Anne Arundel County, Maryland and Rodney Price v. Michael H. Reeves
No. 68
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
June 7, 2021
September Term, 2019
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Argued: September 11, 2020
CIVIL LIABILITY — STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION — MEASURE OF DAMAGES — COMPENSATORY DAMAGES — In light of
CIVIL LIABILITY — GROSS NEGLIGENCE — SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE — Legally sufficient evidence was presented at trial to permit a jury to make the finding that Officer Price was grossly negligent when there were specific facts in evidence at trial that the dog was not attacking the police officer, the police officer shot the dog twice while standing in front of the residence, and there were differing accounts of how the dog was positioned when shot.
JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, C.J.
Hotten, J., dissents.
Filed: June 7, 2021
This case affords us the opportunity to address the scope of compensatory damages available in the case of the tortious injury or death of a pet. Resolution of that issue requires our examination of the text of
These questions stem from Anne Arundel County Police Officer Rodney Price‘s fatal shooting of a family dog while carrying out his duties as a police officer. On February 1, 2014, Officer Price encountered Respondent Michael Reeves’ dog, Vern, a Chesapeake Bay retriever, in the front yard of Mr. Reeves’ home. Evidently believing he would be attacked, Officer Price shot Vern twice. The dog died soon thereafter. Mr. Reeves subsequently brought suit alleging, inter alia, that by fatally shooting Vern, Officer Price committed a trespass to Mr. Reeves’ chattel, acted with gross negligence, and violated Mr. Reeves’ rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The case went to trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Reeves, finding that Officer Price committed a trespass to Mr. Reeves’ chattel, acted with gross negligence, and violated Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The jury awarded no damages for the constitutional violations, $10,000 for the trespass to chattel claim, and $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages for the gross negligence claim. The circuit court then reduced the gross negligence damages to $200,000 pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA“).
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in part and held in an unreported divided decision that
For reasons that follow we hold that
Facts and Procedural History
The Incident
On February 1, 2014, as part of an ongoing investigation into a spate of burglaries in a residential neighborhood in Anne Arundel County, Officer Price was going door-to-door seeking relevant information. Officer Price, the only witness to the events that ensued immediately thereafter, would later testify at trial to the following. At approximately 4:45 p.m., Officer Price approached Mr. Reeves’ residence from the house next door. He saw a light on inside and noticed that some of the windows were open. He also observed two doors at the front entrance to the house. One door was open; a second door, at trial variously described as a screen door and a transparent storm door, was closed. Officer Price determined from those indicators that the house was occupied at the time. He testified that he had no reason to believe that any member of the Reeves family had any involvement with the burglaries and he did not have any “cause for concern” as he approached the house.
Officer Price walked onto the front porch of Mr. Reeves’ home and knocked on the closed door. When no one answered, he left the porch and headed towards Mr. Reeves’ driveway, where he stood with his back to the house. As he was taking notes in his notepad, Officer Price heard the sound of a door behind him. He turned around and saw a dog “coming at” him from about five feet away. According to Officer Price, the dog was growling and barked once.
Officer Price testified that he put his left forearm up at “roughly” the level of his neck as the dog approached. Officer Price stated that the dog placed its front paws on his forearm for about one second. He recalled taking one step back and pushing the dog away from him. Afraid that the dog was going to attack his face, Officer Price testified that he shot the dog twice while the dog‘s paws were still on his left arm. The dog then made a screeching noise and limped across the yard, where the dog collapsed. After the shooting, Officer Price informed dispatch of what happened, saying “a dog came at me.” According to Officer Price, the dog did not bite or scratch him during the incident.
Officer Price is 5‘8” and, at the time of the incident, weighed about 250 pounds. He testified that he had a taser, baton, and mace on his person at the time. Furthermore, he admitted that he did not vocalize any commands to the dog. At the time of the incident, Officer Price had been a sworn officer for less than a year.
Shortly after the shooting Mr. Reeves exited the house, approached Officer Price, and asked him what had happened. Officer Price recalled at trial that he responded that the dog had come at him, and he had to shoot it. Mr. Reeves testified that he then stepped forward and Officer Price responded by drawing his firearm. With his hand on the weapon, Officer Price told Mr. Reeves: “Stop. Don‘t take another step.”2 Mr. Reeves then turned around and rushed to where his dog Vern had collapsed on the other side of the yard and was curled up beneath the neighbor‘s fence. Mr. Reeves proceeded to administer CPR to Vern.
Additional officers arrived at the scene, and Officer Price returned to headquarters. Mr. Reeves testified that he believed that Vern died on the scene, but his son, Michael Reeves Jr., drove Vern to a nearby veterinary hospital where the dog was confirmed dead.3
On September 24, 2015, Mr. Reeves and his sons, Michael Jr. and Timothy, filed a complaint asserting thirteen claims against Anne Arundel County (the “County“), Anne Arundel County Police Chief Kevin Davis, and Officer Price.4 The claims that ultimately proceeded to trial against the County and Officer Price (“Petitioners“) were: (1) trespass to chattel; (2) violation of Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights for the unlawful shooting of his dog; (3) violation of Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights for the unlawful seizure of the dog; and (4) gross negligence.
Trial in the circuit court began on May 4, 2017. Mr. Reeves’ counsel called Officer Price as an adverse witness. Officer Price had previously stated in a deposition that because the dog‘s paws were muddy, paw prints covered his uniform. He had also stated during the deposition that he had dirt on both of his shoulders and on his badge. At trial, counsel for Mr. Reeves introduced photographs that the police department took shortly after the incident. When shown the photographs, one of which was magnified 300 times, Officer Price admitted that there was no mud or dirt from the dog‘s paws on his upper body or badge. He further acknowledged that the photographs showed mud on the thigh area of his pants. He also admitted that there were no cuts or scratches on his forearm or tears in his uniform.
Mr. Reeves’ counsel then played a video deposition of the testimony of an out-of-state witness, Dr. Kevin Lahmers, a veterinary pathologist at the Virginia-Maryland College of Veterinary Medicine. Dr. Lahmers performed the necropsy on Vern‘s body. He could not determine which bullet was fired first. However, he testified that either bullet wound could have been fatal. According to Dr. Lahmers, one of the bullets entered through the dog‘s sternum area while the dog was facing the firearm, passed through the heart and lung, and lodged close to the right hip. He further testified that the other bullet entered either the right or left side of the dog‘s body near its ribs, “with the animal turned perpendicular to the gun,” and exited the other side.
Dr. Lahmers explained that Vern weighed around 75 pounds and, based on images of the dog, if standing on hind legs Vern would only reach the stomach or mid-abdomen of an adult man of average height. Dr. Lahmer‘s testimony was thus at odds with Officer Price‘s account that Vern could have reached the height of the officer‘s neck while the dog‘s front paws were on the officer‘s forearm.
Mr. Reeves’ son Timothy then took the stand and explained that his father had purchased Vern as a puppy in 2009. According to Timothy, Vern was intelligent, playful, sweet, and a quick learner. He testified that Vern had not displayed aggression towards other pets or people, including children, and Vern had no problems with large crowds in the neighborhood park. Mr. Reeves’ other son, Michael Jr., testified that Vern was a member of their family.
After the testimony of his two sons, Mr. Reeves took the stand. He stated that he became interested in training dogs while
Mr. Reeves also testified that he was taking medication to cope with the loss of Vern. He stated that he no longer had any plans to breed Chesapeake Bay retrievers. Timothy testified that his father moved from Maryland to California after Vern was killed, and that the family “had all left because that incident for my father has just destroyed him.”
At the close of trial, the circuit court denied the Petitioners’ motion for judgment as to Mr. Reeves’ claims under Articles 24 and 26. The court submitted those claims, along with the trespass to chattel and gross negligence claims, to the jury. The circuit court foreclosed the availability of punitive damages, though, by granting the Petitioners’ motion for judgment on the issue of actual malice and punitive damages.
After deliberating for approximately one hour and thirty minutes, the jury returned the verdict finding that Petitioners had violated Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Officer Price had acted with gross negligence, and he had committed a trespass to Mr. Reeves’ chattel.
The jury found a violation of Mr. Reeves’ due process rights under Article 24 by depriving him of his dog. However, the jury awarded him $0 in damages for that constitutional claim. The jury further found that Officer Price had violated Mr. Reeves’ constitutional rights under Article 26 by “seizing” Vern and/or interfering with the use or enjoyment of the dog. The jury likewise awarded Mr. Reeves $0 in damages for that constitutional claim. As to both constitutional claims, the jury also found that Officer Price did not act with “ill will or improper motivation.”6
The jury then found that Officer Price was grossly negligent and awarded Mr. Reeves $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages, for a total of $1,250,000. Finally, for the trespass to chattel claim, the jury awarded Mr. Reeves $10,000 in economic damages. The jury also made a factual finding on the verdict sheet that the dog was not attacking Officer Price at the time of the shooting.
On May 18, 2017, Petitioners filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, and/or a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion in full. The circuit court then reduced the jury award for trespass to chattel from $10,000 to $7,500, pursuant to
The Decision of the Court of Special Appeals
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the circuit court in a divided unreported opinion. Reeves v. Davis, No. 1191, Sept. Term 2018, 2019 WL 5606605 (Oct. 30, 2019). The majority held that
The County . . . asks that we distinguish Brooks from this case because the jury did not award Reeves any damages for the County‘s constitutional violations, whereas the jury in Brooks did. However, . . . Brooks stands for the proposition that
CJP § 11-110 does not bar recovery for non-economic damages, at least when the tortfeasor has been grossly negligent.
Reeves, 2019 WL 5606605, at *9. The majority also held that the jury was provided legally sufficient evidence to support its finding that Officer Price had acted with gross negligence.
Judge Friedman dissented, disagreeing with the majority on both issues. He interpreted
On appeal to this Court, Petitioners present the following questions for review:
- As a matter of first impression, does [
CJP § 11-110 ] limit the amount of damages recoverable for negligently causing the death of a pet? - Did the Court of Special Appeals err in finding sufficient evidence of gross negligence?
We affirm the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s finding of gross negligence. However, we reverse on the statutory construction issue and hold that
II.
Discussion
A. Statutory Construction of CJP § 11-110
We are tasked with construing
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature. A court‘s primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny.
To ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the statute. If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute‘s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to the legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written without resort to other rules of construction. We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with “forced or subtle interpretations” that limit or extend its application.
We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute‘s plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute. We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute‘s object and scope.
Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose and relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.
In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical or incompatible with common sense.
State v. Bey, 452 Md. 255, 265–66 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 421–22 (2010)).
1. Plain Meaning
We start with the text of
(a) Definitions. — (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) “Compensatory damages” means:
(i) In the case of the death of a pet, the fair market value of the pet before death and the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care; and
(ii) In the case of an injury to a pet, the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care.
(3) (i) “Pet” means a domesticated animal.
(ii) “Pet” does not include livestock.
(b) Measure of damages. — (1) A person who tortiously causes an injury to or death of a pet while acting individually or through an animal under the person‘s direction or control is liable to the owner of the pet for compensatory damages.
(2) The damages awarded under paragraph (1) of this subsection may not exceed $7,500.
Petitioners contend that
Mr. Reeves argues that, given the statute‘s unique definition of compensatory damages, the damages cap pertains only to reasonable and necessary veterinary care expenses and the pet‘s fair market value. Mr. Reeves asserts that nothing in the statute expressly limits the recovery of other possible types of damages, including pain and suffering or lost wages. He notes that the 2005 amendment removed the words “[t]he measure of damages . . . is” from the 1999 version and replaced them with “[a] person who tortiously causes an injury to or death of a pet . . . is liable to the owner of the pet for compensatory damages,” as defined in the statute. Mr. Reeves argues that this indicates that the Legislature amended the statute in 2005 to allow for the recovery of noneconomic damages.
We disagree with Mr. Reeves’ reading of the statute. The meaning of
“Maryland has long accepted the doctrine of expressio (or inclusio) unius est exclusio alterius, or the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Comptroller v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 537 (2006). Under the statute, “Pet” means a domesticated animal” and “does not include livestock.”
The text evinces legislative intent to allow for certain, defined compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet. Noneconomic damages, such as mental anguish and loss of companionship, are not included in the exhaustive definition of compensatory damages. As such, noneconomic damages are unavailable
We do not read the plain language of
Mr. Reeves argues that pet owners are most like the class of people that are permitted to recover noneconomic damages under the Wrongful Death Act because of the close, familial bond between pet owners and their pets. Nevertheless,
It would also be illogical for
If the General Assembly‘s goal was to cap compensatory damages for pet owners, how strange for it to do so exclusively with respect to such a narrowly defined subset thereof. Doing so would have left all other forms of compensatory damages both uncapped and without guidelines for calculation. Unlike the Wrongful Death Act, the General Assembly did not provide a formula in
We also consider
neighbor‘s cat, or numerous other situations covered under the statute where a private individual and not a local government is at fault.
Punitive damages are designed to accomplish another goal entirely—to punish the wrongdoer for particularly egregious or heinous conduct and to deter others from following suit. See id. at 71–72. When the trial court in this case granted the Petitioners’ motion on the issue of actual malice and punitive damages, it precluded the jury from awarding them to Mr. Reeves.9 As a result, the only type of damages available to Mr. Reeves for the grossly negligent shooting of his dog and the trespass to his chattel are compensatory damages, which are exhaustively
Additionally, there can be only one recovery of damages for each injury under Maryland law. Beall, 446 Md. at 70; see also Smallwood v. Bradford, 352 Md. 8, 24 (1998) (“Duplicative or overlapping recoveries in a tort action are not permissible.“); Francis v. Johnson, 219 Md. App. 531, 561 (2014) (“The Maryland appellate courts have made clear that there can be only one recovery of damages for one wrong or injury.“). We have explained that “[u]nder the Maryland rules, [d]ifferent legal theories for the same recovery, based on the same facts or transaction, do not create separate claims.” Beall, 446 Md. at 70 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The existence of multiple claims ultimately depends upon whether the ‘aggregate of the operative facts’ presented states more than one claim which can be separately enforced.” Id. at 70-71 (citation omitted).
Here, Mr. Reeves’ gross negligence and trespass to chattel claims are premised on the same set of operative facts. They are thus alternative legal theories for the same recovery. Therefore, Mr. Reeves is entitled to one recovery as compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Reeves suffered a tragic loss, the only injury before us for which Mr. Reeves can recover is the death of his dog, because the jury awarded no damages for the constitutional harms.
to personal property. See Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693 (1999) (“It is a generally accepted rule of law that statutes are not presumed to repeal the common law ‘further than is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law.‘“) (citation omitted). Rather,
In this way, this case is distinguishable from the decision in Brooks v. Jenkins, on which Mr. Reeves relies. In Brooks, the Court of Special Appeals explained the scope of its holding as follows: “We hold only that [
The Dissent contends that we have passed on the opportunity to change Maryland‘s common law to expand the damages available in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet, in line with a minority modern trend. See Dissent Slip Op. at 5-6, 9-13. However, no such opportunity is before us. The issue in this case is not whether our common law is or should be in line with modern sensibilities regarding pets. Also not before us is the issue of whether Maryland law classifying pets as personal property should be changed. See Dissent Slip Op. at 14-15. Rather, this case presents the narrow issue of whether
The Legislature may wish to amend
In sum, the plain meaning of
The legislative history of
In 2001, House Bill 907 proposed amending the statute to allow recovery for certain noneconomic damages up to $25,000. The bill would have excluded licensed veterinarians providing medical assistance and nonprofit employees from such liability. H.D. 907, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001). House Bill 907 did not pass. In 2002, House Bill 221, which would have provided for the recovery of noneconomic damages in the case of the intentional death of a pet, likewise capped at $25,000, also did not pass. H.D. 221, 2002 Leg., 416th Sess. (Md. 2002).
Petitioners argue that these bill failures indicate that the Legislature did not intend to allow for noneconomic damages for the injury to or death of a pet. Mr. Reeves argues that the bill failures mean the opposite, i.e. the 2005 version enacted years later provided for the recovery of those damages. On the contrary, these bill failures indicate to us that the Legislature did not intend for the statute to include noneconomic damages as compensatory damages in the case of injury to or death of a pet.
We recognize that “the fact that a bill on a specific subject fails of passage in the General Assembly is a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent.” City of Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 329 (2006) (citation omitted). However, whether a proposed amendment failed “can be useful sometimes in ascertaining or confirming legislative intent.” Antonio v. SSA Sec., Inc., 442 Md. 67, 87 (2015). Here, amendments that would have expressly provided for the recovery of noneconomic damages and capped their recovery at $25,000 failed. It does not follow that the Legislature intended
In 2005, the Legislature enacted House Bill 941, substantively amending
The Floor Report to House Bill 941 summarized the 2005 amendment to the statute as altering the damages that may
Following House Bill 941, there were no other substantive changes to the statute until 2017, when the Legislature increased the damages cap to $10,000. S. 143, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017). Thus, the legislative history supports our reading of
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Gross Negligence
We turn now to whether the jury had sufficient evidence to reach a finding of gross negligence against Officer Price and the circuit court‘s denial of the Petitioners’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. “An appellate court reviews the trial court‘s decision to allow or deny judgment or [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] to determine whether it was legally correct, while viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 30-31 (2012) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). This Court affirms the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “if there is ‘any evidence, no matter how slight, that is legally sufficient to generate a jury question.‘” Id. at 31 (citation omitted). Furthermore, if “the nonmoving party offers competent evidence that rises above speculation, hypothesis, and conjecture, the [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] should be denied.” Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 706 (2015) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
“Issues involving gross negligence are often more troublesome than those involving malice because a fine line exists between allegations of negligence and gross negligence.” Stracke v. Estate of Butler, 465 Md. 407, 420 (2019) (quoting Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 (2007)). Gross negligence is “something more than simple negligence, and likely more akin to reckless conduct.” Barbre, 402 Md. at 187 (citation omitted). It is “an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, “a wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or acts wantonly and willfully only when he inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to the rights of others that he acts as if such rights did not exist.” Id. (citations omitted).
In Brooks v. Jenkins, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court did not err by permitting the jury to decide whether the deputy was grossly negligent when he shot the Jenkinses’ family dog. 220 Md. App. at 461-62. Brooks observed that “the trial court in this case properly denied the motion for judgment so long as the Jenkinses introduced evidence sufficient to permit the jury to infer that Deputy Brooks acted either with the intent to inflict injury or
Here, the jury was presented with more than evidence of “simple negligence.” When “viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” there was sufficient evidence for a juror to have drawn the rational inference that Officer Price acted with utter indifference towards Mr. Reeves’ rights when Officer Price shot his dog twice. See Jones, 425 Md. at 30-31. The facts in evidence rose above mere “speculation, hypothesis, and conjecture” that Officer Price was grossly negligent. See Cooper, 443 Md. at 706.
The jury was presented with Officer Price‘s testimony, the testimony of the Reeves family, and the recorded video testimony of Dr. Lahmers, a veterinary pathologist expert. The jury also had the opportunity to view the photographs. As in Brooks, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have rationally found that Officer Price was grossly negligent when he shot Mr. Reeves’ dog. Dr. Lahmers testified that Vern could only reach a person‘s mid-stomach while standing on hind legs. This contradicted Officer Price‘s testimony that the dog‘s paws were resting on his forearm at neck level. Photographs magnified 300 times depicted mud on Officer Price‘s pant legs, not on his upper uniform, as he had claimed, indicating inconsistencies in Officer Price‘s account of events.
Officer Price admitted at trial that, as he approached Mr. Reeves’ residence, he had no suspicions that the family was involved with the burglaries that he was investigating. He also admitted that it appeared the home was occupied at the time. Officer Price was not on Mr. Reeves’ property in order to serve a warrant or look for a suspect. By his own account, Officer Price saw that lights were on in the house, the windows were up, and the front door was open. He was taking notes in front of Mr. Reeves’ residence when the dog approached him. Officer Price discharged his weapon at the dog while standing in front of the home in the middle of the afternoon. Additionally, like in Brooks, there were other non-lethal measures he could have taken. Officer Price could have used his taser, baton, or mace, or made verbal commands.
Although Officer Price testified that Vern was growling and barked once as the dog approached him, a reasonable juror could have found, as this jury did, that the dog did not attack him. The jury heard conflicting accounts from Officer Price and Dr. Lahmers as to how the dog was positioned when shot. Whereas Officer Price recalled that the dog‘s paws were on his arm when he fired the shots, Dr. Lahmers testified that the dog was turned away from the officer when one of the shots was fired. Furthermore, like in Brooks, there was no evidence that Vern was vicious or threatening. Testimony at trial indicated that Vern had no history of aggression and got along with the neighbors, young children, and other animals.
III. Conclusion
In light of
Further, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on the gross negligence issue. There was sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to find that Officer Price acted with gross negligence by shooting Mr. Reeves’ dog. When viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a rational juror could have found that Officer Price acted willfully or with utter indifference towards Mr. Reeves’ rights, and thus, was grossly negligent. However, pursuant to the single recovery rule and
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT.
For while we have our eyes on the future[,]
history has its eyes on us[.]
This is the era of just redemption[.]
We feared at its inception[.]
We did not feel prepared to be the heirs
of such a terrifying hour
but within it we found the power
to author a new chapter[.]¹
Respectfully, I dissent. The Majority interpreted
The Majority‘s interpretation of
Generally, a plaintiff may not recover emotional or non-economic damages for negligently caused personal or real property loss. Dobbins v. Washington Cty. Suburban Sanitary Comm‘n, 338 Md. 341, 351, 658 A.2d 675, 679-80 (1995) (“it remains the law of Maryland that a plaintiff cannot ordinarily recover for emotional injuries sustained solely as a result of negligently inflicted damage to the plaintiff‘s property.“); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 48-49, 338 A.2d 48, 55 (1975) (“Maryland decisions have generally denied compensation for mental anguish resulting from damage to property.“).
Acts “inspired by fraud, malice, or like motives[]” provide a major exception to this general rule. Ziegler v. F St. Corp., 248 Md. 223, 226, 235 A.2d 703, 705 (1967) (highlighting emotional damages motivated by fraud or malice are recoverable even in the absence of physical impact); State, for Use of Aronoff v. Balt. Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 539, 80 A.2d 13, 18 (1951). A defendant who commits tortious acts to property beyond mere negligence can be held liable for emotional damages. See Aronoff, 197 Md. at 538, 80 A.2d at 17 (citing Buchanan v. Stout, 123 A.D. 648, 108 N.Y.S. 38 (1908) (holding that the plaintiff cannot recover for the tortious death of her cat without a showing of willful or grossly negligent² behavior)).
The Majority affirmed in part the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that Officer Price acted with gross negligence when he shot and killed Vern, but the Majority reversed in part the Court‘s holding that
The Majority did not have to reach this conclusion and should have concluded that pets killed or injured with gross negligence may permit the recovery of emotional damages. We are bound to interpret statutes that displace common law as narrowly as possible. See generally Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 728 A.2d 698 (1999) (noting that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed narrowly, so as to not make any change beyond that which is expressly stated and necessary). To date, Maryland common law has not clearly specified whether gross negligence is equivalent to “fraud, malice, or like motives” especially in the context of tortious harm to pets. This Court has noted that there is not a consistent usage of gross negligence across “more than twenty-five appearances in our statutes[.]” Taylor, 384 Md. at 227, 862 A.2d at 1034.3 This Court in some instances equated gross negligence with “fraud, malice, or like motives” in the past,4 which according to longstanding precepts of Maryland common law may render a tortfeasor liable for emotional damages for damage to property. Aronoff, 197 Md. at 539, 80 A.2d at 18. It would have been sound, especially given the strong emotional bond between people and pets, for the Majority to recognize an additional exception to the common law that grossly negligent harm to pets may entail liability for emotional damages. Pets, particularly dogs, possess individual personalities, emotions, intelligences, and behaviors.5 Maryland law should distinguish between the recovery of grossly negligent harms to pets and inanimate objects accordingly.
a. The Majority‘s holding creates a double anomaly in Maryland law.
Pets already hold an anomalous position within Maryland law. They are the only type of “property” with capped compensatory damages. The Majority‘s decision places pets in a doubly anomalous position: they are the only type of property subject to a compensatory and non-compensatory cap. A tortfeasor may “wantonly and willfully” shoot and kill a beloved, family dog, “utterly indifferent” to the family‘s emotional bond and pay no more than $10,000 in damages, while a fraudster who intentionally tricks a family into selling a painting of their dog would face uncapped compensatory damages and punitive damages.
The Majority‘s decision also creates an incongruous result where a person can be criminally liable for neglecting their pet under Maryland‘s animal cruelty law,
b. The Majority‘s decision contrasts with the modern trend of our sister jurisdictions that have expanded pet owners’ ability to recover for injured or killed pets.
The Majority‘s decision stands at odds with the modern trend of our sister jurisdictions
Similar decisions have since been reached in Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Puerto Rico and Washington. See, e.g., Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Due to Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91 A.L.R. 5th 545 § 3 (2001) (annotating various jurisdictions’ laws that allow for recovery of emotional damages for an injured or killed pet). In Plotnik v. Meihaus, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585 (4th Dist. 2012), the plaintiffs sued their neighbor after he allegedly struck their 12-inch tall miniature pinscher with a baseball bat after the dog dashed into the neighbor‘s yard. Id. at 1605, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 598. The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held:
Id. at 1607, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 600 (internal citations and quotation omitted).We believe good cause exists to allow the recovery of damages for emotional distress under the circumstances of this case . . . . [W]hile it has been said that [dogs] have nearly always been held to be entitled to less regard and protection than more harmless domestic animals, it is equally true that there are no other domestic animals to which the owner or his family can become more strongly attached, or the loss of which will be more keenly felt. Additionally, one can be held liable for punitive damages if he or she willfully or through gross negligence wrongfully injures an animal.
The court based its decision on California‘s civil code that permits recovery of exemplary damages or “damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant[]” for malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct.
The Majority‘s interpretation contravenes the General Assembly‘s legislative purpose to expand the amount a plaintiff may recover for tortious harms to their pet.
In 1989, the General Assembly originally enacted the predecessor to
The predecessor to
The legislative history of the 2017 amendment to
S.B. 143 Second Reading.If I shot your painting worth $10,000, I would get more money than if I shot your dog. . . . This seems outrageous . . . it seemed particularly cruel to call [what we consider] a family member just an object and then put an arbitrary cap on what it‘s worth. It seems inane to me.
The General Assembly also knew of the Court of Special Appeals’ recognition of recovery of emotional damages for an injured pet under
This Court need not rely on a presumption to draw the conclusion that the General Assembly knew and tacitly approved of Brooks. During a hearing of SB 143, Kelley Donohue, on behalf of the Maryland Association for Justice, expressly referenced Brooks in her testimony. The legislators
The Majority‘s decision missed an opportunity to bring Maryland‘s common law in line with Marylanders’ love for their pets.
Marylanders have strong emotional bonds with their pets, especially their dogs. Most people, including Mr. Reeves, considered his dog a part of the family and “his best friend in the world[.]” The designation of dogs as mere personal property belies common experience, cultural values, and societal expectations. Treating dogs as mere property also erases a dog‘s intrinsic attributes as a living being and the irreplaceable instinct to love and protect human companions. A dog, unlike an inanimate object, welcomes its human companion after a day at work, protects its human companion when in danger, and exhibits behavior and emotions that is consistent with grief and distress when its human companion is ill, injured, or passes away. Given prevailing societal values, attitudes, and norms, it no longer appears tenable to deny emotional damages for a cherished family dog, killed with gross negligence, in the same way that the common law precludes emotional damages for an inanimate object that was accidentally broken. See Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 417, 48 A.3d 242, 262 (2012) (adjusting the common law to accord with modern societal values, conditions, and interests).
Marylanders can no longer rely on Brooks to vindicate the loss of a cherished pet companion. The Majority‘s decision comes at a time when pet ownership is surging. The 2019-2020 National Pet Owners Survey estimated 67% of U.S. households have a pet, up from 56% in 1988. This data omits the recent uptick following the Covid-19 global pandemic. Kim Kavin, Dog Adoptions and Sales Soar During the Pandemic, The Washington Post (Aug. 12, 2020). Pet adoption has always provided more than just companionship, it establishes a connection and unconditional love. KK Ottesen, Humane Society President Discusses the Surge of Pet Ownership During the Pandemic – And What Animals Can Teach Us, The Washington Post (Apr. 27, 2021) (“[Animals] provide [connection and unconditional love]. That‘s who they are. That‘s what they do.“).
The Majority has missed an opportunity to recognize pets, not just as emotive, intelligent, loving, and cherished members of our families, but as representing more than mere personal property. In the past, courts did not wait for legislative enactment to expand the concept of personage when societal needs, values, and interests demanded it. This Court can break from precedent when “passage of time and evolving events” render it “archaic or inapplicable to modern society[.]” State v. Stachowski, 440 Md. 504, 520, 103 A.3d 618, 627 (2014). Greater legal protection of beloved family pets is long overdue.7
The average Marylander may be more surprised to hear that the law has recognized a boat, or more precisely, a vessel, as a legal person. Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 403, 15 S. Ct. 657, 664 (1895) (affirming “a distinct principle of the maritime law, namely, that the vessel, in whosesoever hands she lawfully is, is herself considered the wrongdoer, liable for the tort, and subject to a maritime lien for the damages“) (emphasis added). Even though vessels constitute inanimate amalgamations of mostly steel, aluminum, fiberglass and timber, the law endows the vessel with a legal personality (usually gendered as female) and empowers “her” recovery for tort damages.
The common law extended recognition of legal personage to what the average person would consider property not because people loved corporations and vessels more than their pets. Instead, legal, commercial, and societal interests demanded it. “[A]nything can be made a legal unit, and the subject of rights and duties, a fund, a building, a child unborn, a family. There is no reason, except the practical one, why, as someone has suggested, the law should not accord to the last rose of summer a legal right not to be plucked.” Jeffery S. Kerr, et al., A Slave by Any Other Name is Still a Slave, 19 Animal L. 221, 226 (2013) (quoting Gerard Cark Gebdersib, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Law (Harvard U. Press 1918)) (footnote omitted).
The law should similarly extend a recognition of limited personhood to pets, if only so their human companions can seek recovery for grossly negligent conduct that caused injury or death to that pet. The law should reflect the importance and centrality of pets to individual families and society as a whole. It has already done so for multinational corporations and vessels. Pets deserve similar treatment.
Formalistic adherence to classifying pets as property dredges up the law‘s ignominious history of treating living beings, notably slaves and women, as property not legal persons.
The designation of pets under the common law as mere personal property deprives pets the dignity of living beings. When Maryland became a state in 1788, it formally inherited the common law of England, which still considered slaves, women, and pets as property. Over decades of struggle and progress, Maryland, like every state in the union, cast aside the harmful classification of people as property.9 Pets should not be consigned to eighteenth-century notions of property. It denies the dignity abundantly ascribed to pets by society. It prevents people of Maryland from being made whole after a tragic injury or death of their pet.
CONCLUSION
In this instance, it appears that pet owners who sustain the loss of the pet as the result of the grossly negligent acts of another will have no recourse other than with the General Assembly to move Maryland forward.
For these reasons, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Notes
Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dept. of Soc. Services, 384 Md. 213, 228, 862 A.2d 1026, 1034 (2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).[a]n intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them. . . . A wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or acts wantonly and willfully only when he inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to rights of others that he acts as if such rights do not exist.
Carbasho v. Musulin, 217 W. Va. 359, 363, 618 S.E.2d 368, 372 (2005) (Starcher, J., dissenting).This opinion is simply medieval. The majority blithely says that “our law categorizes dogs as personal property“—that “damages for sentimental value, mental suffering, and emotional distress are not recoverable” when one‘s pet is injured or killed by the negligence of another person. In coming to this conclusion, the majority overlooks the fact that the “law” in question is the common law which is controlled by this Court. There was nothing stopping the majority from changing that common law other than their lack of concern for pet owners and the emotional bonds that exist between owners and their pets. When the common law of the past is no longer in harmony with the institutions or societal conditions of the present, this Court is constitutionally empowered to adjust the common law to current needs. . . . As Justice Holmes succinctly reflected, “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasisovereign that can be identified.” . . . Yet the majority opinion continues to maintain the primitive limits of the common law, and refuses to adjust to the realities of the modern world, and permit recovery of damages for sentimental values, mental suffering, or emotional distress.