316 F.3d 412 | 3rd Cir. | 2003
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This appeal arises out of a federal civil rights lawsuit(cid:13) brought by persons under state court orders for failing to(cid:13) support their children. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and(cid:13) injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 contending the Due(cid:13) Process Clause establishes a right to counsel, and, if(cid:13) indigent, a right to appointed counsel. Defendants are New(cid:13) Jersey state court judges and the administrative director of(cid:13) the New Jersey courts.1 The District Court abstained under(cid:13) Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). We will affirm.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) *The Honorable John T. Noonan, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for(cid:13) the Ninth Judicial Circuit, sitting by designation.(cid:13) 1. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331,(cid:13) 1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291.(cid:13) 2(cid:13) I(cid:13) Plaintiffs, Michael Anthony, Anne Pasqua and Ray(cid:13) Tolbert, are all under child support orders issued by the(cid:13) Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family(cid:13) Part. Because they failed to meet their child support(cid:13) obligations, they were arrested and incarcerated for civil(cid:13) contempt of a court order.2(cid:13) Plaintiffs allege violations of their due process rights(cid:13) under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Specifically, they(cid:13) contend the presiding judges failed to inform them of their(cid:13) right to counsel and, if indigent, to appointed counsel, and(cid:13) moreover, the judges failed to appoint counsel for them.(cid:13) Plaintiffs contend they were indigent at the time of their(cid:13) hearings, continue to be indigent, and remain in arrears on(cid:13) their support obligations. As such, they aver there is a(cid:13) great likelihood they will again be deprived of their asserted(cid:13) rights because in the future they will be obligated to appear(cid:13) in similar contempt hearings.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. Anthony was arrested on April 19, 2000 and incarcerated. He(cid:13) appeared before defendant Superior Court Judge Gerald J. Council on(cid:13) May 11, 2000, and was released that same day after paying $125.00(cid:13) toward his arrears. Pasqua was arrested on May 15, 2000, and appeared(cid:13) before defendant Superior Court Judge Lee F. Forrester on May 18,(cid:13) 2000. Pasqua was incarcerated until June 1, 2000, when she was(cid:13) released without having made any payment towards her arrearage.(cid:13) Tolbert was arrested on March 27, 2000, and held until April 13, 2000,(cid:13) when he appeared before Judge Council. Tolbert was incarcerated until(cid:13) June 7, 2000, when he was released "pursuant to[a] state appellate(cid:13) court order which is not related to this suit." Pasqua v. Council, No. 00-(cid:13) 2418, at 3 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2001) (quotations omitted). On June 8, 2000,(cid:13) another hearing was held on Tolbert’s arrearage and after being re-(cid:13) incarcerated, he was soon released and placed in a work/training(cid:13) program.(cid:13) 3. Plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges defendants violated their rights under(cid:13) the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article(cid:13) I, paragraph 8 of the New Jersey Constitution. The District Court also(cid:13) examined plaintiffs’ assertions under the Sixth Amendment of the United(cid:13) States Constitution. Pasqua, No. 00-2418, at 2 n.1. But in plaintiffs’(cid:13) appellate briefs, they do not mention these federal and state(cid:13) constitutional provisions. Because claims not raised in their briefs are(cid:13) waived, we will not consider these claims. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins.(cid:13) Corp. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir. 2000).(cid:13) 3(cid:13) Based on the alleged deprivations and their fear of future(cid:13) deprivations, plaintiffs sued certain New Jersey judges and(cid:13) the administrative director of the New Jersey courts under(cid:13) 42 U.S.C. S 1983. See 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (creating liability for(cid:13) individuals who, "under color of any statute, ordinance,(cid:13) regulation, custom, or usage" of a state, subject others "to(cid:13) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities(cid:13) secured by the Constitution and laws"). According to(cid:13) plaintiffs, their constitutional deprivations occur under(cid:13) court rules and procedures promulgated and followed by(cid:13) defendants.(cid:13) Plaintiffs seek the following declaratory and injunctive(cid:13) relief: a declaration that defendants’ failure to inform them(cid:13) of their right to counsel and to appointed counsel, as well(cid:13) as defendants’ failure to provide counsel, violated their(cid:13) constitutional rights; and an injunction preventing future(cid:13) incarceration without notification of right to counsel and to(cid:13) appointed counsel, and requiring appointed counsel(cid:13) whenever a hearing might result in a deprivation of liberty.(cid:13) Plaintiffs also seek certification of a plaintiff class(cid:13) consisting of indigent New Jersey residents under child(cid:13) support orders who may appear in similar contempt(cid:13) hearings. The proposed defendant class would consist of all(cid:13) New Jersey Superior Court Judges. Finally, plaintiffs seek(cid:13) a preliminary injunction to immediately remedy the current(cid:13) alleged failures of the New Jersey court system. 4(cid:13) The District Court did not reach the merits of the suit.(cid:13) After defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of(cid:13) Answer, the District Court abstained citing Younger v.(cid:13) Harris. Because it abstained, the District Court denied(cid:13) plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and a preliminary(cid:13) injunction. The plaintiffs appeal the decision to abstain and(cid:13) the denial of their motions. Because this appeal comes to(cid:13) us from a grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ.(cid:13) P. 12(b)(6), "[w]e accept all factual allegations in the(cid:13) complaints and all reasonable inferences to be drawn(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. In addition, plaintiffs ask that defendants be required to review the(cid:13) cases of all persons currently incarcerated in violation of the(cid:13) constitutional rights asserted in this suit. Plaintiffs request attorneys’(cid:13) fees and costs.(cid:13) 4(cid:13) therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. We(cid:13) may affirm only if it is certain that no relief could be(cid:13) granted under any set of facts which could be proven."(cid:13) Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1993).(cid:13) II(cid:13) Before turning to the merits of abstention, we address(cid:13) standing. Defendants did not contest plaintiffs’ standing(cid:13) nor did the District Court address the issue. But we are(cid:13) under an "independent obligation" to examine standing,(cid:13) "even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even if(cid:13) the parties fail to raise the issue before us." FW/PBS, Inc.(cid:13) v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990) (citation(cid:13) omitted). Upon review, we agree with the tacit(cid:13) understanding of the parties and the District Court that(cid:13) plaintiffs have standing in this matter.(cid:13) As formulated by the Supreme Court, standing requires(cid:13) the satisfaction of three elements:(cid:13) First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact(cid:13) --an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)(cid:13) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or(cid:13) imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,(cid:13) there must be a causal connection between the injury(cid:13) and the conduct complained of . . . . Third, it must be(cid:13) likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury(cid:13) will be redressed by a favorable decision.(cid:13) Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)(cid:13) (quotations, citations and footnote omitted). Plaintiffs here(cid:13) meet all three prongs of the standing test.(cid:13) First, plaintiffs allege they have been injured because of(cid:13) past constitutional deprivations and are likely to be injured(cid:13) in future child support contempt hearings. Fears of future(cid:13) injury are based on the likelihood that plaintiffs, who(cid:13) allegedly remain indigent, will be summoned again before(cid:13) the New Jersey courts for failing to meet their support(cid:13) obligations. Plaintiffs contend they are unlikely to enjoy(cid:13) their asserted rights in any future hearings. See Scalchi v.(cid:13) Scalchi, 790 A.2d 943, 945 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)(cid:13) ("The current law in New Jersey [does not] require that(cid:13) 5(cid:13) counsel be assigned to an indigent in a support(cid:13) enforcement proceeding."); Prob. Servs. Div., Admin. Office(cid:13) of the Courts, Your Guide to Court Preparation: Answers to(cid:13) Common Questions About Child Support Enforcement(cid:13) Hearings (n.d.) ("A lawyer will not normally be court-(cid:13) appointed for this type of hearing . . . .").(cid:13) Furthermore, there is a causal connection between the(cid:13) alleged deprivations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and(cid:13) the complained-of conduct by the judges and administrator(cid:13) who promulgate and follow the current court practice.(cid:13) Finally, plaintiffs’ injuries could be redressed by a favorable(cid:13) ruling of a federal court declaring the actions of the New(cid:13) Jersey courts unconstitutional and issuing the appropriate(cid:13) injunctions.(cid:13) Our view on standing is in accord with most decisions(cid:13) rendered in similar suits. In challenges to current child(cid:13) support contempt hearings and to threatened future(cid:13) hearings, courts have explicitly held that plaintiffs have(cid:13) standing. E.g., Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 5 n.11 (6th(cid:13) Cir. 1980) (finding standing for plaintiffs demanding right(cid:13) to appointed counsel and other due process rights in future(cid:13) child support hearings); Johnson v. Zurz, 596 F. Supp. 39,(cid:13) 42-43 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (finding standing for plaintiffs(cid:13) demanding right to appointed counsel in current and future(cid:13) child support hearings); Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp.(cid:13) 1318, 1326-28 (D. Conn. 1984) (similar to Parker ). Other(cid:13) courts have assumed that plaintiffs have standing without(cid:13) directly addressing the issue. E.g., Henkel v. Bradshaw,(cid:13) 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973); Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F.(cid:13) Supp. 969 (S.D. Ohio 1981).5(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. We are aware of only one similar case in which a court held a plaintiff(cid:13) did not have standing, but that case, Mann v. Hendrian, 871 F.2d 51(cid:13) (7th Cir. 1989), is distinguishable. Mann focused on prospective relief for(cid:13) one individual to protect against alleged constitutional deprivations by a(cid:13) single judge. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit believed the(cid:13) plaintiff ’s alleged future injury was too speculative because he failed to(cid:13) show he would likely appear before the judge in question in any future(cid:13) hearing. Id. at 53. Moreover, the court believed the relief sought was, in(cid:13) part, unnecessary because, at the time of his federal suit, Mann knew of(cid:13) his right to counsel at state contempt hearings and thus did not need an(cid:13) order forcing the state court judge to inform him of this right. Id. at 52-(cid:13) 53.(cid:13) 6(cid:13) This suit focuses on a cognizable past injury for which(cid:13) declaratory relief is sought. The suit also seeks to prevent(cid:13) future injury for all indigents, notably those unaware of the(cid:13) rights alleged here, who will appear in child support(cid:13) contempt hearings before any New Jersey Superior Court(cid:13) judge. Hence, the injury here is not conjectural or(cid:13) hypothetical nor is the efficacy of the sought remedy(cid:13) speculative.(cid:13) III(cid:13) Turning to the merits, "[w]e exercise plenary review over(cid:13) the legal determinations of whether the requirements for(cid:13) Younger abstention have been met." FOCUS v. Allegheny(cid:13) County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1996). If the requirements have been met, "we review the(cid:13) district court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion."(cid:13) Id.(cid:13) In Younger, which involved a First Amendment-based(cid:13) challenge to California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act, the(cid:13) Supreme Court held that, unless there were extraordinary(cid:13) circumstances, federal courts should not enjoin pending(cid:13) state criminal prosecutions. 401 U.S. 37. The ruling was(cid:13) based on traditional principles of equity and on(cid:13) considerations of comity. Id. at 43-44. Younger defined(cid:13) comity as "a proper respect for state functions, a(cid:13) recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of(cid:13) a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance(cid:13) of the belief that the National Government will fare best if(cid:13) the States and their institutions are left free to perform(cid:13) their separate functions in their separate ways." Id. at 44.6(cid:13) Since Younger, the Supreme Court has extended the(cid:13) doctrine to bar federal interference in other types of state(cid:13) proceedings. Younger has been applied to civil enforcement(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 6. In Samuels v. Mackell, a case decided on the same day as Younger, the(cid:13) Court held that "the same equitable principles relevant to the propriety(cid:13) of an injunction must be taken into consideration by federal . . . courts(cid:13) in determining whether to issue a declaratory judgment, and that where(cid:13) an injunction would be impermissible under these principles, declaratory(cid:13) relief should ordinarily be denied as well." 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971).(cid:13) 7(cid:13) proceedings and to other civil proceedings "involving certain(cid:13) orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’(cid:13) ability to perform their judicial functions." New Orleans(cid:13) Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,(cid:13) 368 (1989) (listing Court cases that have expanded the(cid:13) doctrine). Younger has also been applied to certain state(cid:13) administrative proceedings. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v.(cid:13) Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986); Middlesex(cid:13) County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.(cid:13) 423 (1982). The boundaries for the application of the(cid:13) doctrine remain somewhat elusive. But from its inception,(cid:13) it has been clear that Younger abstention only comes into(cid:13) play when an important state interest is implicated.(cid:13) We have framed a test to determine when Younger (cid:13) abstention is appropriate. In order for a federal court to(cid:13) abstain under the Younger doctrine:(cid:13) (1) there [must be] ongoing state proceedings that are(cid:13) judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings [must](cid:13) implicate important state interests; and (3) the state(cid:13) proceedings [must] afford an adequate opportunity to(cid:13) raise federal claims. Even if the necessary three(cid:13) predicates exist, however, Younger abstention is not(cid:13) appropriate if the federal plaintiff can establish that (1)(cid:13) the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith(cid:13) or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other(cid:13) extraordinary circumstances exist . . . such that(cid:13) deference to the state proceeding will present a(cid:13) significant and immediate potential for irreparable(cid:13) harm to the federal interests asserted.(cid:13) Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing(cid:13) Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432, 435).(cid:13) All three predicates exist here. Moreover, there is no(cid:13) showing of bad faith, harassment or some other(cid:13) extraordinary circumstance, which might make abstention(cid:13) inappropriate. As such, we conclude the District Court was(cid:13) correct in abstaining in this suit.(cid:13) A. Pending Proceeding(cid:13) Ensuring the provision of child support is a function(cid:13) particular to the states. New Jersey law provides New(cid:13) 8(cid:13) Jersey courts with the authority to order and direct the(cid:13) payment of child support. In part, the statute reads:(cid:13) Pending any matrimonial action brought in this State(cid:13) or elsewhere, or after judgment of divorce or(cid:13) maintenance, whether obtained in this State or(cid:13) elsewhere, the court may make such order . . . as to(cid:13) the care, custody, education and maintenance of the(cid:13) children, or any of them, as the circumstances of the(cid:13) parties and the nature of the case shall render fit,(cid:13) reasonable and just . . . .(cid:13) N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:34-23.(cid:13) Each plaintiff here is under a child support order. Each(cid:13) order requires continual involvement by the New Jersey(cid:13) courts. Under New Jersey law, parents are obligated to(cid:13) provide support until a child is emancipated. Newburgh v.(cid:13) Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1037 (N.J. 1982).7 As such,(cid:13) plaintiffs have been, and will remain, under their child(cid:13) support orders for many years. Throughout the duration of(cid:13) the order, the New Jersey courts are charged with(cid:13) monitoring, enforcing and modifying the child support(cid:13) obligations. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:17-56.9a (providing for(cid:13) review and modification of child support orders); N.J.R. 5:7-(cid:13) 5 (providing for monitoring and enforcement of child(cid:13) support orders, including the institution of contempt(cid:13) hearings if obligors fail to make payments); N.J.R. 5:25-3(cid:13) (explaining the jurisdiction, duties, powers and(cid:13) responsibilities of Child Support Hearing Officers). As is(cid:13) apparent, the New Jersey courts have performed their(cid:13) delegated functions with respect to plaintiffs’ child support(cid:13) orders.(cid:13) Plaintiffs contend that, because they are not currently(cid:13) appearing or scheduled to appear in any particular child(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 7. Emancipation can occur upon a variety of events taking place. The(cid:13) "[a]ttainment of age [eighteen] establishes prima facie, but not(cid:13) conclusive, proof of emancipation." Newburgh , 443 A.2d at 1037. As(cid:13) such, parents may be required to provide for a child who is older than(cid:13) eighteen, including contributing toward the costs of higher education. Id.(cid:13) at 1038-39; see also Gac v. Gac, 796 A.2d 951, 955-58 (N.J. Sup. Ct.(cid:13) App. Div. 2002) (explaining that a father may have to contribute toward(cid:13) the costs of his daughter’s college education).(cid:13) 9(cid:13) support hearing, including a contempt hearing, there is no(cid:13) "ongoing" or "pending" proceeding.8 This argument may(cid:13) carry weight in other types of suits. But given plaintiffs’(cid:13) specific claims here and the particular nature of child(cid:13) support orders, the argument is unavailing.9(cid:13) In seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs(cid:13) focus retrospectively and prospectively. To the extent(cid:13) plaintiffs address past contempt proceedings, review is(cid:13) barred by Younger. Once a party has appeared in state(cid:13) court and has had "an opportunity to present [its] federal(cid:13) claims in the state proceedings," a federal court normally(cid:13) should refrain from hearing the claims. Juidice v. Vail, 430(cid:13) U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (emphasis in original). The"party . . .(cid:13) must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking(cid:13) relief in the District Court, unless he can bring himself(cid:13) within one of the exceptions specified in Younger." Huffman,(cid:13) 420 U.S. at 608.10 Plaintiffs here had ample opportunity to(cid:13) raise any constitutional claims at their state contempt(cid:13) hearings. They also could have appealed any adverse(cid:13) decision to higher courts. See infra Section III.C. Instead,(cid:13) they impermissibly attempted to bypass the state system(cid:13) and to seek relief in federal court.(cid:13) Addressing prospective injunctive relief, plaintiffs’(cid:13) requested remedies will undeniably interfere with pending(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 8. The adjectives "ongoing" and "pending" are used interchangeably in(cid:13) the caselaw. References to "ongoing" or "pending" proceedings are meant(cid:13) "to distinguish state proceedings which have already commenced from(cid:13) those which are merely incipient or threatened." Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,(cid:13) 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975).(cid:13) 9. In contrast to child support orders, which endure for many years and(cid:13) require continual state court involvement, most criminal and civil actions(cid:13) are single, discrete matters, which have easily identifiable starting and(cid:13) endpoints. That state courts continually monitor, enforce and modify(cid:13) child support orders makes these particular procedures unique.(cid:13) 10. Similarly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine restricts lower federal court(cid:13) review of state-court judgments and evaluation of constitutional claims(cid:13) that are "inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [decision] in a(cid:13) judicial proceeding." D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,(cid:13) 483 n.16 (1983); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413(cid:13) (1923). Because here we affirm abstention under Younger, we do not(cid:13) address whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.(cid:13) 10(cid:13) state proceedings. In New Jersey, child support orders and(cid:13) the mechanisms for monitoring, enforcing and modifying(cid:13) them comprise a unique system in continual operation.(cid:13) Each plaintiff here is party to an open case that will not(cid:13) terminate until the child support order is finally(cid:13) discharged. The New Jersey courts retain continuing,(cid:13) exclusive jurisdiction over these matters, whether the(cid:13) claims are intrastate or interstate, see N.J. Stat. Ann.(cid:13) S 2A:4-30.65 et seq., and the state courts constantly(cid:13) monitor plaintiffs’ compliance with their orders. The New(cid:13) Jersey Probation Division, an arm of the state judiciary, is(cid:13) charged with oversight and reporting failures in meeting(cid:13) support obligations. N.J.R. 5:7-5. The Probation Division(cid:13) and the New Jersey courts are conferred with authority to(cid:13) ensure that payments are made and to remedy any failures(cid:13) to pay. Id.11 A New Jersey Superior Court judge may(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 11. The extent of the state courts’ involvement in child support matters(cid:13) is exemplified in New Jersey Court Rule 5:7-5. The Rule is entitled:(cid:13) Failure to Pay; Enforcement by the Court or a Party; Income(cid:13) Withholding for Child Support; Suspension and Revocation of(cid:13) Licenses for Failure to Support Dependents; Execution of Assets for(cid:13) Child Support; Child Support Judgments and Post-Judgment(cid:13) Interest.(cid:13) N.J.R. 5:7-5. As the title suggests, the Rule provides for various means(cid:13) by which the New Jersey courts, and the Probation Division in specific,(cid:13) can secure the payment of child support obligations.(cid:13) Of particular note is the continual monitoring by the Probation(cid:13) Division, which may lead to the institution of contempt hearings if a(cid:13) failure to pay is not quickly remedied. In part, the Rule reads:(cid:13) (a) Contempt and Relief in Aid of Litigant’s Rights. If a person fails(cid:13) to make payments or provide health insurance coverage as directed(cid:13) by an order or judgment, the Probation Division responsible for(cid:13) monitoring and enforcing compliance shall notify such person by(cid:13) mail that such failure may result in the institution of contempt(cid:13) proceedings. Upon the accumulation of a support arrearage equal to(cid:13) or in excess of the amount of support payable for 14 days or failure(cid:13) to provide health insurance coverage as ordered, the Probation(cid:13) Division shall file a verified statement setting forth the facts(cid:13) establishing disobedience of the order or judgment. The court . . .(cid:13) may then, in its discretion, institute contempt proceedings . . . and(cid:13) an aggrieved party, or the Probation Division on that party’s behalf,(cid:13) may apply to the court for relief . . . .(cid:13) N.J.R. 5:7-5.(cid:13) 11(cid:13) "revise[ ] and alter" orders "from time to time as(cid:13) circumstances may require." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:34-23.(cid:13) Any party, including plaintiffs here, at any time, may(cid:13) request modification of a support order. See N.J. Stat. Ann.(cid:13) S 2A:17-56.9a.(cid:13) For purposes of Younger, such a comprehensive and fluid(cid:13) system designed to address the ever-present and ever-(cid:13) changing realities of child support orders must be viewed(cid:13) as a whole, rather than as individual, discrete hearings.(cid:13) Plaintiffs have acknowledged as much. Their request for(cid:13) prospective injunctive relief acknowledges that because of(cid:13) their indigency and continued arrearages, they will be(cid:13) subject to future ongoing contempt proceedings. Thus their(cid:13) request for federal court intervention to prevent alleged(cid:13) future constitutional violations constitutes impermissible(cid:13) interference with pending state proceedings.(cid:13) This holding is in accord with Younger. As the Supreme(cid:13) Court has explained, part of the purpose of Younger(cid:13) abstention is to avoid "duplicative legal proceedings" and(cid:13) the "disruption of the state . . . justice system." Steffel v.(cid:13) Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974); see also Juidice, 430(cid:13) U.S. at 336. Federal court ruling and relief here would(cid:13) address issues that plaintiffs can raise in their own cases(cid:13) currently pending in the New Jersey courts. Federal ruling(cid:13) and relief also would interfere with and disrupt the New(cid:13) Jersey court system, especially if the federal court must(cid:13) monitor and enforce the state courts’ compliance with a(cid:13) federal order. See Parker, 626 F.2d at 8 (stating that a(cid:13) federal order requiring state courts to provide appointed(cid:13) counsel and other asserted due process rights would(cid:13) necessitate continual federal court monitoring of the state(cid:13) courts). Moreover, a federal court ruling could be(cid:13) "interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court’s(cid:13) ability to enforce constitutional principles," a suggestion the(cid:13) Younger doctrine seeks to avoid. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462.(cid:13) B. Important State Interest(cid:13) New Jersey has an overriding interest in ordering,(cid:13) monitoring, enforcing and modifying child support(cid:13) obligations. Any ruling in this action would surely affect(cid:13) this interest. As such, the second predicate of our Younger(cid:13) test is satisfied.(cid:13) 12(cid:13) Two Supreme Court cases in particular illuminate our(cid:13) analysis. In Juidice v. Vail, the Supreme Court concluded(cid:13) that abstention under Younger was appropriate with(cid:13) respect to pending contempt hearings. 430 U.S. at 328-30.(cid:13) According to the Court, a "State’s interest in the contempt(cid:13) process, through which it vindicates the regular operation(cid:13) of its judicial system, so long as that system itself affords(cid:13) the opportunity to pursue federal claims within it, is surely(cid:13) an important interest. . . . [W]e think it is of sufficiently(cid:13) great import to require application of the principles" in(cid:13) Younger and its progeny. Id. at 335. After Juidice, the Court(cid:13) applied the Younger framework to determine whether(cid:13) abstention was appropriate when a corporation challenged(cid:13) the legality of certain post-judgment procedures in Texas.(cid:13) Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). In Pennzoil,(cid:13) the Court recognized "the importance to the States of(cid:13) enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts." Id. at(cid:13) 13.(cid:13) Juidice and Pennzoil underline a state’s interest in the(cid:13) proper functioning of its court system, especially its(cid:13) procedures for enforcing court orders. This case implicates(cid:13) the operation of the New Jersey judicial system. Contempt(cid:13) hearings are an integral part of child support enforcement.(cid:13) As the Supreme Court has highlighted a state’s interest in(cid:13) judicial administration generally, and in the coercive effect(cid:13) of contempt hearings specifically, we believe that New(cid:13) Jersey’s interest here is of "sufficiently great import" to(cid:13) satisfy the second prong of the Younger test. Juidice, 430(cid:13) U.S. at 335.(cid:13) Other Supreme Court cases provide an alternative(cid:13) rationale to support our conclusion. Under the Younger(cid:13) doctrine, when a state seeks to vindicate its own policies as(cid:13) a party to a pending state proceeding, an important state(cid:13) interest often is implicated. Although Younger itself involved(cid:13) a criminal prosecution, the doctrine has been applied to(cid:13) restrict federal interference with state civil proceedings. See,(cid:13) e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (state instituted a(cid:13) child abuse proceeding); Trainor v. Hernandez , 431 U.S.(cid:13) 434 (1977) (state sought to use prejudgment attachment(cid:13) procedures to collect money allegedly owed to it); Huffman,(cid:13) 420 U.S. 592 (state sought to close down a movie theater(cid:13) 13(cid:13) through a nuisance suit). Here, New Jersey may act as a(cid:13) party in state court proceedings to ensure that children(cid:13) under its jurisdiction receive proper support,12 thereby(cid:13) vindicating its own state policies.(cid:13) C. Adequate Opportunity To Raise Federal Claims(cid:13) Addressing the third predicate, "the burden on this point(cid:13) rests on the federal plaintiff to show that state procedural(cid:13) law barred presentation of [its] claims." Pennzoil, 481 U.S.(cid:13) at 14 (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs have offered no reason(cid:13) why their claims could not be fully heard by New Jersey(cid:13) courts. Moreover, defendants contend plaintiffs would(cid:13) encounter no difficulty adjudicating their claims in the New(cid:13) Jersey courts. Defendants’ contentions are undisputed by(cid:13) plaintiffs and we find no reason to doubt them. Therefore(cid:13) we hold the third predicate of the Younger test is also(cid:13) satisfied.(cid:13) Plaintiffs have the opportunity to raise their claims in any(cid:13) child support hearing and to appeal adverse decisions(cid:13) through the state appellate system and eventually to the(cid:13) United States Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C.S 1257. Under(cid:13) New Jersey law, child support matters are heard in the(cid:13) Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family(cid:13) Part. See N.J.R. 5:1-1, 1983 explanatory note (The "Family(cid:13) Part of the Chancery Division [is] a co-equal unit of the(cid:13) Superior Court . . . [and is part of] a single integrated(cid:13) statewide trial court of general jurisdiction."); N.J.R. 5:1-2(cid:13) (listing "actions . . . cognizable in the Family Part"). As a(cid:13) consequence, there is a continuing, open and available(cid:13) forum to raise any issues. Child support obligors are free to(cid:13) raise their issues at any time at any child support hearing(cid:13) or contempt hearing. Obligors can appeal, as of right,(cid:13) decisions of the Family Part to the Appellate Division.(cid:13) N.J.R. 2:2-3(a)(1) ("[A]ppeals may be taken to the Appellate(cid:13) Division as of right . . . from final judgments of the Superior(cid:13) Court trial divisions . . . ."); see also N.J.R. 5:1-1, 1983(cid:13) explanatory note ("[A]ll rules . . . applicable to Superior(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 12. Acting as a party includes appearances by the Probation Division(cid:13) seeking enforcement of orders on behalf of aggrieved individuals. See(cid:13) N.J.R. 5:7-5 ("[A]n aggrieved party, or the Probation Division on that(cid:13) party’s behalf, may apply to the court for relief . . . .").(cid:13) 14(cid:13) Court actions continue applicable to actions cognizable in(cid:13) the Family Part unless otherwise provided . . . ."). Appeal to(cid:13) the New Jersey Supreme Court is available as of right or on(cid:13) certification depending on the specifics of the case. N.J.R.(cid:13) 2:2-1.(cid:13) D. No Bad Faith, Harassment or Other Extraordinary(cid:13) Circumstance(cid:13) Plaintiffs have not directly challenged the District Court’s(cid:13) finding of no bad faith, harassment or other extraordinary(cid:13) circumstance, which might make abstention inappropriate.(cid:13) We have no reason to disturb the District Court’s holding.(cid:13) See Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 437(cid:13) (agreeing with district court’s ruling when respondents did(cid:13) not challenge "the findings of the District Court that there(cid:13) was no bad faith or harassment . . . and no other(cid:13) extraordinary circumstances [were] presented to indicate(cid:13) that abstention would not be appropriate").(cid:13) Plaintiffs cite one New Jersey decision from the Appellate(cid:13) Division, but it does not change our analysis. In Scalchi v.(cid:13) Scalchi, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division(cid:13) stated that "[t]he current law in New Jersey[does not](cid:13) require that counsel be assigned to an indigent in a support(cid:13) enforcement proceeding." 790 A.2d 943, 945 (N.J. Super.(cid:13) Ct. App. Div. 2002). But this statement does not(cid:13) demonstrate that the New Jersey courts are resistant to(cid:13) adjudicating indigent parents’ constitutional rights. We are(cid:13) confident that any constitutional challenge to state court(cid:13) practice would receive proper consideration by the New(cid:13) Jersey courts.13(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 13. The New Jersey Supreme Court has suggested indigent defendants(cid:13) should be afforded counsel "whenever the particular nature of the charge(cid:13) is such that imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude is(cid:13) actually threatened or is a likelihood on conviction." Rodriguez v.(cid:13) Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223 (N.J. 1971). Moreover, after the New(cid:13) Jersey Supreme Court decision, the United States Supreme Court(cid:13) expressed a similar sentiment when it stated there is a "presumption(cid:13) that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel . . . when, if he(cid:13) loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty." Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc.(cid:13) Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).(cid:13) 15(cid:13) E. Similar Cases(cid:13) In concluding that abstention is appropriate here, we are(cid:13) in general accord with most decisions in similar suits. At(cid:13) the same time, we recognize that, because of different fact(cid:13) patterns and legal rationales, there is some variance in the(cid:13) opinions. In Parker v. Turner, the Court of Appeals for the(cid:13) Sixth Circuit held that abstention was appropriate when(cid:13) plaintiffs sought certain due process rights, including right(cid:13) to appointed counsel, in future child support hearings. 626(cid:13) F.2d 1. In part, the Sixth Circuit reached its holding by(cid:13) relying on the principles enunciated in O’Shea v. Littleton,(cid:13) 414 U.S. 488 (1974).14 Parker , 626 F.2d at 8 ("We find(cid:13) O’Shea controlling. The relief which the plaintiffs seek in(cid:13) this case would necessarily require monitoring of the(cid:13) manner in which the state juvenile judges conducted(cid:13) contempt hearings in non-support cases."). While we need(cid:13) not rely on the rationale of O’Shea, we agree with Parker(cid:13) that federal courts should avoid improper interference with(cid:13) state proceedings. See 626 F.2d at 6, 8. In Henkel v.(cid:13) Bradshaw, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held(cid:13) that abstention under Younger was appropriate when a(cid:13) child support "contempt proceeding [was] still pending and(cid:13) [would] not be set for a hearing on the merits until the(cid:13) resolution of [the federal] action." 483 F.2d at 1388 n.5.(cid:13) Also, in Johnson v. Zurz, 596 F. Supp. 39, and Mastin v.(cid:13) Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, federal trial courts suggested(cid:13) that abstention might normally be appropriate when(cid:13) plaintiffs sought due process rights in child support(cid:13) hearings. Those courts, however, held that abstention was(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 14. In O’Shea, plaintiffs sought to enjoin allegedly discriminatory state(cid:13) court practices. The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs failed to allege an(cid:13) actual case or controversy. 414 U.S. at 493. But even if the complaint(cid:13) presented a case or controversy, the Court said it would conclude(cid:13) plaintiffs failed to state "an adequate basis for equitable relief." Id. at(cid:13) 499. The Court suggested that any relief would impermissibly require(cid:13) "unwarranted anticipatory interference in the state criminal process by(cid:13) means of continuous or piecemeal interruptions of the state proceedings(cid:13) by litigation in the federal courts." Id. at 500. Such interference would be(cid:13) "nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings(cid:13) which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger(cid:13) . . . and related cases sought to prevent." Id.(cid:13) 16(cid:13) inappropriate in the particular cases due to "extraordinary(cid:13) circumstances," which denied plaintiffs the ability to press(cid:13) their claims adequately in state court. Johnson , 596 F.(cid:13) Supp. at 44; Mastin, 526 F. Supp. at 971. 15(cid:13) IV(cid:13) Having decided to abstain under Younger, the District(cid:13) Court stated that "[s]ince plaintiffs’ complaint will be(cid:13) dismissed, plaintiffs’ requests for certification of plaintiff(cid:13) and defendant classes; and for a preliminary injunction(cid:13) must be denied." Pasqua, No. 00-2418, at 14. Because we(cid:13) agree that abstention is appropriate, we will affirm the(cid:13) denial of the motions.(cid:13) V(cid:13) Because all three predicates of the Younger test exist and(cid:13) because there is no bad faith, harassment or other(cid:13) extraordinary circumstance, which might make abstention(cid:13) inappropriate, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment(cid:13) to abstain. We do not intend to minimize the importance of(cid:13) the rights asserted. But we believe this constitutional(cid:13) challenge should be raised in the New Jersey courts.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 15. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also held, in an(cid:13) unpublished opinion, that Younger abstention was appropriate when a(cid:13) party alleged in federal court that a child custody and support award(cid:13) issued in Virginia violated the First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth(cid:13) Amendments. See Etlin v. Robb, 458 U.S. 1112 (1982) (discussing Etlin(cid:13) v. Dalton, 673 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1981), in dissent from denial of(cid:13) certiorari).(cid:13) We are aware of only one case with which there is significant discord.(cid:13) In Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318, the federal trial court held, after(cid:13) conducting a Younger test, that abstention was not appropriate when a(cid:13) plaintiff sought right to counsel and appointed counsel in future child(cid:13) support contempt hearings. This decision was based on the conclusion(cid:13) that there were no ongoing state proceedings at issue. Id. at 1331. But(cid:13) as noted, we believe that given the unique ongoing nature of child(cid:13) support orders and the particular mechanisms for monitoring, enforcing,(cid:13) and modifying these orders, plaintiffs’ request for relief impermissibly(cid:13) asks the federal courts to interfere with pending state proceedings.(cid:13) 17(cid:13) We will affirm the District Court’s denial of plaintiffs’(cid:13) motions for class certification and a preliminary injunction.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 18
