The defendant, Anthony Warren, appeals from a habitual offender adjudication that followed this Court's previous opinion affirming his murder conviction but vacating the habitual offender determination in his original trial and remanding for further proceedings. Warren v. State,
The defendant first claims the evidence was insufficient to identify him as the person who committed the underlying murder conviction that was subject to enhancement by the habitual offender finding. The defendant admits that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that he had committed two prior unrelated felonies, but he maintains that "there is a whole failure of proof in that there is no evidence other than a common name" to link him to the murder conviction or to the date of the offense. Br. of Appellant at 11.
That the defendant was the person convicted of murder in the original trial "was an issue which had been decided in the case, was the law of the case, and was totally outside the realm of the second assembled jury." Gilliam v. State,
For his second contention, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his objection to the jury being informed of the nature of the underlying conviction. The defendant requested that any mention that the underlying felony was murder be removed from the Information and Abstract of Judgment and that
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the jury be informed only that the defendant had been convicted of an underlying felony without naming the felony. The defendant argues that the identity of the offense was irrelevant and should have been excluded. A jury is "entitled to know why they were being assembled to determine appellant's status as a habitual offender." Gilliam,
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Notes
. To establish that the defendant is a habitual offender, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has been previously convicted of two separate and unrelated felonies. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8. To be "unrelated," the commission of the second felony must be subsequent to the sentencing for the first, and the sentencing for the second felony must have preceded the commission of the current felony for which the enhanced sentence is being sought. Toney v. State,
