142 Ky. 539 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1911
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
On and prior to August, 1909, M. D. Anglea was employed by the East Tennessee Telephone Company as a lineman, or “trouble man.” Sometime prior to that date the Franklin Electric Ice Company established an electric light plant in the city of Franklin, the place where Anglea was engaged, and by some arrangement, which is not shown, the electric light company attached its wires to the poles of the telephone company. For some time the electric light plant was operated only at night, but about three months before Anglea was killed, the company started and continued the operation during the day time. Anglea was killed about three o ’clock one afternoon while on the pole of the telephone company in .the performance of his duty as lineman for that company, by coming in contact with an electric light wire, and. his administratrix brought suit against both companies, alleging that Anglea lost his life by reason of the joint and
On the trial of the ease, after the administratrix introduced her testimony, the lower court gave the jury a peremptory instruction to find in behalf of the telephone •company, to which she objected and from which ruling she appeals. The court overruled the motion made by the electric light company for a peremptory instruction, completed the testimony as to it, instructed the jury and it found in behalf of the administratrix, the sum of $5,-000, from which the electric light company appeals.
These two companies owed Anglea very different duties. The telephone company, his employer, was required by law to use reasonable care to furnish him a reasonably safe place and appliances in and with which to labor. Anglea had been a lineman for that company at that place for about seven years. It was his business to erect the poles, string the wires and keep them in condition for use by the telephone company’s subscribers. He knew the condition of the wires of the company and the bad condition of the wires of the electric light company as" well as or better than any' one connected with his employer, and he had no special or positive directions by any superior employe of the telephone company to do work on the pole where he was killed, and it was on account of these facts, we infer, that the lower court gave the jury a peremptory instruction to find for the telephone company. This is a close question, but, giving some weight to the judgment of the lower court, we are inclined to let the judgment in favor of the telephone company stand.
The situation of the electric light company is different from that of the telephone company. Anglea was a member of the public in so far as it was concerned, and it knew that he would be frequently compelled to go up this pole while in the discharge of his duties to the telephone company; therefore, it was necessary for it to properly and safely insulate and string its wires. The testimony as to Anglea’s injury and death was, in substance, that this pole was about forty-five feet high;
The electric light company did not defend upon the idea that it had used due care in stringing and insulating its wires, but, on. the contrary, its main defense was that its wires were in such a bad condition that Anglea must have known it, and as he took the risk of coming in contact with them, his administratrix should not be allowed to recover. The testimony shows that he knew that it was dangerous to touch one of the electric wires while standing upon a conductor of electricity connected with the ground, and the electric light company claims for that reason his administratrix should not be permitted to recover.
In the case of Overall v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 20 Ky. Law Rep., 759, a case very similar to the one at bar, this court said:
“Appellant at the time he was struck was in a place where his business required him to be, and where he had a right to be, and it was the duty of the electric light company to know that linemen of the telephone company
If the electric light company’s contention were sustained, it would have £he effect to remove all employes of. the telephone company from the discharge of their duties. It is true, the evidence shows that Anglea knew that to come in contact with the wire when standing upon ■a conductor of electricity which was grounded would produce injury or death, hut there is no evidence that he intentionally came in contact with the wire. As stated, the inference from the testimony is that he was looking up through the limbs trying to see if they were causing the trouble with the ’phone which had been reported out ■of repair, and that while thus situated he received a ■shock in the manner before stated which caused him to unconsciously straighten up and come in contact with the electric light wire. There was no testimony of contributory negligence on his part, and as it cannot be presumed that a person who is dead at the time of the trial was guilty of contributory negligence, it must he proved. (Lexington & Carter County Mining Co. v. Stephens’ Admr, 104 Ky., 502, and C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., v. Yocum, 137 Ky., 117.)
The testimony of all the witnesses shows that the electric light wires were improperly hung and insulated, and there is no pretense on the part of the company that It made any effort to insulate them, therefore, the instructions criticised by it which required the company to exércise a high degree of care in that regard were not hurtful to it and it is unnecessary to consider the instructions any further.
As before stated, the main defense is that the place and appliances were so unsafe that Anglea must have known it and it was his duty to cease his labor for the telephone company, and as he did not he can not recover. We can not agree with appellant, Franklin Electric Ice Company, in this.
The judgment is, therefore, affirmed in both cases.