62 N.Y.S. 410 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
This case was properly disposed of by this court at Special Term by a judgment which allowed to the plaintiff .the amount he is conceded to have paid at the time of entering into the contract of purchase which he now seeks to have specifically performed. The only question now before this court is upon the dismissal of the complaint, and the refusal to grant the judgment demanded.
On the 3d day of April, 1893, plaintiff’s assignor entered into a written contract with the Methodist Protestant Church of Williainsburgh for the purchase of certain land known as Union Cemetery.
During and subsequent to the determination of the litigation, the plaintiff does not appear to have done anything to assert, his rights, although given the power to act under various clauses of the contract ; and while we do not think it can be fairly urged that it came to an end under the terms of. the agreement, in 1894, we are persuaded that the plaintiff is not in a position to warrant a court of equity in interfering as between him and a subsequent purchaser in good faith who is now in possession of the property. The litiga
The plaintiff urges that, as the bodies had not been removed from the Union Cemetery at the time of these transfers, and as the ■sale contemplated conveyance of a fee simple, the instruments were incapable of conferring.title dming the time that the bodies remained; and this action, being brought before the removal of the bodies, there was no purchase in good faith for a bona fide consideration without notice of the rights of the plaintiff. We are of opinion, however, that it. was within the discretion of the. Legislature to permit the church to sell the land with the bodies still in the ground, provision being made for their proper removal to another place of interment, and that the Legislature did authorize such a transfer if that was a reasonable and proper method of carrying out the provisions of the law. The contention of the plaintiff that the statute ■ being merely permissive, did not impose the duty on the church of performing its trust, and that it could not cut itself free from the title to the property without having discharged the trust, is of doubtful application to the facts of this case. In Baltimore v. Marriott (9 Md. 174; cited' in 3 Ann. ■& Eng. Ency. of Law [2d ed.], 517) it Was held that it is a well-settled principle that when a statute confers power and authority upon a corporation, to be exercised for
It is not necessary, however, that we hold the statute to be mandatory, compelling a removal of the bodies; for treating its language as permissive merefy, the result is the same. The statute clearly contemplates the sale and removal as practically contemporaneous acts, though either might precede the other. It is quite within the terms of the act to assume that a sale of the land might be necessary to enable the corporation to procure another burial lot and pay the cost of the removal of the bodies. Under such circumstances the deed, if made prior to removal, would be subject to the easement which the lot owners held, which would only-he extinguished upon a removal of the bodies; but where they are removed, the deed takes effect in accordance with its terms. There is nothing repugnant to morals or religion in this transaction. The rights of
The purposes of the law have been fully carried out under the provisions of the contract entered into between the defendants Sloane and the church, at a large expenditure on. the part of the former; the property has been reduced to possession by Batterman, and the equities are so preponderating in his favor that it would ill become this court to attempt to divest him of his title, especially as there is no evidence which would warrant us in concluding that defendant Sloane purchased the property with any notice of plaintiff’s equity in the premises.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred, except Hibsohberg, J., taking no part..
Judgment affirmed, with costs.