84 Iowa 355 | Iowa | 1892
The policy in suit contained a provision as follows: “If the assured shall have or shall hereafter make any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on the property hereby insured or any part thereof, without the consent of this company written thereon, then and in every such case this policy shall become void.” The company consented to addi
The policy also contains the following provision: “Persons sustaining loss or damage by fire shall forthwith give notice of said loss to the company, and as soon after as possible render a particular account of such loss, signed and sworn to by them, stating whether any and what other insurance has been made on the same property, giving copies of the written portions of all policies thereon; * * * and until such proofs are procured * * * the loss shall not be payable.”
After the fire the plaintiffs made proof of loss in writing, and the defendant company sent its agent to adjust the loss. The loss occurred October 24, 1884. The written proof of loss made thereafter contained the following as to additional insurance: “That, in addition to the sum insured by said policy on said property, there was concurrent other insurance made thereon to the amount of twenty-four thousand dollars, as particularly specified in schedule A hereto attached, besides which there was no other insurance thereon.” The company required the plaintiffs to file additional proofs, “giving copies of the written portions of all policies thereon,” except the policy in suit. This the plaintiffs did, at an expense of some twenty-five dollars. The agent of the company sent to make the adjustment was one A. A. Crandall, and during his investigations he received information that there was excessive additional insurance, and by letter he informed the general agent of the company of the fact. This information was not obtained by Crandall from an exa.mina.tion of the policies, but from conversations with
The appellees state the following as the rule of their contention: “If in any negotiations or transactions with the insured, after knowledge of the forfeiture, the insurance company recognizes the continued validity of the policy, or does acts based thereon, or requires the insured by virtue thereof to do some act or incur some trouble or expense, the forfeiture is, as a' matter of law, waived.” They cite for its‘support Hollis v. State Ins. Co., 65 Iowa, 454. "Without accepting the rule as broadly as stated, [it may be said that the rule is correct, where the company, with full knowledge of the facts out of which the forfeiture of the policy arose, by its acts recognized the policy as a valid and subsisting contract, and induced the plaintiff to act in that belief, and to incur trouble and expense; such action would be a waiver of the condition under which the forfeiture arose. But the facts in this case do not bring it within the rule. The record is not authority for saying, that, when the company required the additional proofs, it was in full possession of the facts as to the excessive insurance. It is true that the company had information of that character, but it does not appear to have been such that the company could know it was true. The plaintiffs had not admitted it. They had stated in their proofs that the additional insurance on the property was twenty-four thousand dollars, but it was stated in the proofs that nothing had been done, by or with the privity or consent of the plaintiffs, to violate the conditions of the policy or render it void. Thus, upon the face of the proofs made, the plaintiffs were maintaining that there was no excessive insurance that avoided the policy. The written proofs were a contradiction of the information received through Crandall, and it is not to be said, under such a state of facts, that the company, in ask
The judgment is bevebsed.