108 Minn. 37 | Minn. | 1909
Plaintiff, engaged as a broker in the business of listing mills and elevators for sale or exchange, brought this action against the defendant land company to recover for services performed and expenses incurred at defendant’s request in finding and procuring a purchaser for, and negotiating the sale and selling, the defendant’s described mill. The reasonable value of the services was alleged to be $625. Defendant’s answer was a general denial. On trial the district judge held as a matter of law that the correspondence and testimony showed the rendering by plaintiff of services for defendant under such circumstances as would raise a promise in law on the part of the defendant to pay plaintiff what such services were reasonably, worth. The only issue submitted to the jury was the value of such services. The jury returned a verdict in the sum of $289.20. This appeal was taken from the order of the trial court denying the usual alternative motion of defendant.
1. One group of defendant’s thirty-one assignments asserts error in the conclusion of the trial court that as a matter of law there was implied contract on the part of the defendant to pay plaintiff the reasonable value of his services. Defendant insists that there was no agreement between the parties at all. To prove that contract the correspondence between the parties was admitted in evidence.
Defendant urges: “It is somewhat startling to have the court hold that regardless of the nature of the correspondence, and in spite of the fact that the defendant had not agreed to pay any commission, and understood that the correspondence did not indicate that any was expected, that defendant was required to pay whatever the jury might guess was the value of the plaintiff’s services.”- If this were not reiterated in various phrases with apparent seriousness, we should be inclined to treat this view of the case as humorous. Certainly defendant’s surprise on ascertaining that he was expected to pay a commission is naive in the extreme. It is clear- that the court properly excluded the evidence tending to show that defendant did not consider that he had agreed by these letters to pay any commission, and the like, and that the court was justified by the corres
2. Another reason assigned why the trial court was in error is that plaintiff “did nothing, and the deal was not closed as he understood it should be, and, in fact, as he understood it was.” It is undoubtedly true that a man must carry out a contract before he is entitled to any compensation. Johnson v. Fehsefeldt, 106 Minn. 202, 118 N. W. 797. In this case we think it is clearly shown that this is what plaintiff did. He was a real estate broker, and he earned his commission because he procured a purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy upon terms acceptable to the purchaser, and who did in fact buy upon terms actually accepted by the owner. This case is controlled by Hubachek v. Hazzard, 83 Minn. 437, 86 N. W. 426. It would distort the natural significance of letters and facts disclosed by this record to hold that the implied contract required the plaintiff to procure some one who would take the mill property upon the exact terms first proposed by defendant. The fact that at one time negotiations had a short break, and that the parties separated and immediately afterwards caine together, does not bring this case within the principle of Fairchild v. Cunningham, 84 Minn. 521, 88 N. W. 15, and allied cases. Nor is there any force to the objection that there is a variance between the complaint and the testimony. The complaint was broad enough to justify plaintiff’s recovery for “what he accomplished in the way of bringing the parties together.”
3. Defendant also insists that plaintiff was not entitled to a commission from both parties to the exchange of properties, and that the record shows him just as much entitled to a commission from one as from the other. This argument is not meritorious. The objection was not made an issue by the pleadings. The answer was a general denial. Nor does the record show that plaintiff was entitled
4. We have examined all other assignments of error, and have found none which would justify reversal of the trial court, or which calls for detailed consideration.
Affirmed.