she has only assumed to pay two-thirds of it. And I could not say that she is bound for any more. That question, though one of great interest to the State, is not involved in this case. Because, however, it may be decided the obligations assumed by the State are for valuable consideration.
But it tis argued that the Legislature had no power, under the constitution, to authorize a contract to be made binding the State to receive the interest coupons when due in payment of taxes, &e., upon the ground—IVst, that it is incompatible with other obligations imposed upon the Legislature by the constitution of the State. And in support thereof, it is said those provisions of the constitution which set apart certain funds, and a certain proportion of the tax for the public schools, would be defeated by this legislation. It would seem to be a sufficient reply to say, that if it were impracticable to 'raise a sufficient revenue for both purposes, the latter did not impose an obligation on the Legislature paramount to the obligation to provide for the payment of the interest on the public debt. That was an obligation antecedent and paramount to the constitution itself, and could not be repudiated by the constitution, if it bad so provided. But it is not repudiated nor ignored ; but the obligation is clearly recognized by sections 7, 8, 19 and 20 of article 10—at least-to pay Virginia’s proportion. And, furthermore, this being an obligation of debt, and
But there need be no clashing of duties here. It is only required that the Legislature should levy a tax sufficient for both objects ; a duty imposed on .it by the constitution. It has not been the practice to set apart in the public treasury the identical money received for the public schools; nor is it required by the constitution, or act of Assembly. And the Legislature has discharged its constitutional obligation when it has set apart the required amount for that purpose.
But secondly, it is urged that the whole subject of taxation, the raising and collecting the public revenue, and its appropriation, is under the exclusive control of the representatives of the people, and that it is a power which cannot be surrendered. That principle will not be questioned; but to give validity and effect to the coupon provision of the act of 1871 does not in any sense, or in any respect, conflict with that principle. For it was the act of the representatives of the people. It was the act of a legislative assembly clothed with precisely the same powers with which the present General Assembly is vested. Indeed, it is the same legislative department of power in the government," though the persons delegated by the people to its exercise are not identical. Neither Assembly is superior to the other; and the acts of one, within the limitation of its powers by the State and Federal constitutions, are entitled to the same respect that the acts of the other are, and have the same binding fcrce. A subsequent Assembly may, indeed, repeal the acts of a preceding, not because it is superior, but because it is equal, in legislative power. But the repeal, where rights have vested, can only operate prospectively. When it undertakes to annul and in
A majority of this court, in Griffin v. Cunningham, 20 Gratt. 31, went very far in the expression of their sacred regard for this doctrine of vested rights, when they held that decrees of certain persons, who had been detailed or appointed by a military commander, to fill the office of judges of the Supreme court of Appeals of Virginia, during the military rule, and which were pronounced, after whatever of authority they had under the military appointment bad ceased, against the protestation of at least one of the parties who complained, could not be reviewed by this court, because rights had been vested by the said decrees. And that an act of the Legislature which expressly authorized this court to review them, upon the petition of any party who felt himself aggrieved, was unconstitutional. J. Staples, in delivering his opinion, said: “The parties interested in them (the decrees) acquired thereby vested rights, of which they -cannot be divested by special enactments of a retrospective character.” Two of the judges held that the pretended decrees vested no rights, and that the law was constitutional.
In the case of the Bank of the Old Dominion v. McVeigh, 20 Gratt. 457, the court held that an act of the Legislature was unconstitutional, which authorized payment of a debt contracted to be made to the President and Directors of the mother bank, by a citizen of the Confederate States, to be made to the branch bank, when the place of business and the directory of the mother bank were within the enemy’s lines, because it impaired the obligation of contract. In dissenting from that decision I did not controvert the principle, that if the law violated a contract between the State and the bank, or between the bank and its debtor, it was unconstitutional
It is true, that government may, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, divest individuals of their rights of property, which public necessity requires should be appropriated to public uses. But it is equally the settled law, that government cannot exercise this power without compensating the individual for the fair value of his property. This principle of eminent domain can, therefore, have no application to the questions involved in these causes.
But the doctrine that one legislative Assembly cannot invest rights which a subsequent Assembly may not divest, which has recently been promulgated, can find no warrant in reason or authority, and leads to the most pernicious consequences. If the Legislature may enact laws divesting you of your rights of property in contracts and personal securities, it may divest you of your title to your lands; for the bondholder is as much entitled to his bond as to his land. And as all our titles to real estate are mediately or immediately vested by acts of legislation, and as no time runs against the Commonwealth, if that doctrine be true the tenure by
Thirdly, It is objected, that no rights vested by virtue of the contract on the part of the State, to receive thq coupons in payment of taxes and public dues, because the General Assembly had no power to appropriate a part of the revenues of the State for a period of thirty-four years, for the payment of interest on the public debt in a way to bind future Legislatures. Is this so ? Cannot one General Assembly make an appropriation of future revenues of the State, so as to vest in parties the right to the appropriation in such manner that it cannot be divested by a subsequent General Assembly ?
The power to appropriate, as well as the power of taxation, is a legislative function.
Indeed, it is claimed by those who sustain the act of 1872 that they are sovereign legislative powers, which cannot be surrendered by the Legislature. By article V., section 1, of the constitution of Virginia, the legislative power of the Commonwealth is vested in the General Assembly. Consequently the Assembly which enacted the act of 1871 in question, was, during the term of its existence, fully invested with the whole legislative power of the State, and could appropriate the revenues, or such part of the revenues as was necessary to meet the annual legitimate liabilities of the State, as long as those liabilities existed, unless its powers in this
The convention which framed our State constitution might have withheld this power from the General Assembly, and doubtless would have done so if it had so designed, because it was then no novel principle of legislation in America. By the act of the Virginia Legislature of March 18th, 1856, treasury notes were authorized to be issued, not to exceed, at any one time outstanding, $1,300,000 in principal, which, it was provided by the act, shall be received by way of setoff in liquidation of all taxes and debts due the Commonwealth after the 30th of September 1856. The issue of $1,000,000 of notes was authorized by the act of March 14th, 1861, bearing six per cent, interest; $2,000,000 by ordinance of April 30th, 1861, and $4,000,000 by the ordinance of 28th of June 1861. All these issues were made receivable in payment of taxes and dues to the Commonwealth, and a doubt was never raised, that I ever heard, as to the constitutionality of that provision. The same principal of legislation had been practiced in other States of the Union—in Michigan aS' far back as 1841, and in Tennessee as far back as 1836, and by the Congress of the United States more frequently and on a more extended scale, from 1847 down to the act of July 17th, 1865, embracing an issue of bonds, registered and coupon, and treasury notes exceeding one billion, the coupons and treasury notes of the entire issue being made receivable and payable for taxes and public dues, except import duties, &c.
But this power is recognized, in the constitution, and the General Assembly is expressly required to appropriate a part of the revenue in advance for the extinguishment of the principal of the debt. Section eight of article X. of the constitution is in these words: “The General Assembly shall provide by law a sinking fund, to be applied solely to the payment of the principal of the State debt, which sinking fund shall be continued until the extinguishment of such State debt; and every law hereafter enacted by the General Assembly, creating a debt or authorizing a loan, shall provide a sinking fund for the payment of the same.” This provision of the constitution does not invest the power iu the General Assembly to appropriate a part of the annual revenues of the State in advance, but imposes the obligation on it to exercise the recognized power with which it was invested for the purpose indicated in the way prescribed. And now7, if it is a legislative function of the General Assembly to create a sinking fund, by an appropriation of a part of the revenue, thirty-four years in advance, to extinguish the principal of the public debt at its maturity, which appropriation cannot be disturbed or diverted from its object by subsequent General Assemblies, it would follow that to make an appropriation in advance for the payment of the interest of the public debt, is not contrary to the legislative function. And being stipulated for in this case, and made a part of the contract, its repeal by a subsequent General Assembly would fall within the prohibitory clauses'of both the Federal and State constitutions above recited.
But fourthly, it is objected that the provision in the
That the Legislature cannot enact a law which will disable and make it impossible for it to discharge important duties to the country, which the constitution devolves upon it, is a principle which I will not controvert. And this is the whole of Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Gratt. 470, as far as it bears the remotest analogy to any question raised upon this record. In that case it was held to be the constitutional duty of Congress to provide for the common defence, and to call into the military service of the country every able-bodied citizen, if needed for the public defence, and that it was a power which Congress could not abdicate. And it was held that if the act of Congress could be construed to authorize, without limitation, able-bodied citizens to be released by contract for' ever afterwards from the obligation of rendering military service for the country, the act was unconstitutional, as it would, if carried into execution, divest Congress of the power to discharge an important duty essential to the public defence, which had been confided to it by the constitution, and the contract was void.
And it is now argued that, inasmuch as it is the constitutional duty of the Legislature to levy taxes and raise a revenue necessary to carry on the government and to fulfil its obligations—which it cannot fail to do without violating its constitutional duty—that an act, whether by the same Assembly or a previous one, which would deprive it of the power to discharge that constitutional duty, would be unconstitutional and void. What we have to consider, then, is, Is such the nature and effect of the coupon provision in the act of 1871?
I would not say, however, that in no case would it be competent for the judicial tribunal to declare a law tobe unconstitutional upon this ground. Such a case might be supposed. Lor example, if the Legislature should enact a law for ever exempting the property, real and personal, of all the people of the State from taxation, who should claim the benefit of the exemption within a limited time, I am not prepared to say that such an act would not be unconstitutional. But if the judicial authority could interpose to annul a law enacted by the Legislature, upon the ground that it incapacitated it in future to discharge its important constitutional duties, it could only be in an extreme case, and where it was palpable on the face of the law, that such was intrinsically its nature, and that such must be its effect and operation.
It does not palpably appear from the intrinsic character of the act of 1871, of otherwise, that its provisions in relation to the receivability of the coupons amount to a surrender or abdication of any important power of the Legislature, or that it disables the Legislature now, or in future, to fulfil its constitutional obligation to raise a sufficient revenue to pay the interest on the public
And the method which it adopts to secure it is not novel, as we have seen ; nor is it an “ ingenious contrivance” in any improper sense. It only authorizes the application of the equitable principle of setoff in such cases. And why is it not as equitable and just to apply this principle of setoff’ against the government as against individuals ? Why should I not have the same right to setoff against a demand of the government against me, a just claim which I hold agaiust the government, as I would have against an individual ? It is said “governments are established for the benefit of mankind.” They should be, and not to trample on the rights of mankind. To be a benefit to mankind, they should act with the utmost good faith and integrity in all cases. They ought not to observe with less fidelity and integrity their contracts with individuals than they exact from them in their dealings with one another. In the United States v. Mann, 2 Brock. R. p. 9, which was a case of setoff against a demand of the United States, C. J. Marshall said : “ The clearest principles of equity and law require that it (the setoff) should not be rejected ; and if the court be permitted to take jurisdiction of the subject, it cannot be disregarded without disregarding also the soundest principles of law.” The setoff' was allowed against the United States demand.
Doubtless the General Assembly which enacted the law allowing the application of this principle -believed they were making a judicious and beneficial arrangement for the Commonwealth ; and that the resources of
We deeply sympathize with our fellow-citizens in the burdens which have been thrown upon us as the result of the war, and the policy of the general government towards us since the war, which we have suffered in common with them. Mo people perhaps ever deserved better, and fared worse, than the people of "Virginia. But the courage, firmness and fidelity to principle, with which they have borne the ravages of war, and none the less nobly the disasters consequent upon final defeat has attracted to them the admiration of all noble and generous minds ; and I cannot believe that this same people would, for the sake of a few cents additional taxes upon the one hundred dollars value of property, be willing to repudiate their contract. I have no thought that a virtue which has been tried in the crucible of severest affliction, without faltering, will yield to so slight a pressure. It seems to be conceded by the action of the Legislature that the revenues arising from the present rate of taxa-•
There is nothing then in the nature of the act itself, or in the circumstances of the country, to show that it is unconstitutional. But the constitutionality of such legislation has been settled, as far as it can be, by the Supreme court of the United States, in two cases, Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. U. S. R. 190, and Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. U. S. R. 44. The former case was decided by a majority of only one. And I am free to say that there is much in the circumstances of that case, whilst I regard the principle as sound, which would cause me to doubt the correctness of the decision. But in the recent case of Exchange Bank v. Knox, 19 Gratt. 739, decided by this court,.in which I did not sit, the principle decided in the above case was approved. And in Furman v. Nichol it was unanimously reaffirmed by the Supreme court of the United States.
In cases involving the construction of the constitution and laws of the United States, it seems now to be generally conceded that the decisions of the Supreme court are binding upon the State courts. And practically they are conclusive of the rights of the parties, whether
From the best consideration I have been able to give subject, I have not a doubt on my mind that the decision is right. And such, I understand, is the case * with the other judges who united in that decision. What, then, should this court do? We have been told, in the petition for a rehearing, that our decision has met with great disfavor. And outside of this hall the admonition has been given, that we hold our office at the will of the Legislature, and that it is perilous to thwart it. If this be so, that which has been regarded heretofore as indispensable to the security of the citizen in the enjoyment of his civil rights of life, liberty and property—the separation of the judicial power of the State from the legislative, and an independent judiciary—is repudiated by our constitution. If we sit here to obey the behests of the Legislature, and to do its will and pleasui’e, why the mockery of having a judicial department in the State? The remarks of Judge Scott, in delivering his opinion in Bouldin’s case, 6 Leigh, 639, in 1836, ai’e appropriate to this occasion, some extracts from which I hope will not be considered out of place here.
Speaking of the convention of 1829-30-—perhaps the most distinguished body of men that ever assembled on this continent, of which he was a distinguished member, he says: “No member of that body appreciated more highly than I did the inestimable value of an independent judiciary; none felt more intensely the thrilling appeal of the late Chief Justice (John Marshall, clarum ei venerabile nomen), in which he deprecated £ an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependant judiciary, as the greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning people,’ and implored us not to £draw down this curse upon Virginia.”’ Again he
I am opposed to a rehearing.
The rehearing repused.
Mandamus awarded in the first case, and in the second judgment affirmed.