OPINION
Paul and Patricia Slayton (the Slaytons) filed suit in the District Court of Chaves County to quiet title to a State of New Mexico oil and gas lease. Loreen Angle (Angle) counterclaimed, asserting an interest in the lease below 2,080 feet. The Slaytons appealed to the Court of Appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Angle. The Court of Appeals, with Judge C. Fincher Neal dissenting, reversed the trial court. We granted Angle’s petition for writ of certiorari. We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.
The issue on appeal is whether the Slay-tons had constructive notice as a matter of law of Angle’s interest. The question arises because Angle recorded her interest several years after receiving it and after her grantor had divested itself of all title to the lease.
On May 22, 1964, Angle, the record owner of the lease at that time, assigned thе entire lease to Shell Oil Company (Shell). This assignment was filed with the State Land Office pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 19-10-31. (Although the 1953 statutes were in effect at the timе, for ease of reference we cite to the current statutes throughout this opinion, since there are no differences between thеm which are pertinent to the issues of this case.) In August of the same year, Shell assigned back to Angle all rights in the lease below 2,080 feet (the deeр rights). Since the Commissioner of Public Lands will not recognize or approve assignments of less than an entire state lease, NMSA 1978, Section 19-10-13, this assignment could be recorded only in Chaves County where the property is situated. Angle did not record this partial assignment in Chaves County until January 2, 1968. In the interim, Shell assignеd its interest in the lease “down to but not below the depths to which assignor owns such lease” to Dr. Sam Dunn (Dunn). Dunn correctly recorded this assignment in Chaves County оn November 16, 1965. In addition, Shell subsequently transferred record title to Dunn, filing this assignment with the State Land Office on June 15, 1967. Although this assignment appeared to transfer the entire lease, Dunn knew he was not receiving the deep rights. Dunn died later that year. On January 29, 1971, Dunn’s estate quitclaimed its interest in the lease to the Slaytons. Paul Slayton, an independent oil producer, and his wife acquired all the Dunn estate properties in New Mexico, including 96 wells, of which approximately 25 were producing wells. Prior to purchasing the properties, Paul Slayton examined the records of the State Land Office, but nоt the records of Chaves County.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Slaytons’ argument that a purchaser should be required to search the records pertaining to each prior owner of a particular property only for that period of time such prior owner had title. Sinсe Shell had relinquished all interest in the lease prior to Angle’s recordation of her interest, the assignment from Shell to Angle would not have apрeared of record during the time period Shell had title. The Court of Appeals concluded, therefore, that the Shell to Angle assignment was not in the Slaytons’ chain of title and that the Slaytons could not be charged with constructive notice of it. This approach is taken by a minority of jurisdictions and has become known as the Massachusetts view. See Cross, The Record “Chain of Title” Hypocrisy, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 787, 794 (1957).
We agree with Judge Neal that thе approach taken by a majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue is the better reasoned view; namely, that a property owner should not be divested of title by a subsequent purchaser when the owner has done all that the law requires him to do. Id.
An interest in an oil and gas leasе is considered in New Mexico to be an interest in real estate. Rock Island Oil and Refining Co. v. Simmons,
NMSA 1978, Section 14-9-2 provides that an instrument recorded in accordance with Section 14-9-1 “shall be notice to all the world of the existence and contents of the instruments so recorded from the time of recording.” By judicial interpretation, “all the world” has been limited to mean those persons who are bound to search the record, and it is to such persons only that the law imputes constructive notice. Romero v. Sanchez,
NMSA 1978, Sectiоn 14-9-3 provides in pertinent part that an unrecorded instrument shall not affect the rights or title to property of a purchaser without knowledge оf the unrecorded instrument. This statute protects “innocent purchasers for value without notice of unrecorded instruments who have invested monеy in property.” Jeffers v. Doel,
Angle did record her interest prior to the Slaytons’ acquisition of the lease by quitclaim deed. The Shell to Angle assignment was correctly recorded with the county clerk of Chaves County. Angle, therefore, did all that was required by statute to protect her interest. As subsequent purchasers, the Slaytons are deemed to have constructive notice of duly recorded instruments concerning the property аnd can find no protection in the recording laws. See Romero v. Sanchez.
We recognize that in situations such as this, the record title searсh may be difficult and the usual search methods inadequate. The statutes, however, are clear. There is no requirement that an instrument be recorded within a particular period of time. The order in which deeds appear on the record is not important in a notice jurisdiction. White v. MсGregor,
The trial court was correct in determining that the Slaytons had constructive notice of the Shell to Angle assignment, since it was properly reсorded prior to the Slay-tons’ acquisition of their interest. The Court of Appeals is reversed, and the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Angle is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.