*1 645.16(6) plain language § on the of the ty has arisen. See Minn.Stat. Based statute (2002) foregoing analysis, reject conse- and our we (requiring attention as interpretation); appellant’s argu- of see also Minn. without merit additional quences 645.17(1) (2002) ment, (declaring legisla- “repose” § its assertion that the lan- Stat. 541.051, 1(a), guage § of tive intent the absurd unreason- Minn.Stat. subd. able). only injury addresses claims and not indemnity.
claims for contribution and C. Narrow Construction critical,
Although singularly it is not we DECISION on give weight deliberating while these appellant’s Because suit on its claims of considerations to the demand of the su indemnity contribution and occurred with- preme court for strict construction of the parameters § of Minn.Stat. 541.051 unique provisions § 541.051 Minn.Stat. (2002), timely, and thus was we reverse the (2002). Wells, County v. See Kittson Den summary judgment district court’s and re- Assocs., 237, 240-41, brook & 308 Minn. proceedings mand for in further the case. (contrasting Reversed and remanded. approach to this statute with the lib previously eral construction accorded stat embodying impor
utes of limitations “as claims”).
tant in public policy barring stale premised
This rule of construction was in
uncertainty scope of Minn.Stat. 541.051, resulting that persons risk may fairly
affected its terms apprised application of its ANTONE, to their deci Appellant, Richard sions, potential and the harsh result for persons. affected Id. These are reasons MIRVISS, Respondent. Israel applicable that are question the kind of in at issue this case. No. A04-1367. considerations, Based on these we con- Appeals Court of of Minnesota. repose clude that the statute of deems April 2005. appellant’s accrual of contribution in- demnity claims to have occurred at the end year following completion tenth
construction 1993. Because the statute permits commencement of
action following on the claims in the two
years, appellant’s against respon- actions timely.
dents 2004 were
In by interpretation the absence of relief repose,
of the statute of appellant states permitting
cause for its contribution and
indemnity general actions under principles equity justice. Because the district judgment
court’s is reversed under the
statute, we need not reach this issue. *2 Olson, Olson,
Jeffrey Jeffrey A. A. PLLC, Edina, MN, appellant. for Rooney, MN, Edward F. Minneapolis, respondent. *3 Considered and decided SHUMAKER, Presiding Judge; DIETZEN, Judge; CRIPPEN, Judge.* OPINION SHUMAKER, GORDON W. Judge. Appellant-client appeals the district court’s dismissal of legal malpractice action against respondent-attorney, con- tending that the district court erred when it held that the statute of began limitations to run when appellant and his former spouse got married in reliance on an ante- nuptial agreement respondent prepared appellant’s and that action was commenced after the period expired.
FACTS legal malpractice This is a action in appellant Richard Antone claims he sustained attorney, because his respondent Mirviss, Israel improperly antenuptial agreement drafted an that An- spouse tone and his former entered. The district court limi- statute of ruled expired tations had before Antone com- menced granted suit and Mirviss’s motion to dismiss the action. Antone contends the district court erred as a matter of law. As Antone prepared marry for a sec- time, ond attorney he consulted Mirviss about might prevent how he spouse obtaining from certain of his assets if he died or if the dissolved their mar- riage. alleges that Mirviss advised * VI, judge 1 0. Ap- Retired the Minnesota Court of Minn. Const. art. peals, serving by appointment pursuant was entitled to receive. would be antenuptial agreement that an instrument and The district court entered its amended protective proper an judgment awarding portion to draft of that value promised 3, dissolu- January in the event “so 2003.
tion, would not benefit Antone’s fiancée negligence, Premised on theories rela- that occurred any appreciation fiduciary duty, breach of and breach of assets/proper- premarital tive to contract, Antone started this action ties.” September 2003. Mirviss Mirviss on antenuptial agree-
Mirviss drafted suit, arguing moved to dismiss the after con- parties signed that both ment expired statute of limitations had attorneys. respective their sulting with September 2003. The district court parties’ as- *4 agreement disclosed The began that the to agreed; ruled statute spous- limitation on provided and for a sets married, about parties run on the date the marriage event of a al maintenance the years 16 before Antone started the law- dissolution, property it silent as to but was suit; granted and the motion to dismiss. dissolution. rights upon appealed. Antone 21, married on December parties The ISSUE
1986, they signed the ante- day one after a Antone commenced nuptial agreement. alleges that he retained re- Appellant 12 nearly marriage proceeding dissolution antenup- spondent attorney prepare 25, later, He September 1998. years on from prevent spouse tial pendency of the alleges during that of a obtaining certain assets the event first time he discovered for the dissolution alleges He that re- marriage dissolution. antenuptial agreement did that agree- spondent prepare proper failed to a parties’ assets address the division of por- that his obtained ment and spouse from ob- prevent did not in an award 16 property tion of such taining prom- assets that Mirviss marriage. Appellant after the date of protect. ised the award. started suit after 9, 2000, the district court On November ruling that by court err Did the district dissolution, ruling judgment entered to run on began of limitations the statute agreement did not that and, thus, the marriage, the date of authority the court’s to order affect legal malpractice action is time-barred? that would include assets division have been covered alleged were to ANALYSIS Nevertheless, the dis- by agreement. Review Standard of appreciated all of the trict court awarded the correct apply that we can to Antone. Ultimate- So value of such assets review, first address the we remanded the issue standard ly, supreme court Citing of the case. court, procedural posture stating: hold as to the district “We citing any limitations but not statute of portion that a a matter law Mirviss moved procedure, rule of civil during the appreciation market-related response Antone’s Antone v. dismiss the action. property.” is marital (Minn.2002). summary Antone, motion as one for 96, treated the 103 645 N.W.2d P. 56. The Minn. R. Civ. judgment under directive to the dis- supreme court’s dismissing its order court based to determine the district trict court on remand was 12.02(e), R. P. on Minn. Civ. the action appreciated of the value portion 568
failure to state a claim on which relief
judgment,
can
inal district court
appellate
granted.
be
decisions,
court
entry
of the district
judgment.
parties
court’s amended
12.02(a)-(f)
R.
P.
provides
Minn.
Civ.
(1)
agree
the statute of limitations
12.02(e)
if,
on a motion based on a
begins to run
legal malpractice
when the
defense,
pleading
“matters outside the
are
accrues,
cause of action
that the
presented
to and not excluded
cause of action is deemed to have accrued
court, the motion shall be treated as one
when it is able to survive a motion to
summary judgment
and disposed of as
”
dismiss for failure to
a claim
state
provided in
parties
Rule 56....
Both
may
granted.
which relief
Herrmann
submitted various affidavits and other
Severson,
McMenomy
&
590
“matters outside the
N.W.2d
pleading[s],” and the
(Minn.1999).
district court did not
also
exclude
Therefore,
agree
exhibits.
begins
the district court’s
statute
to run “after
occurs,
summary judgment
damage
dismissal was a
in fa-
though
even
the ultimate
vor of Mirviss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56. damage
unpredictable.”
is unknown or
Accordingly,
correct
Richman,
standard of re-
Muenzer,
Sabes &
Inc. v.
that applicable
summary
view is
to a
judg-
(Minn.App.1988).
appeal
ment.
In an
summary judg-
argues
that Antone suffered
*5
ment,
appellate
the
court determines
“some damage”
spouse
when he and his
genuine
whether there is a
issue of materi-
signed
the
al fact for trial and whether the district
married because Antone then lost
right
the
interpretation
court erred in its
applica-
prevent
to
claiming
tion of the
by Cooper
law. State
v.
obtaining an interest in
in ques-
the assets
French,
2,
(Minn.1990).
4
460 N.W.2d
tion if
parties eventually
the
dissolved
Statute of
Trigger
Limitations
their marriage.
question
appeal
sole
on
is this:
survive a motion to dismiss a
To
triggers
“What event
legal malpractice
legal
action,
plaintiff
a
must
statute of limitations when
allegation
is
“(1)
allege sufficient facts to show
the exis
attorney
improperly prepared an
(2)
attorney-client
tence of an
relationship;
antenuptial agreement?”
ques
As to this
constituting
acts
negligence or breach of
tion,
genuine
raise no
issue of
contract;
that such
proxi
acts were the
material fact. When material facts are not
mate
plaintiffs
cause of the
damages; and
in dispute,
question
of when a statute
(4) that but for defendant’s conduct the
begins
law,
to run is
one
plaintiff would have been successful in the
which this court
Ryan
reviews de novo.
v.
prosecution or defense of the action.”
126,
ITT
Corp.,
Ins.
450 N.W.2d
128
Life
O’Toole,
Corp.
Blue Water
336 N.W.2d
(Minn.1990).
(Minn.1983).
Here,
281
Antone’s law
541.05,
Under Minn.Stat.
subd.
suit would survive a motion to
if
dismiss he
(1) (1998), the period of limitation within
alleged
but for
negligence
Mirviss’s
which
legal malpractice
lawsuit must be
contract,
and breach of
he would not have
years. However,
started is six
the statute
any portion
lost
appreciated
value of
is silent as to when that period begins question.
the assets in
Here,
run.
possible triggering dates are
the respective dates of the execution of
“damages”
element
antenuptial agreement,
marriage,
context of this action is the loss of some
dissolution,
commencement of the
orig-
appreciated
value. Antone’s claim accrued
authority
proposi-
offered no
for the
any evi- has
on
“possible
it was
point
at the
money damages
action for
can
consistent
tion
might
produced,
be
which
dence
when,
grant
by any
theory,
survive a motion to<dismiss
pleader’s
with
v. Minn.
might
pro-
Martens
evidence that
be
demanded.”
conceivable
relief
Co.,
732, 739-
duced,
616 N.W.2d
Mining Mfg.
&
for an actual loss
only
potential
(Minn.2000)
N. States Power
(quoting
money
has occurred.
391, 395, 122
Franklin, 265 Minn.
v.Co.
“In
court stated that:
district
added).
(1963))
(emphasis
Minnesota,
of limitations on a
the statute
“possible
if it was not
conversely,
Stated
begins to run when
legal malpractice claim
produced,
be
any
might
on
evidence
advice.”
action is taken based
theory,
pleader’s
with the
consistent
propo
for that
The court cited Herrmann
demanded,”
claim will
grant the relief
holding
in Herr
sition. But that is not
de-
Id. The relief Antone
dismissed.
rule in
mann and is not the
Minnesota.
money damages for
in this action is
mands
Herrmann,
operative and the court final award defendants injury suf- plaintiff that sought protect. had to ascertainable property of Antone alleged malpractice fered from Zanetis’ impossible imagine It is to what its divorce until state court issued in Antone would have been amount 572 gave and its final to the at the approval marriage
decree
had notice
time of the
Popes’
plaintiff
property
If
from
property division.
his non-marital
was deleted
and, therefore,
malpractice
agreement
unpro-
filed
suit before
was
had
this
then,
property
tected. His non-marital
thus be-
it would have been dismissed for
of
part
came a
the marital
was
injury.
of an
estate and
lack
subject
marital
to the
claims of his former
*6.
Id. at
spouse.
rule
The Minnesota
is
accord. The
agree
majority
I
with the
began
statute of limitations here
to run
when the
context of
statute of limitations
upon
entry
the date of the
the district
of
accrues,
damage”
“some
occurs when
judgment.
court’s amended
legal malpractice claim can
mo
survive a
tion to
claim
dismiss
failure to state a
DECISION
relief can
I
upon
granted.
But
appellant
no damages
Because
suffered
agree
majority
do not
with the
that “some
the district
to
until
court awarded
his for-
damage” must be in the form of ascertain
spouse property
mer
was to
money damages
able
for the statute of
to him through
antenuptial
be reserved
to
generally
limitations
accrue. See
Herr
respondent
agreement
prepared, the stat-
Severson,
McMenomy
mann v.
&
590
limitations did
to run
begin
ute of
until
(Minn.1999) (“[T]he
run
award,
appellant’s
the time of the
ning of the statute does not
depend on
timely.
lawsuit three
later was
ability to ascertain the exact amount of
Reversed and remanded.
(emphasis added);
damages”)
Olson
cf.
Aretz,
(Minn.App.
346 N.W.2d
DIETZEN, Judge (dissenting).
1984) (“Uncertainty as to the
of
fact
respectfully
I
dissent. Because Antone
any damages
whether
were sustained at all
damage”
“some
suffered
at the time of the
recovery,
is fatal to
uncertainty
but
as to
marriage,
not.”)
and not at the time of the disso-
omitted),
(quotation
the amount
is
years later,
(Minn.
lution
I
affirm
would
30, 1984).
review denied
Oct.
court’s grant
summary judg-
district
The Herrmann Court concluded that
dismissing
ment
Antone’s stale
the statute
upon
accrues
claim.
prohibited
occurrence
the “first
transac
Herrmann,
their wedding,
Before
his
tion.”
spouse’s GERBER, petitioner, if other if is erty only spouse insane Respondent, or is otherwise has been deserted divorce). an loss of to a Antone’s entitled a dam- interest his assets was exclusive tort from the proximately flowed
age GERBER, Appellant, John Truman if exact amount malpractice even time of unascertainable at the marriage. County Anoka, intervenor, troubling majority opinion has two Respondent. First, an desiring implications. No. A04-1538. prac- antenuptial agreement will encounter agree- reluctant draft such titioners Appeals Court of Minnesota. they liable for will be held ments because malprac- long alleged advice after the April 12, 2005. Second, because “some tice has occurred. prop- not occur until marital
damage” does proceeding, in a
erty is divided dissolution majority opinion open-end- creates time for a legal extension of
ed contrary gen- is to the This result
claim. limitation, which intent of statutes of
eral cer- provide claims and to
is to bar stale affairs, hold not to
tainty professional malprac- potentially liable
practitioners many years the tort
tice for after has to a care that
occurred and standard of forgotten.
long ago been grant
I affirm district court’s would summary judgment and conclude legal malpractice lawsuit falls six-year limita- statute of
outside
tions.