12 Ga. App. 159 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1913
Bobert Anglin was presented for peddling before registering and paying the peddler’s tax for the year 1912. By agreement of counsel, he was tried, upon an agreed statement of facts, before the court, without the intervention of a jury. It was agreed that Z. T. Anglin, the father of the defendant, had a Confederate soldier’s license to peddle, and was, by the proper ordinary’s certificate and otherwise, qualified to peddle, and that, although the defendant had no license to peddle, he was hired by his father for wages, had no interest himself in the business, and peddled and worked as an employee and agent of his father. None of the articles which the accused' was alleged to have peddled fall within those businesses which are unaffected by a Confederate veteran’s certificate. The ■ court adjudged the defendant guilty, and the present writ of error challenges that judgment.
In our opinion, the ruling in this case must be controlled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Hartfield v. Columbus, 109 Ga. 112 (34 S. E. 288). It is true that in- that case the court was dealing only with a municipal ordinance, and the indictment in this case concerns the payment of a State tax levied upon peddlers, but the essential principle underlying both cases is identical. Waiving consideration of the constitutionality of such legislation (for that point is not before us), it is perfectly clear that it was the intention of the legislature, in the adoption of sections 1888-9-90-91 of the Civil Code (1910), to confer upon Confederate soldiers a substantial benefit by the grant of the exemption from license fees. ■ It was an act of quasi-classification. No member of
We infer that it was the intention of the legislature to allow Confederate veterans to employ agents, servants, or other employees in the conduct of their peddling, where it appears that the alleged agents and employees do in fact and in good faith sustain that relation to the holder of the certificate. A mere subterfuge or device by which the Confederate soldier’s certificate would be used to relieve other peddlers would, of course, not relieve bogus agents and employees from the payment of the license tax which peddlers are by law required to pay; and, in any case, the employment of an unusual number of so-e,ailed agents would offer reasonable grounds of suspicion of the bona fides of the transaction. The legislature seems to have had this view of the case in mind in the passage of the act of 1892 (Ga. Laws, 1892, p. 99), now embodied in section 1892 of the Civil Code; for, in authorizing Confederate soldiers to carry on the business of daguerreán, photographic, or similar artist, without paying the license, it was especially enacted that the privilege should not extend to any person who had as many as three employees. And this very limitation in section 1892 clearly evidences that the legislature intended that the privilege conferred by such exemption as we are now dealing with might lawfully be exercised through such agents as the Confederate soldier might employ. So much as to the intention of the General Assembly. However, we do not place our ruling solely
We are aware that in the recent case of Smith v. Whiddon, 138 Ga. 471 (75 S. E. 635), it was ruled, upon the authority of Howard v. Reid, 51 Ga. 328, that one who actually travels as the vendor of patent medicines is liable for the payment of the license tax, although he is acting only as agent or employee of a disabled or indigent Confederate soldier, who, under the provisions of section 1888 of the Civil Code, is authorized to peddle without obtaining, a license. This ruling is relied upon by counsel for the State in the present case.- This court is bound to follow the rulings of the Supreme Court, as precedents, and it does so without question.
In our 'opinion, the only disputed point in this case is squarely ruled by the Supreme Court in the Hartfield case, supra; and, it being agreed that the defendant was a bona fide agent of the Confederate soldier, having no interest in the business and making no sales except for the veteran, the lower court erred in adjudging him guilty. ' Judgment reversed.