4 Ark. 176 | Ark. | 1848
This was a proceeding to revive a judgment and continue its lien on land. The defendant in error sued out process of sci. fa. against the plaintiff in error, returnable into the Pulaski circuit court, at the October term, 1845, which was returned by the sheriff of that county as executed, not only upon the plaintiff in error, but also upon John Brown and David Skelton, his terretenants. During the return term, the plaintiff in error filed his motion “ to set aside the sheriff’s return on the sci. fa.J which motion was pending and undetermined when the defendants in error moved to amend the writ of sci. fa., “ by striking out that portion commanding the sheriff to summon the terretenants,” and immediately afterwards, on the same day, the plaintiff in error filed his motion or demurrer, seeking “ to quash and set aside” the writ of sci. fa. for misjoinder of parties: whereupon the court “sustained the motion to amend” and “ overruled the demurrer.” To which decision of the court in sustaining the motion to amend and in overruling the demurrer the plaintiff in error excepted at the time, and his bill of exceptions sets out a literal copy of the sci. fa. and of the sheriff’s return thereon prior to the amendment, by which it appears that the sci. fa., prior to its amendment, run not only against the plaintiff in error, but also against his terretenants, and that the amendment allowed removed the objection taken by the demurrer, and that the court then adjudged the sci. fa. and the return thereon sufficient in law and overruled the demurrer: whereupon, by the leave of the court, the plaintiff in error filed three pleas in bar: The 1st, setting up a levy on real estate of the plaintiff in error subject to sale for the satisfaction of the judgment, of value more than sufficient to satisfy the judgment, which levy had never been, in any manner, disposed of or discharged by sale or otherwise howsofever. (a) 2d, Payment of the judgment in full. 3d, Nul tiel record of such judgment as is mentioned in the writ.
To the first pica, defendant in error filed his demurrer; to the second pica, he filed his replication denying the payment; and to the third pica, his replication affirming- the existence of the record. To the demurrer to the first plea, plaintiff in error joined, and after argument it was submitted, and by the court taken under advisement; to the second and third pleas, issues of fact were joined, both of which were tried by the court and found for the defendants in error; on which finding judgment final was rendered by the court that the original judgment be revived and the lien thereof continued and that execution issue. The plaintiff in error then filed his motion for a new trial, which was overruled. To which opinion of the court overruling the motion for a new trial, plaintiff in error excepted, and by his bill of exceptions all tbe evidence adduced on the trial of the issue joined on the plea of nul tiel record is set out, which consisted of a judgment entry (read from the record book in which the proceedings and judgment of the circuit court of Pulaski county had and pronounced at the September term, A. D. 1840, are entered and recorded) of the original judgment, which is the foundation of these procedings, entered there as by default, and also the judgment entry (read from the record book in which the proceedings and judgments of the circuit court of Pulaski county had and pronounced at the September term, A. D. 184-2, are entered and recorded) of the revival of said original judgment, in the name of Humphries, as administrator, also entered there as by default. To the reading of all which said plaintiff in error, on the trial of the issue formed on the plea of nul lid record, objected, and his objection was overruled.
Numerous supposed errors by the court below are assigned in this court by the plaintiff. The first and second assignments will be considered together, as they both relate to the motion to set aside the return of the sheriff to the sci. fa., to the motion or demurrer to quash that writ, and to the'granting of the motion to amend.
In the cases of James Danley vs. Rabins' heirs, reported in 3 Ark., and of Ashley vs. Hyde & Goodrich, reported in 2 English, 92, the legal effect of a motion for a new trial ,is clearly declared: and the doctrine of these cases, when applied to this, cuts out from the record, and takes from the view of this court, the first bill of exceptions taken by the plaintiff in error, which, until that motion was made, presented the facts upon which these two assignments are based. And as the supposed mis-joinder of parties does not, otherwise, appear than by this bill of exceptions, thus taken from the view of this court, inasmuch as the sci. fa., as contained in the record now before the court, is against the plaintiff in error alone, the demurrer for the supposed misjoinder of parties must be considered as having been properly overruled. The fact that the sheriff executed a sci. fa., running against the plaintiff alone, upon the plaintiff in error, and also upon two other persons, against whom the process did not run, cannot impair either the writ or return; at most, it was but supererogation on the part of the sheriff, without legal effect. And as there is nothing- in the record now before this court, upon which the leave given by the court below to amend, could have operated, the granting of that motion must be considered as having been inoperative.
The third assignment is predicated upon the action of the court below upon the first plea of the plaintiff in error. To this plea there was a demurrer and joinder, and after argument it was submitted and taken under advisement. And although the record does not otherwise disclose the holding of the court below on this question of law thus presented, the subsequent final judgment of the court in favor of the defendant in error and against the plaintiff in error after the trial of the two issues of fact, necessarily shows that the matter set up in this plea was taken and held by the court below to be insufficient to bar the action. The question, then, presented by this assignment, is the sufficiency of this first plea. And this question was directly determined in the affirmative at the January term, A. D. 1848, of this court in the case of Anderson vs. Fowler, the doctrine of which case we are not disposed to disturb. Therefore in holding the matters set up in this first plea of the plaintiff in error to have been insufficient to bar the action of the defendant in error, there was manifest error in the court below.
The other assignments will be considered together, as they all, subsequently, call in question the evidence adduced on the trial of the issue of fact formed on the plea of nul tiel record. The judgments read in evidence were clearly not void; and the error on the face of the sci. fa., which preceded the second one, irregularly brought to the knowledge of the court below — manifestly a clerical misprision, which could have in truth neither injured or deceived any one — was clearly amendable in the court below, and in this court would be considered as amended.(a) But, however erroneous might have been these judgments in point of law, nevertheless, while they stood unreversed and not in any manner vacated, they could not in point of fact be questioned in this collateral way on the plea of nul tiel record, but were clearly admissible in evidence to prove the issue formed on this plea.
But, for the error of the court below in holding the first plea of the plaintiff in error insufficient to bar the action of the defendant in error, the judgment must be reversed.