[¶ 1] Antler’s Inn & Rеstaurant, LLC appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Skowhegan, LaVerdiere, C.J.) affirming the decision of the Department of Public Safety denying the Inn’s application for a liquor license. The Inn contends that the Department failed to meet statutory and constitutional notice rеquirements, and that its basis for denying the license is insufficient as a matter of fact and law. The Inn also argues that the District Court erred in dismissing its independent claim against the Department brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LexisNex-is 2002). We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] In 2007, the Inn obtained its first liquor license. In 2008, when the Inn was required to renеw its liquor license, it applied to the Town of Bingham for a Class A lounge license pursuant to 28-A M.R.S. § 2(15)(L) (2012). When the Town’s Board of Selectmen denied the requested license, the Inn appealed to the Bureau of Liquor Enforcement within the Department of Public Safety pursuant to 28-A M.R.S. §§ 82(5), 653(3) (2012). See 28-A M.R.S. § 2(6) (2012). After conducting a public hearing, a Department hearing officer also denied the license.
[¶ 3] The Inn appealed the Department’s decision to the District Court and asserted independent claims against the Department and the Town alleging various constitutional and statutory violations, and seeking injunctive relief and attorney fees.
[¶ 4] On the merits of the Inn’s appeal of the Department’s decision, however, the court remanded the matter to the Department after concluding that an appeal of a municipality’s denial of а liquor license could only be decided by the Commissioner of Public Safety, and not a hearing officer; the court instructed: “The Department shall either re-hear the appeal or conduct additional procedures that it deems necessary to comply with the Department’s responsibilities under Title 28-A and all applicable statutes.” See 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C)(3) (2012); 28-A M.R.S. §§ 2(9-A), 82(5), 653(3) (2012).
[¶ 5] On remand, the Department did not conduct a second hearing, but instead relied on the evidence obtained from the hearing before the remand. The hearing officer issued a recommended decision, again concluding that the Inn’s license application should be denied; the parties had an opportunity to object to the recommended decision. On March 14, 2011, the Commissioner of the Department, also without conducting a hearing, issued а final decision approving the hearing officer’s recommended decision in its entirety. The Commissioner entered only one additional finding — that one of the Inn’s owners was sent notice by certified mail of the hearing that was conducted before the remand.
[¶ 6] The Inn filed a second appeal in the District Court to challenge the Department’s decision; it also asserted the same independent claims against the Town and the Department as in its first appeal. On the Town’s and Department’s motions, the court dismissed all claims other than the Rule 80C direct appeal of the Department’s final decision on remand. The Inn appeals from the District Court’s decision affirming the Department’s denial. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 10051(3), 11008(1) (2012).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 7] On appeal from a municipality’s denial of a liquor license application, “the bureau may issue the license only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the decision was without justifiable cause.” 28-A M.R.S. § 653(3)(B). We have interpreted the statute to require the Bureau to conduct a de novo hearing, see, e.g., Allied Res., Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
[¶ 8] The Inn first argues that the Department violated the Maine Administrative Procedure Act (the Act), 5 M.R.S. §§ 8001-11008 (2012), and the Inn’s right of procedural due procеss by failing to issue the required notice to the Inn of the hearing on the Inn’s requested liquor license.
[¶ 9] As a preliminary matter, the Inn’s challenge to the notice of hearing afforded by the Department is not preserved for our review. We have said many times that an argument, even one of constitutional dimension, that is not raised before an administrative agency may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Oronoka Rest, Inc. v. Me. State Liquor Comm’n,
[¶ 10] Even if the Inn had preserved this argument, however, we would not vacatе the Department’s decision on this basis. The Act sets forth the notice requirements that apply when a statute, like the liquor statute, mandates that an agency conduct an administrative hearing: “[N]otiee shall be given ... [t]o the person or persons whose legal rights, duties or privileges are at issue, by regular mail, sufficiently in advance of the hearing date to afford an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument.”
[¶ 11] Here, the administrative record supports the Department’s finding that it sent a copy of the public notice of the hearing to one of the Inn’s owners by certified mail approximately three weeks before the scheduling hearing. Indeed, the Inn’s owner testified at the hearing, “I got the registered letter for this hearing.” Although the notice technically complied with the requirement to list the statutory аnd jurisdictional authority for the hearing (28-A M.R.S. § 653(3)); the nature and
[¶ 12] There is no dispute, however, that the owners of the Inn received advance notice that largely complied with section 9052(4), and that they attended and fully participated in the hearing on behalf of the Inn. The Inn also had ample notice of the ultimately dispositive basis for the Commissioner’s denial of the liquor license — the Inn’s service of liquor in an unlicensed area.
B. Grounds for Denial
[¶ 13] The Inn’s next contention— that the ground on which the Department denied the license was not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record and is insufficient as a matter of law — is not persuasive. The Department ultimately based its denial of the license on the Inn’s service of liquor in the basement, an unlicensed area.
C. Dismissal of Independent Claim
[¶ 14] Finally, the Inn contends that the District Court erred in entering judgment against the Inn on its “cognizable section 1983 claims” — alleging lack of notice, insufficient notice, bias, ex parte communications, illegal and improper deliberations, arbitrary decision-making, reliance on hearsay evidence, and a deprivation of property without just com
[¶ 15] The Inn’s section 1983 claims against thе Department and Town fall squarely within the exclusivity principle. Title 5 M.R.S. § 10051(3) provides that “[t]he District Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review licensing decisions of the Department of Public Safety taken pursuant to Title 28-A, section[ ] ... 653.” When such a review is undertaken, the District Court is empowered to resolve the matter by affirming or remanding, or the court may “[r]everse or modify” the Department’s decision if the “findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions” are
(1)In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by bias or error of law;
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or сharacterized by abuse of discretion.
5 M.R.S. § 11007(4). Each of the Inn’s section 1983 claims may therefore be resolved by the District Court pursuant to section 11007, and thus the Act’s process provides the exclusive remedy available to the Inn.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. The Inn also attempted to challenge the Town's decision pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B,
. The Inn concedes that it did nоt raise the notice issue before the Department before its first appeal to the District Court, but argues that it did raise the notice issue in the District Court, and thus the Department was aware of the argument when it issued its second decision denying the license on remand. Nevеrtheless, the Department was not required to, and did hot, conduct a second hearing after the District Court’s remand. The notice issue related to the notice of the first hearing, and the Inn’s failure to raise that issue during the first round of Department proceedings operаted to forfeit its rights.
. Section 9052(2) also makes a provision for public notice of such a hearing when the proceeding involves "issues of substantial public interest.” 5 M.R.S. § 9052(2)(B) (2012).
. The Inn was aware that its service of liquor in an unlicensed area of the building would be at issue before the Dеpartment because the Town had denied the license the year before in part based on its finding that "it was run as a bar downstairs.”
. The Department also found, as a basis to deny the license, that the Inn had committed various food statute violations. Because the Inn’s аdmission to serving liquor in an unlicensed area is, by itself, sufficient to support the license denial, and because the Department does not press the food code violations as a ground for its decision in this appeal, we need not decide the adequacy of such a basis for denying a liquor license as a matter of fact or law.
. The Inn does not appeal the dismissal of its other independent claims.
. We need not determine whether the denial of a liquor license is a deprivation of a federal right for section 1983 purposes because, even if it is, the remedy afforded here is adequate.