Ankrom v. HagemanAnkrom v. Hageman
{¶ 1} This mаtter came before the court on motion of defendant the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“OAPA”) for judgment on the pleadings, filed June 1, 2001. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum contra on June 22, 2001, to which defendant filed a reply on June 28, 2001. This court entertained oral arguments from the parties on July 23, 2001.
{¶ 2} The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment against the OAPA for allegedly violating their contract rights that arose out of plea negotiation and the
{¶ 3} The defendant moves the court for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiffs cannot possibly prevail in their legal arguments because the plea-negotiation contracts lack express terms, because county prosecutors cannot bind the OAPA in the exercise of its discretion, because the OAPA properly considered each plaintiffs parole petition using all available and reliable information (which inсludes the indictment), and because public policy prohibits limits to the Parole Board’s discretion.
{¶ 4} Under
{¶ 5} First, factual issues surround defendant’s argument that the negotiated plea contracts contained no express terms and that there can be no agreements based on unilateral expectations. Thе court can almost take judicial notice that, throughout the late 1980s and the early 1990s, criminal defendants were routinely told by prosecutors and defense attorneys alike that they would serve the front end of аn indefinite sentence — less good time credit if earned— and that the tails of indefinite sentences were being ignored. Indeed, many defendants may have moved to withdraw their pleas as being involuntarily entered if they could have known in a timely manner that such representations would turn out to be absolutely false. Some may still have the opportunity to withdraw their pleas based on a continuing manifest injustice.
{¶ 7} A prisoner becomes eligible for parole at a certain time, as defined by statute. See
{¶ 8} Indeed, the OAPA is exercising no discretion at all. The opinions of the victims (or their representatives), the investigating officers, the prosecutor (who quite likely made the plea offer only after concluding that the chances of getting a conviction for the indicted offense is slim or uncertain at best), the defеnse attorney, and the judge who accepted the plea are not considered at all. The inmate is automatically given a “flop” or “super flop.”
{¶ 9} The prosecutor may know he is unlikely to get а verdict for a purposeful killing, so he offers to allow the defendant to plead to manslaughter. The defendant gives up his opportunity to be acquitted of all offenses and takes the “deal” (which actually may be no “bargain” at all). Then, the OAPA simply classifies the inmate for “aggravated murder” on little or nothing óf evidentiary quality. Can this process be justified by the argument that a prosecutor cannot bind the Parole Board? Why didn’t the defendant just go to trial? A conviction on the indicted offense could not have been any worse.
{¶ 11} Defendants assert that the Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County) has at least twice rejected the claims of the plaintiffs herein. See Lower v. Ghee (Aug. 2, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-1349; Brown v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (May 17, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-1401. Hоwever, as pointed out by plaintiffs’ counsel, the decisions to which defendants refer are memorandum decisions and, as such, are not intended to have precedential value. See State ex rel. Hoover Co. v. Indus. Comm. (Oct. 29, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APD10-1365,
{¶ 12} Because this court finds no binding authority from the Tenth District, this court has looked to decisions from other Ohio courts of appeals. It finds Randolph v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (Jan. 21, 2000), Miami App. No. 99CA17,
{¶ 13} “A plea agreement ‘is contractual in nature and subject to contract-law standards.’ State v. Butts (1996),112 Ohio App.3d 683 , 685-686,679 N.E.2d 1170 , 1172, quoting Baker v. United States (C.A.6 1986),781 F.2d 85 , 90, certiorari denied (1986),479 U.S. 1017 ,107 S.Ct. 667 [93 L.Ed.2d 719 ], A county prosecutor is an agent of the state. See State v. Barnett (1998),124 Ohio App.3d 746 , 755,707 N.E.2d 564 , 570, discretionary appeal not allowed (1998),81 Ohio St.3d 1497 ,691 N.E.2d 1058 ;R.C. 309.08. Thus, the Miami County prosecutor entered the plea agreement with Randolph on behalf of the State of Ohio. See id.”
{¶ 14} Defendants herein argue that the Randolph holding was subsequently limited by State v. Callahan (Oct. 6, 2000), Montgomery App. No. 18237,
{¶ 15} In August 2001, the Second District Court of Appeals revisited the subject matter of Randolph in Lee v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (Aug. 31, 2001), Montgomery App. No. 18833. Therein, Lee claimed that the OAPA violated his plea agreement by classifying his parole eligibility based on his offense of indictment (aggravated murder) rather than the offense of conviction (involuntary manslaughter). The trial court ordered the OAPA to place Lee in Category 8 instead of Category 13 (undеr the new guidelines for classifying offenders that it adopted in 1998), and the OAPA appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court, stating, “[T]he words ‘eligible for parole’ [as used in
{¶ 16} The Second District Court of Appeals further found the OAPA’s argument that county prosecutors have no authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the OAPA to be “disingenuous,” citing
{¶ 17} Upon review of the pleadings and the arguments presented by the parties, both in the briefs and orally to this court, as well аs of relevant case authority, this court concludes that defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is not well taken. When viewing the allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorаble to the plaintiff class, this court is unable to conclude that no material factual issues exist and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is hereby DENIED.
Motion denied.