20 Mass. 360 | Mass. | 1825
delivered the opinion of the Court. It is difficult to ascertain with certainty the meaning of a will so unskilfully drawn as this is which is now depending. Whether it was the intention of the testator to give an estate tail to Sarah Annable, or an estate in fee simple to her and her children as tenants in common ; and if the latter, whether he intended to provide for all the children, or for those only who were living at the time of making the will, or who might be living at the time of his decease, does not distinctly appear by the language of the will, and must therefore be determined by rules of construction.
The intention of the testator is to be regarded, if clearly expressed, although he may be ignorant of technical language, and may use it improperly;
These words are, “ I give all the remainder of my estate, both real and personal, to my daughter Sarah Annable, and the children born of her body, including all my wife has the improvement of during her life after her decease.”
The case must turn upon the construction to be put on
But it has been argued, that if Sarah did not take an estate tail, she and her children took as joint tenants. But the St. 1785, c. 62, § 4, [see Revised Stat. c. 59, § 10,] is decisive on this point. It is no valid objection, that the will took effect before the passing of this act. The statute extends to past grants and devises in express terms, and its operation is not to impair any vested right. It serves rather to render the tenure more beneficial. No estate had vested in any survivor previous to the passing of the act, and therefore from and after that time, Sarah and her children held as tenants in common, whatever might have been the construction of the devise before.
As to the question, whether the children born after the will was made, can come in for their shares, we think that they may. “The children of her body” meant all the children she might have. This will not appear to be a strained construction of the words, when it is observed that as to part of the property the devise was prospective, it being of a remainder after a life estate to the widow. If the devisor had intended to limit his bounty to the children living when he made his will, he would have named them, or used words to show that he meant so to limit it.
No question as to the personal estate is now before us, but there seems no doubt, that the afterborn children are entitled to their shares by way of executory devise, so that the intent of the testator, if we have rightly interpreted it, may in all respects be fulfilled.
Judgment for the demandant.
See Ingell v. Nooney, 2 Pick. (2nd ed.) 366 and notes
Parkman v. Bowdoin, 1 Sumner, 366; Jones v. Davies, 4 Barn. & Adol. 43; Ray v. Enslin, 2 Mass. R. (Rand’s ed ) 563, n. (a), and the cases there cited.