Aрpellant Cynthia Anglin appeals the revocation of her drug-court probation. She raises two points on appeal. The first is that the drug court failed to screen her when she first entered the program. The second is that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke her probation. We disagree with both points and affirm.
Anglin is a fifty-three-year-old woman who, prior tо the incident giving rise to this appeal, was a law-abiding citizen. She has been married to Steve Anglin for thirty-three years, cares for three children and a grandchild, and works as a registered nurse. In November 2004, Steve asked two law enforcement officers to accompany him to his house to visit with his wife because he suspected she was involved in some “illegal stuff.” Upon their arrival, the officers asked for permission to search the home and Anglin’s purse. The Anglins consented, and a small amount of cocaine and drug paraphernalia were found. Anglin was arrested and charged with possession of a contrоlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Anglin pleaded guilty to the charges. As part of her guilty plea, she agreed to thirty-six months’ probation and placement in drug court authorized by thе Arkansas Drug Court Act of 2003. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-98-301 to -304 (Repl. 2006).
On June 6, 2005, Anglin was late to drug testing prior to a court appearance — a drug-court violation. Although she was late for testing, she was tested prior to court, and pаssed the test. On June 20, 2005, Anglin was arrested for driving while intoxicated — another drug-court violation. She was drug tested after this incident and tested positive for morphine, which was attributed to prescription medication she received from her family physician and was authorized by Anglin’s probation supervisor. Anglin was found guilty of the DWI charge and has appealed that conviction, which is currently pending. On the day following the DWI arrest, Anglin fаiled to appear for drug testing and a group meeting and failed to contact her probation supervisor — all drug-court violations.
In July 2005, the State filed a petition to revoke probation based upon the above drug-court violations occurring June 20 — 21, 2005. At the hearing on the petition to revoke probation, the trial court held that Anglin violated her conditions of probation and sentenced her to forty-eight months’ imprisonment at the Regional Correctional Facility. Anglin appeals from this order.
We consider the sufficiency of the evidence before addressing other alleged trial errors. Rudd v. Stаte,
There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Anglin’s probation. Trial testimony established that the drug court in White County requires strict compliance with the conditions of probation. Further testimony established that Anglin violated probation conditions when she failed to timely appear for a drug test, was arrested and convicted of DWI, failed to attend a grouр meeting, failed to call in to her supervisor, and failed to appear for drug testing.
Anglin essentially admits to committing the probation violations but argues that she was diagnosed with delirium, and therefore did not inexcusably fail to comply with probation conditions. For support, she relies upon Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(d) (Repl. 2006), which states:
If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexсusably failed to comply with a condition of his or her suspension or probation, the court may revoke the suspension or probation at any time prior to the expiration of the period оf suspension or probation.
The term “inexcusable” is defined as “incapable of being excused or justified — Syn. unpardonable, unforgivable, intolerable.” Barbee v. State,
Anglin cites two Arkansas cases where it was held that the defendant had an excuse for failing to comply with probation conditions and revocation of probation was improper. In Baldridge, supra, the defendant failed to pay fees and fines and failed to appear in person to his probation officer. The trial court revoked probation; however, our court reversed, holding that decision was not supported by the evidence. The Baldridge defendant was а child burdened with adult responsibilities of being the primary provider for his ill mother and younger siblings; the defendant made some payments, but was admittedly in arrears; the defendant and his probation officer both testified thаt defendant made numerous attempts to explain his inability to pay the fees and fines; the defendant worked any available job in an attempt to meet the bare necessities of life for himself and his family; and the defendant had no transportation or money with which to afford transportation to appear in person to his probation officer.
In Barbee, supra, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of negligent homicide and was sentenced to probation. One of the conditions of probation was that the defendant’s driver’s license was revoked for three years. The State filеd a petition to revoke the defendant’s probation alleging that he had been driving during the period when his license was revoked. At the hearing the defendant admitted he had driven a vehicle, but he assertеd that he had driven only after he was informed by the county-revenue office that his driving record was clear and he was issued a valid driver’s license. The trial court revoked probation.
On appeal, thе supreme court reversed, holding that the defendant was a model probationer, was “tremendously rehabilitated,” and was incorrectly given a driver’s license by the State when he was only seeking to obtаin an identification card in order to get a marriage license. The court also found that, while he drove, the defendant received no traffic citations and engaged in no criminal activity. The cоurt held that these facts were unique and constituted forgivable, pardonable, and excusable behavior for the defendant’s failure to strictly comply with probation conditions.
The facts in Barbee and Baldridge are distinguishable from the facts in this case and do not excuse Anglin from violating probation conditions. While the evidence in this case established that Anglin was diagnosed with delirium, and that delirium can affect a patient’s level of consciousness and usually includes extreme disorganization of the thought process, the record is devoid of evidence establishing that Anglin, on the dates that she violated her рrobation conditions, was suffering from delirium and was not thinking clearly. To the contrary, she violated a probation condition when she was late for drug testing, and there is no argument that she was suffering from delirium at that timе.
Additionally, Anglin was ordered by the trial court to undergo a psychological evaluation. William A. Cochran, Ph.D., concluded that Anglin suffered from a mental disease but no mental defect. He stated, “While she reрorted hallucinatory experiences, even if true, she did not indicate that these in any way were involved with her probation revocation.” He specifically stated that at the time the probаtion violations occurred, Anglin had the culpable mental state required to establish the elements of the offenses charged, had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of hеr conduct, and had the capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law. Therefore, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Anglin inexcusаbly failed to comply with the conditions of her probation, and the trial court’s decision to revoke probation is affirmed.
For her second point on appeal, Anglin argues that the trial court еrred in failing to hold that the drug court failed to screen her when she first entered the program. Anglin argues that if the drug court had properly screened her they would have learned that she was ineligible for the program due to her “mental health concerns.” It is undisputed that the drug-court personnel failed to screen Anglin when she first entered the program, although it is drug-court policy to do so.
We do not reach thе merits of this issue because Anglin failed to preserve it for appeal. See Hardman v. State,
It was not until after Anglin got into drug court, violated conditions of probation, and was faced with a petition to revoke her probation that she first argued she was not eligible for drug court. Under these circumstances, we hold that Anglin has not preserved her argument for appellate review.
Affirmed.