Anthony Ralph Stephens v. Angela Michelle Stephens

Aug 5, 2026
03-26-00589-CV

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This attempted appeal arises out of a post-decree enforcement action in which Angela Michelle Stephens filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to compel the return of her child. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 157.371-.376. Anthony Ralph Stephens filed a notice of appeal challenging the court‘s issuance of the writ. Anthony1 also attempts to appeal the trial court‘s order denying his request for a temporary restraining order.

On July 14, 2026, the Clerk of this Court sent Anthony a notice requesting that he file a response by July 24, 2026 explaining how this Court may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal and advising him that failure to file a response may result in dismissal of the appeal. Anthony has not filed a response.

A trial court‘s order granting or denying a writ of habeas corpus in a child custody case is not an appealable order. Gray v. Rankin, 594 S.W.2d 409, 409 (Tex. 1980);2 Fox v. Perez, No. 14-15-00085-CV, 2016 WL 93526, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). The grant or denial of a temporary restraining order is generally not appealable. See In re Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm‘n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. 2002) (addressing grant of temporary restraining order). Whether an order is a nonappeable temporary restraining order or an appealable temporary injunction depends on the order‘s characteristics and function, not its title. Nikolouzos v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 680-81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In his notice of appeal, Anthony refers to the order as one denying his request for a temporary restraining order and the record does not include an order denying a request for a temporary injunction. Accordingly, the court‘s order is a nonappealable interlocutory order.

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

Karin Crump, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: August 5, 2026

Notes

1
Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their given names for clarity.
2
Gray interpreted former Texas Family Code section 14.10(a), Act of May 25, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, sec. 14.10(a), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1426 (“If the right to possession of a child is presently governed by a court order, the court in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the right to possession of the child shall compel return of the child to the relator if and only if it finds that the relator is presently entitled to possession by virtue of the court order.“). Current Texas Family Code section 157.372(a) is substantially the same as former section 14.10(a) and provides that, subject to Texas Family Code chapter 152 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738A), “if the right to possession of a child is governed by a court order, the court in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the right to possession of the child shall compel return of the child to the relator only if he court finds that the relator is entitled to possession under the order.” Tex. Fam. Code § 157.372(a).