*1 Antanovich, John ANTANOVICH and Nellie Gary Co-Administrators the Estate of Antanovich, deceased, Appellants, Lee
v. COMPANY, Appellee. ALLSTATE INSURANCE Cynthia BRENDLINGER, Individually and as Administratrix of Brendlinger,
the Estate of guardian Kenneth and as natural Brendlinger, Brendlinger of Traci Jodie and Lonnie Brend- linger; Brendlinger, Brendlinger and Traci Jodie and Lonnie Brendlinger, individually, Appellants,
v. COMPANY, Appellee. ALLSTATE INSURANCE Antanovich, John ANTANOVICH and Nellie Gary Co-Administrators of the Estate of Antanovich, Lee deceased
v. COMPANY, Appellee. ALLSTATE INSURANCE Appeal of PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION. WILSON, Administrator, Gerald Alan C.T.A. of the Estate of Wilson, Deceased; Wilson, Eleanor D. and Louis D. as surviv ing spouse on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other Wilson, deceased, survivors Appellants, v. of Eleanor D. COMPANY, Appellee. KEYSTONE INSURANCE Supreme of Pennsylvania. Court
Argued Sept. 1984.
Decided Feb. *2 Seneca, O’Dell, Anthony Washington, J. Seneca & for in appellants No. 17.
Stephen Faldowski, P. McCloskey, Phillips Washington, & for in appellee No. 17. Slone, H.
Robert Mahady Mahady, for Greensburg, in No. 18. appellants Burns,
Michael William for Pittsburgh, appellee 18. No. Rovner, C. Angino, Angino P.C., Richard & Harrisburg, 19; appellant for No. Slone,
Robert H. for appellee Brendlinger in No. 19. Burns, Michael W. Pittsburgh, Stephen P. McCloskey, Barker, Washington, Chicago, 111., William T. for appellee Allstate Ins. Co. in No. 19. Seneca, J.
Anthony Washington, appellee Antanovich in No. 19. Rovner,
Richard C. Angino, Angino P.C., & Harrisburg, Eli N. Donsky, Donsky, P.C., & Dashevsky, Levin Philadel- phia, for and amicus appellants Pennsylvania curiae Trial Lawyers Ass’n in No. *3 Hutchinson,
Hugh Rebmann, J. Obermayer, Maxwell & Hippel, Philadelphia, for in No. appellee 43. Less, Bazelon, Price, A.
Jeffrey Less Philadelphia, & amicus curiae in No. 43. NIX, C.J., LARSEN, FLAHERTY,
Before and McDER- MOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA PAPADAKOS, and JJ.
OPINION THE OF COURT HUTCHINSON, Justice. 1
Before us are three appeals by
from
of
allowance
orders
Superior Court.
In Antanovich v. Allstate Insurance
Company,
322,
320
Pa.Superior
(1983),
Ct.
(1983), reversed the of Superior judgment Court Westmore- directing payment land Common Pleas of multi- County Wilson v. case, and in the third ple basic loss benefits Keystone Company, Insurance Pa.Superior Ct. (1983), panel Superior of Court vacated the on the of judgment Philadelphia of Common Pleas basis of Antanovich and Brendlinger. en banc All disposition three remanded for of recomputation cases were benefits. cases, appellants each of these have claimed amounts statutory coverage required by excess the No-fault their purchase Act for work loss based on of automobile policies premiums covering insurance payment operation risk of such loss from several automobiles argue or their decedents owned.3 that the they They which 12, 1984, P.L.-, 1984-11, February by 2. Act of No. as amended Act 1984, P.L.-, February No. 1984-12. Allstate, parents Gary In Antanovich v. and administrators of Lee Antanovich sued to recover work loss benefits in the amount of $60,000.00 theory on the that because the no-fault issued vehicles, coverage Allstate covered four the benefits of each should premiums paid by stacked. The Mr. Antanovich for uninsured motor- personal injury protection period ist 21, for the November Chevrolet, May $28.40 1980 to 1981 amounted to on a 1974 Chevrolet, on a on $27.40 $57.00 another 1974 Chevrolet and on $24.00 a 1970 Chevrolet. Mr. and Mrs. Antanovich received $15,000.00 party company from the third tortfeasor’s insurance $15,000. every up four weeks from $578.00 Allstate to a total of Appellants argued they lump had below that were entitled to a sum loss, payment for work which issue was decided in their favor below and not raised before us. *4 Allstate, widow, executrix, Brendlinger In v. the who is also the and Brendlinger brought policy children of Kenneth suit on a no-fault Dodge issued to him Allstate. The covered a 1977 and a premiums paid respectively 1971 Catalina. The for uninsured motor- coverage personal injury protection ist and $4.40 amounted to and paid Brendlinger lump for $13.00 each car. Allstate Mrs. a sum work $13,903.00, $5,000.00 loss benefit of in survivors’ benefits and $1,500.00 expenses. in funeral widower, Wilson, Keystone, In Wilson v. the Louis D. and the administrator, Wilson, Gerald Alan sued to recover an additional $35,000.00 loss, expense $579.50 in work additional in funeral $10,000.00 paid additional for survivors benefits. Premiums had been statutory coverage for and excess on each of two cars. premium of a basic for insurance payment on one vehicle to required entitles them the work benefits by law.4 major they From this ask us premise to infer that premiums of payment additional for of the two decedents, four other their they, cars which owned in entitles them basic work loss of spite benefits their prohibitions against insurance contracts’ such re- multiple support reasoning of this covery. they refer one of introductory legislative “findings” in the No-fault Act’s preamble:
(a) General Findings. Assembly hereby finds and —The declares that:
(3) the maximum feasible restoration of all individuals injured compensation the economic losses of the survivors of all in individuals killed motor vehicle acci- dents on Commonwealth highways, in intrastate com- merce, in activity affecting intrastate commerce purposeful essential to the humane and functioning commerce; 1009.102(a).
40 P.S. § Appellants finding claim that this states a policy which precludes any prohibition contractual of multiple work loss benefits whenever several cars are findings insured. The are, this section of the preamble however, prefatory to the “purposes” of the Act. purposes Those are stated Sub- (b): section
(b) Purposes. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the — policy of the General Assembly to establish at reasonable insurance, purchaser cost system Statewide prompt and adequate basic loss motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims. 1009.102(b). Reading P.S. together particular find- ing and the Act’s purpose we do articulate they believe appellants’ enough theory to overcome a plain unambiguous premium 4. We note record shows the on additional vehicles single policy covered in a is discounted.
73 We, therefore, ground policy. on the provision contract Superior Court. judgment affirm the “stacking” were support arguments Appellants’ Court en presented Superior vigorously and fully (now Judge) Spaeth, President Judge In that court banc. opposing argu- summarized writing majority, for the ments: argue that the Brendlingers do not
The Antanovichs
in some way
or that Allstate
policy
ambiguous,
is
Allstate
Insur
Collister v. Nationwide
misled them.
Life
Cf.
denied,
Co.,
cert.
579,
(1978),
Pa.
Allstate with this definition of the issue, view, but in its a proper understanding of the public policy underlying the No-fault Act leads to the Act, conclusion that stacking prohibited by and that therefore its insurance is valid.
Antanovich, supra, Pa.Superior 326-27, at Ct. at 347-48.
After examining findings purposes in Section 1009.102, of the No-fault 40 P.S. Superior Court § proceeded to set forth analyze the Act’s relevant sub- stantive provisions:
The owner of each vehicle in registered Pennsylvania is (either required provide security insurance or by other- wise) for the payment of basic loss benefits. 40 P.S. occurs, 1009.104. If in resulting an accident injury § victim or the of a survivor deceased victim “is entitled to receive basic loss benefits in accordance provi- with the Id. 1009.201(a). sions of this act.” “obligor pro- The § viding for the security payment basic loss benefits” is required pay regard such benefits “without to fault to thereto, each pursuant individual entitled to the terms and conditions of this act.” Id. 1009.111(b). indicated,
We have already briefly at the beginning part this of our opinion, what are the several different items included within “basic benefits.” To state them fully, provided more are as in they Sections 202 and 103 of the Act: 1009.202 Basic loss benefits
(a) expense Allowable as expense, limits.—Allowable defined in section 103 of this act provided shall be or equivalent in the form provide of a contract required. services
(b) loss, Work loss limits.—Work as in defined section 103 shall provided:
(1) up monthly to a maximum of: (A) one ($1,000) thousand dollars multiplied fraction numerator average whose is the per capita income in this Commonwealth and whose denominator is the average per capita States, income in the United according to the latest available United States Depart- ment of figures; Commerce
(B) amount, the disclosed case of a named who, insured prior resulting the accident in injury, his voluntarily monthly discloses actual earnings to his obligor and agrees writing such obligor with such sum loss; shall measure work
(2) up to a total amount of fifteen thousand dollars *7 ($15,000). (c) Replacement Replacement services services losses. —
loss, as defined in section provided 103 shall be up to a daily ($25) maximum twenty-five dollars for an aggregate of one period year.
(d) loss, Survivors losses. —Survivors as defined in sec- tion 103 provided shall be in an amount not to exceed five ($5,000). thousand dollars 1009.201(a)-(d). P.S. § The term expense” 202(a) “allowable used in Section is defined in Section 103 as follows: expense”
“Allowable means charges reasonable in- for, curred (where or the reasonable value no charges incurred), are needed reasonably and used products, services, and accommodations for:
(A) professional medical care; treatment and (B) health emergency services; (C) medical and services; vocational rehabilitation (D) expenses directly funeral, burial, related to cremation, or other form of disposition of the remains victim, of a deceased not to one exceed thousand five ($1,500); hundred dollars
The term does not include portion charge of a for a clinic, convalescent, room in a hospital, nursing or home, or any other institution engaged providing services, related in excess of a reason-
nursing care and
charge
semiprivate
for
accommoda-
customary
able
tions,
is medically required;
unless more intensive care
loss,
replacement
includable
work
any
amount
loss,
loss.
services
or survivor’s
330-31,
This distinction ...
For
is a
should not be stacked.
loss benefits
recovery
limit. But if
is unlimit-
specified
to avoid a
way
However,
ed,
to stack.
there is another
there is no need
an inten-
clearly
which
manifests
feature of Section
stacked.
not be
tion that basic
102(a)(6)that
of work
recovery
In
in Section
providing
loss,
loss,
and survivor’s loss should
replacement services
amount,”
Assem-
the General
limited to “a reasonable
it meant
“reasonable.”
did not
what
bly
say
$15,000
loss,
for work
say: up
it did
$25
Section
replace-
of one
aggregate period
year
for an
per day
$5,000
loss,
for survivor’s loss.
up
ment services
permit
way
saying
This is
another
simply
amounts, which is what
recovery of more than these
“un-
permitted,
if
would be
happen
stacking were
would
*8
reasonable.”
333,
Id.,
Pa.Superior
320
Ct. at
arguments
with care to the
have listened
We
unper
policy arguments
find their
appellants’ counsels but
Superior Court’s
necessarily approving
suasive. Without
re
the No-fault
since
we hold that
analysis,
entire
enough
clear
void
contains no indication
pealed,
in an insurance contract
unambiguous provision
a plain,
work loss benefits. See Stan
precludes stacking
which
Insurance
Empire
v. American
Blind Co.
dard Venetian
Moreover, in
(1983).
the face
Co.,
300,
77 could have had no reasonable expectation of obtaining stacked benefits.5 opinions
The Court in Antanovich, Brend- Superior linger Wilson are affirmed.
McDERMOTT,J., joins this opinion and files a concur- ring opinion.
LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion in which ZAPPA- LA, J., joins.
McDERMOTT,Justice, concurring. Because of the fundamental differences between the Uninsured Motorist Act1 and the now defunct No-Fault Act2, this case is not controlled by Utica Mutual Insur- Contrisciane, ance Co. v. 328, 504 Pa.
(1984).3 Thus, although I authored the opinion Utica Mutual, I have no hesitation in joining the opinion of the Majority.
LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. This Court has held, in consistently the unin- area, sured motorist multiple coverages under one policy covering more than one vehicle may be cumulated or “stacked” where the insured’s damages exceed the limits of uninsured motorist coverage on a single vehicle. Utica Mutual Contrisciane, Insurance Co. v. 328, 504 Pa. 473 A.2d State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur- (1984); ance Williams, Co. v. 481 Pa. (1978); A.2d 281 Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 (1968). Moreover, A.2d 112 we have required the stacking of uninsured coverages motorist despite various express policy provisions purporting prohibit cumulating 5. See this concurring opinion Blind, writer’s in Standard Venetian supra. 14, 1963, amended, August 1. Act of P.L. 909 1 as 40 P.S. 19, 1974, 2. Act of July P.L. seq., No. 40 P.S. 1009.101 et §§ repealed. since 3. For a discussion of these differences see Kirsch v. Nationwide Co., F.Supp. (W.D.Pa.1982). Insurance *9 benefits, such in an grounds provisions on the
of such public gleaned as both against policy insurance contract are of the Uninsured Motorist goals from the purposes of beneficiary from the that the intended principle Act1 and multiple coverages to when an insurance is entitled Utica Mutual Insur- paid. have multiple premiums been Contrisciane, supra v. at 504 Pa. ance Co.
1010. legitimate
Because I no distinction between perceive No-Fault Pennsylvania Motorist Act and the Uninsured purposes stacking Act2 for the Motor Insurance Vehicle benefits, respec- and no-fault uninsured motorists of the policy provisions I declare the insurance tively, would Companies purporting to Keystone Allstate and Insurance no-fault to void as benefits be prohibit allowing insurance carriers to against public policy. By will additional for no-fault benefits which premiums collect insured has chosen to insure more paid never to the who has single policy, majority than one vehicle under the No-fault Act and has violated purposes frustrated the law, of insurance jurisprudence of the principle a cardinal or she has get paid an insured should what he namely that for. of a motor Act owner required every
The No-fault must operated this Commonwealth vehicle owned covering each such motor vehicle. provide “security” on 1009.104(a). required provided to be Security was P.S. § in 40 P.S. as set forth each for basic vehicle $30,000 1009.202, per payment up and for the accident/$15,000 or death per person bodily injury $5,000 property accident for up per another person 1009.104(a). the scheme created Under damage. 40 P.S. § “insured” be entitled No-fault an would by the a “victim” if he or she was no-fault basic loss benefits accident, of whether regardless in a motor involved vehicle amended, 14, 1963, August 40 P.S. § P.L. 909 as 1. Act of 19, 1974, July No. 40 P.S. 1009.101-1009.701 §§ 2. Act of P.L. 1984-85), repealed. (supp. since *10 the accident occurred while the insured was operating his or her own insured vehicle. See 1009.201(a), P.S. 1009.- §§ 204, In 1009.103. accordance 104(a), with section appellants (or decedents) their purchased insurance to provide the required security on each of their vehicles, which included coverage for basic loss benefits.3 The respective insurance companies (or provided appellants decedents) their with insurance policies drafted as single documents, charged but separate premiums for basic loss benefits coverage provid- ed on each vehicle.4 Despite the fact the insurance companies collected separate premiums for basic loss bene- coverage fits provided vehicle, for each each con- express tained provisions attempting prohibit the stack- ing coverages.5 of such fully 574-575,
3. As set forth majority opinion, more in the at “basic (as expense” loss benefits” include “allowable items defined in 40 P.S. 1009.103), $15,000, up work loss to a “total replacement amount” of year up per services losses for one day, $25 and survivors losses not $5,000. to exceed Keystone 4. Both the policies Allstate and the terminology use the “personal injury protection” required by to cover “basic loss benefits” Reproduced No-fault Act. See Brief and Appellants Record for Wilson Pennsylvania Estate and Lawyers Amicus Curiae Trial Associa- (hereinafter Record) tion Reproduced Wilson Appeal at No. 43 E.D. 5, Docket at Supplemental and Consolidated Repro- Brief and Appellee (hereinafter duced Record for Allstate Insurance Co. Allstate Reproduced Record) at Nos. Appeal 18 and 19 W.D. Docket A, Appendix at lb. policies 5. The Allstate following provision: contained the LIMITS OF LIABILITY Regardless insured, persons policies the number of plans applicable, self-insurance claims made or INSURED MOTOR VE- HICLES applies, to which this liability per- Allstate’s injury protection sonal respect benefits with to BODILY INJURY to any any one ELIGIBLE PERSON in one MOTORVEHICLE accident is limited as follows: (1) payable the maximum amount for WORK LOSS shall not ex- $15,000, ceed monthly limited to a maximum of $1,000 (a) multiplied by average per capita income in Penn- sylvania by average per capita divided income in the United States shown in the Department latest available U.S. of Commerce figures; or (b) monthly earnings actual voluntarily if the NAMED INSURED agrees writing prior involving with Allstate to the accident INJURY, earnings that such shall measure the maximum amount of Allstate; payable WORK LOSS to the NAMED INSURED Contriscane, Utica Mutual Insurance v.Co. supra, this Court considered the “very troublesome issues of cu- mulating under multiple coverages, otherwise ”, ‘stacking’ known as and stated: The in Pennsylvania seminal case on the issue of stack- ing Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Blumling, (1968). 429 Pa. A.2d 112 In that case we voided clause, an “other insurance” and held that “where the loss exceeds the limits of one policy, the insured may proceed policies up under other available to their individu- al limits or to the amount of the actual loss.” Id. 429 *11 Pa. at at 115. in Subsequently, State Farm Williams, Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. 481 Pa. (1978), we held that a policy clause which purported to exclude the cumulation of aby in derogation named insured was of the Uninsured Motor- ist Act. Co., v. Aetna Casualty Sones & 270 Pa.Su- Surety (1979)
per. A.2d 552 the Superior Court held that holding applicable Williams was to liability limita- tion clauses as well as to exclusionary clauses. We agree. import The clear of Harleysville, supra, and Williams, supra, is that any attempt by the insurer diminish the mandated statutorily minimum floor of protection provided by the Uninsured Motorist to, will be considered void as being repugnant and in derogation of, purpose that act. That “floor” apply has been held to to each insured vehicle. See (2) payable the maximum amount for REPLACEMENT SERVICES daily aggregate period year; $25 LOSS is for an of one (3) payable the maximum amount for FUNERAL EXPENSES shall $1,500; not exceed (4) payable the maximum amount for SURVIVOR’S LOSS shall not $5,000. exceed Reproduced Allstate Record at 5b-6b. Keystone policy language, except The contained almost identical personal injury protection that added benefits for work loss purchased, increasing survivor’s loss had been the "maximum amount $35,000 $1,500, payable monthly for work loss” to with a maximum of increasing payable and $10,000. the "maximum amount for survivor’s loss” to Reproduced Wilson Record at 5. Williams, Thus, supra. present in the context we no merit by case in the reliance Utica and/or find on provisions policies Aetna in their purporting liability. limit added). (The
504 Pa. at
473 A.2d at 1010 (emphasis
provisions
policies purporting
liability
those
to limit
prohibiting stacking of
uninsured motorist
multi-vehicle
cov-
erage
substantially
provisions
were
similar to the
involved
in the instant appeal prohibiting stacking of multi-vehicle
benefits.6)
no-fault or basic loss
This Court
then set forth
voiding
the rationale for
anti-stacking provisions
those
permitting stacking
of multiple coverages,
stating:
The
upon
basis
which our Court has justified
first,
that it
the policies sought to
is twofold:
furthers
be accomplished by
Act];
Motorist
[Uninsured
the intended beneficiary
second,
an uninsured
motorist policy is entitled to
when
multiple coverage
multiple premiums have
paid.
been
See
v.
Harleysville
Blumling, supra.
The
grounded
latter rationale is
in the
person
has reasonable expectations when
belief
he pays separate premiums that he has obtained cover-
under
age
separate policies, and
is entitled to
therefore
under each.
*12
Compare
provisions
the
supra,
provi-
set forth in note
with the
case,
policy
sions of
Appellant
the Aetna insurance
in the Utica
Utica’s
99a,
Reproduced
provided:
Record at
which
Liability
Limits of
Regardless
(1) persons
organizations
of the number of
or
who are
(2)
policy,
persons
organizations
Insureds under this
or
who sustain
bodily injury
(3)
property damage,
brought
or
claims made or suits
bodily
(4)
injury
property
on account of
damage,
or
automobiles
policy applies,
or trailers to which this
(a)
liability
Coverage
The limit of
for Uninsured
Motorists
stated
applicable
[$15,000]
person”
the declarations as
to "each
is
limit
the
Company’s liability
damages,
including damages
for all
services,
bodily injury
by
care or loss of
because of
sustained
one
and,
person
any
subject
as the result of
one accident
the above
provisions respecting
person,
liability
each
the limit of
stated in the
[$30,000]
applicable
declarations as
to "each accident”
is the total
Company’s liability
damages, including damages
limit of the
for all
services,
bodily injury
by
for care or loss of
because of
sustained
persons
any
two or more
as the result of
one accident.
The Uninsured Motorist Act was enacted specifically provide coverage to innocent victims of negligent acts of parties. uninsured third The Act was not intended to limit against causes of action tortfeasors, but to assure where recovery tortfeasors are financially unable to pay any judgment awarded. The Act does place any statutory maximum on the amount of coverage any indi- obtain, vidual can only the minimum amount of coverage each insurance policy provide. must Act,
The No-Fault
hand,
on the other
has an entirely
different purpose. The
provides
No-Fault Act
for a spe-
cific
of possible
amount
recovery to be awarded to victims
accidents,
of motor vehicle
regardless
This
of fault.
arrangement allows for prompt compensation to victims.
However, once the
statutory ceilings
exceeded,
are
negligent
is still
party
liable for any further damages
by
caused
his actions. The cause of
against
action
faulty driver
not limited
point. Furthermore,
at this
that,
unlike the
very
fact
Uninsured Motorist
the No-Fault Act does contain
statutory ceilings
in the
majority
applied
7. The
of this
analysis
Court
then
this
to conclude
that, since the decedent Contrisciane was an intended "class one”
beneficiary
family policy,
of the Aetna
but was an incidental "class
beneficiary
Utica,
employer’s
policy
two"
of his
through
fleet
permitted
was
under the
policy.
Aetna
but not under the Utica
337-341,
This conclusion that the No-Fault Act contains statutory on no-fault ceilings or basic loss benefits in recovery is my opinion, First, erroneous two reasons. the Superior Court draws an inference improper legislative from the Findings Purposes. and 40 P.S. 1009.102. That court § acknowledged Finding stressed by appellants, that “the maximum feasible of restoration all individuals and injured compensation of the losses economic of the survivors all individuals killed motor vehicle accidents ... essential to the humane and purposeful functioning commerce,” 1009.102(a)(3), P.S. but was convinced that this Find- § ing mandated of no-fault benefits order to achieve “maximum feasible restoration compensa- ... and view, tion----” In its Finding was outweighed by other Findings expressing the need for statewide, “a low- cost, comprehensive system” and of compensation and fair restoration motor vehicle accident victims their and sur- vivors, (a)(6) 1009.102(a)(4), P.S. (a)(9), and and by the declared “policy the General Assembly to establish at purchaser reasonable cost of insurance, a Statewide system of prompt and basic adequate loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of motor vehicle 1009.102(b). accident victims.” 40 P.S. In my view, the legislative Findings Purposes are neutral as regards stacking I unpersuaded am Superior reasoning Court’s contrary. because, This is so while allowing stacking of basic loss benefits might increase the “low-cost” of the system, hand, on the one prohibiting stacking would reduce the “maximum feasible restoration of all individuals injured compensation of ... economic losses” on the other hand. I agree
And cannot with the Superior Court permit stacking would the system render “unfair” because the owner and insurer of more than one would vehicle receive cumulative basic loss benefits while the owner and
insurer of
one vehicle
only
only
would recover
one unit of
benefits,
loss
a result that
designates
basic
court
“invidious
discrimination.”
320 Pa.Superior Ct.
Secondly, Superior erroneously supports Court its by studying interplay conclusion between several sub- of the No-fault provisions stating: stantive plain Thus the General made its intention Assembly some (“basic that items of respect with medical costs”) should and a limit on recovery rehabilitation imposed (“Payment be of all” such losses should be assured), to other items of loss respect but that with (“work loss, loss”) replacement services survivor’s should be imposed limits on of a recovery (“recovery amount”). implemented by reasonable This intention is benefits, 202 and 103: in providing Sections basic loss no imposed limits are medical and reha- recovery basic costs, imposed bilitative but limits are on recovery loss, replacement work services and survivor’s loss. 102(a)(6) In providing recovery Section work loss, loss, replacement services loss should survivor’s amount,” limited to “a Assem- reasonable General bly say did not what it meant “reasonable.” $15,000 loss, it did for say: up Section work $25 per aggregate period for an of one for day year replace- loss, $5,000 up ment services for loss. survivor’s simply way permit This is another saying amounts, is what recovery more than these which were happen permitted, would would be if ” “unreasonable. added). (emphasis interpretation provisions This is unsound. These indeed establish the “reasonable” amounts of coverage only mandatory where no-fault basic loss coverage is establish an absolute purchased do not they ceiling on —but the amount of basic loss benefits that may be 1009.207, purchased. Section P.S. explicitly re- quired insurance carriers to “offer or obligate themselves to *15 provide (1) added loss benefits including: ... loss excluded from loss by basic benefits limits on expense, allowable loss, loss, work replacement services and survivor’s loss____” 1009.207(a)(1). that, P.S. I would hold in charging premiums additional for each vehicle when a sin- gle premium for basic loss benefits on one vehicle would have sufficed to provide the “reasonable” limits on basic 202, loss in benefits set forth section the compa- insurance nies “obligated” have themselves to provide added loss by stacking benefits the coverages that have for. paid been Another legislature indication the did not intend to place a on ceiling the total amount of loss basic benefits 111(a), recoverable is in contained section 40 P.S. 1009.- 111(a), in provides portion: which relevant
(2) Whenever an individual who or receives is entitled to receive no-fault benefits for an has a claim injury cause of against action other any person causing the as injury upon fault, based a determination of obligor is subrogated rights to the of the only claimant for:
(A) elements of damage compensated for by security for the of no-fault in payment benefits excess of the minimum basic loss required under this act are benefits recoverable; and
(B) the obligor paid has or become obligated pay excess of the mini- accrued or future no-fault benefits mum basic loss required under this act. benefits 207, Under this provision and section it is clear that an insured additional may pay premiums for additional basic loss benefits protection. obligor Where the has made pay- loss in excess of the minimum basic insured
ments to the obligor may become section by established benefits third party insured to sue a rights of the to the subrogated ceiling is a on the Thus there for the excess. in tort insurance carrier without made to be payments the carrier enable that would otherwise rights subrogation tortfeasor; from the over payments recover those benefits”), the carrier’s subro- (“minimum basic ceiling, determination of tort, upon a to sue in based rights gation insured, however, section 202 As to the fault, are revived. mini- establishing as viewed properly is more floor protection. basic loss mum differ in their inter- frequently persons Reasonable and, the No-fault interpreting when legislation pretation divergence of will, by the as evidenced usually they pleas. common in the courts of stacking issue on the opinion Co., Pa.Super. Allstate Insurance Antanovich v. See However, held n. 1. we have A.2d at n. at requires legislation which Act to remedial No-Fault cases where made in doubtful that, if is to be error legislative or the provision of an insurance meaning coverage. unclear, is to be favor the error intent is *16 Co., 502 Pa. 335, Mutual Insurance v. Farm Motley State Farm Mutual (1983); Tubner v. State 340, A.2d 609 466 (1981); 215, 218, A.2d 621 Co., 496 Pa. 436 Insurance 447, 455, 421 Heffner, v. 491 Pa. Insurance Co. Allstate I the more believe (1980). principle, A.2d 629 Given is that it does Act of the No-fault interpretation reasonable of no-fault benefits. stacking prohibit not basic prohibit Act does not No-Fault As the of the insurance benefits, provisions that the it is clear the stacking, while to prohibit purporting herein policies no-fault ben- illusory for multiple premiums charge carriers As invalid. vehicles, should be declared multiple efits on Utica forth, predicated was holding set previously Uninsured of the goals upon policies only not has a person upon also “the belief Motorists but separate premiums pays he expectations when reasonable policies, separate under that he has obtained
87 therefore is entitled to benefits under each.” Utica Mutual Contrisciane, Insurance Co. v. supra at 338, 504 Pa. 473 A.2d Thus, the explicit provisions in the policies therein purporting to limit companies’ the insurance liability for uninsured motorist coverage permitted were not defeat those expectations reasonable insured.
Utica thus perpetuates the long standing principle that insurance contracts are unlike other contracts, most that the principles usual of contract law and interpretation See, be applicable. e.g., Brakeman v. Potomac Co., Insurance 66, 8, 472 Pa. 193, 76 n. 371 A.2d 198 8n. (1977); Johnson v. Concord Co., Mutual Insurance Pa. 450 614, (1973). As the Superior Court stated Co., Sands v. Granite Mutual Insurance Pa.Super. (1974): A.2d Courts rely upon frequently public policy overriding explicit contract, terms in the insurance at least when the contract operate terms would to defeat the reasonable expectations insured, of the because insurance carriers are public affected awith interest and are in a better position to equitably more divide the risk of personal tragedy, insofar as such tragedy can be expressed in dollars Keeton, and cents. See R. Insurance Law 22 (1971). 341-42 citing Johnson v. Concord Mutu- [also Co., al Insurance supra]
The nature of typical non-commercial insurance requires also courts to critically view provisions purporting to limit liability. As Chief Justice Nix observed in Stan- dard Venetian Blind Co. v. Empire American Insurance Co., 503 Pa. (1983) (dissenting opinion), an “insurance essentially contract is a contract of adhesion. Its terms are not bargained but rather dictat- ed Blind, Standard Venetian insurer.” this Court noted that:
in light of the manifest inequality bargaining power *17 between an purchaser insurance company and a of insur- ance, a court on occasion justified deviating from the plain language of a contract insurance. See (court 13 Pa.C.S. 2302 to may refuse enforce contract 88 matter of law if court as a contract clause of any
or of the contract have clause any the contract or deems made”). it the time was at “unconscionable been a imagine is difficult to at 567. It 469 A.2d Pa. at an one which allows contract than more unconscionable it will for which charge premium a company insurance of basic purchase Since any benefits. provide have to never suffices to motor vehicle single on a loss benefits set forth loss benefits the basic insured with provide in the is involved not that vehicle 202 whether section companies insurance to allow accident, is unconscionable it on addi- premiums loss benefits basic charge additional cover- additional refusing provide while tional vehicles age. the orders reasons, I reverse would foregoing
For the
Insurance
v. Allstate
in Antanovich
Court
Superior
v.
Wilson
(1983) and
Co.,
Pa.Super.
495,
v. Marine, INC., INDUSTRIES, corporation, Erie LITTON Industries, trading Erie Inc., as of Litton a division Industries, Appellees. Litton Division of Marine Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of Argued Sept. 22, 1985. Feb.
Decided 28,1985. May Reargument Denied