Anetomang v. OKI Sys. Ltd.Anetomang v. OKI Sys. Ltd.
Rendered on March 1, 2012
Malek & Malek, and Douglas C. Malek, for appellant.
Ulmer & Berne LLP, Jeffrey F. Peck, and Stephen M. Gracey, for appellees.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
CONNOR, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, George Anetomang (“appellant“), appeals from a judgment entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting defendants-appellees, OKI Systems Limited and Crown Equipment Corporation‘s (“appellees,” collectively), motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons that follow, we affirm that judgment.
{¶ 2} On April 8, 2009, appellant filed a complaint against six “John Doe” defendants for injuries he allegedly sustained on August 7, 2007, while in the course and scope of his employment. Appellant‘s complaint stated that all six defendants were individuals, corporations, partnerships or other business entities whose names and addresses were not currently known to plaintiff and could not be reasonably ascertained.
{¶ 3} On March 9, 2010, appellant filed an amended complaint substituting OKI Systems Limited and Crown Equipment Corporation for John Doe Inc. #1. The amended complaint alleged claims for negligence, negligent hiring/supervision/training, and products liability, as well as punitive damages, based on personal injuries sustained by appellant on August 7, 2007. On March 11, 2010,1 appellant caused a summons to be issued upon OKI Systems Limited, in care of its statutory agent, and upon Crown Equipment Corporation, in care of its statutory agent. Neither summons contained the words “name unknown” in the body of the summons. The record reflects a process server obtained personal service by serving both parties on March 23, 2010. The record further reflects the “personal service return” form was filed on March 24, 2010, for both summonses.
{¶ 4} On August 2, 2010, appellees filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, appellees argued a two-year statute of limitations was applicable to appellant‘s personal injury claims, thereby requiring appellant to bring his action on or before August 7, 2009. Because appellant did not bring his action against appellees until the filing of the amended complaint on March 9, 2010, and because appellant‘s amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint due to appellant‘s failure to strictly comply with the requirements of
{¶ 5} On November 5, 2010, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, claiming he properly complied with the requirements of
{¶ 6} On November 15, 2010, appellees filed a reply, citing to Erwin v. Bryan, 125 Ohio St.3d 519, 2010-Ohio-2202, and further arguing appellant failed to follow the specific requirements of
{¶ 7} The trial court concluded appellant failed to comply with the requirements of
{¶ 8} Appellant has filed a timely appeal and now assigns as error the trial court‘s decision to grant appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, appellant argues the trial court misinterpreted the “original” summons language, claiming the summonses that were issued to appellees did in fact constitute “original” summonses. Furthermore, appellant submits the summonses properly contained the words “name unknown,” as the words “name/address unknown” are contained in the caption of each summons. Therefore, appellant contends he properly complied with the requirements of
{¶ 9} An action is commenced if a complaint is filed and a defendant is served with the complaint within one year pursuant to
{¶ 10} If a defendant in an action is unknown, a plaintiff can still file a complaint and later amend that complaint when the name of the unknown party is discovered pursuant to
{¶ 11} Applying the relation-back concept under those circumstances, where a plaintiff files his complaint and the applicable statute of limitations runs, and then the plaintiff amends his complaint, the amendment relates back to the time of the original filing of the action. Therefore, due to the “relation back,” the intervening statute of limitations does not interfere with the amendment. LaNeve at ¶ 11, citing Amerine at 59. However, when the specific requirements of
{¶ 12} Pursuant to
{¶ 13}
When the plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, that defendant may be designated in a pleading or proceeding by any name and description. When the name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. The plaintiff, in such case, must aver in the complaint the fact that he could not discover the name. The summons must contain the words “name unknown,” and a copy thereof must be served personally upon the defendant.
{¶ 14} This court has previously held that in order for an amended complaint to relate back to the original complaint regarding a defendant originally identified by a fictitious name, the plaintiff must personally serve the newly identified “John Doe”
{¶ 15} In the instant case, it is readily apparent the appellant did the following: (1) filed his original complaint within the two-year statute of limitations period; (2) designated the defendants by a fictitious name in the original complaint; and (3) averred in the original complaint that he could not discover the names of the fictitious defendants, as is required pursuant to our decision in Easter. However, a review of the summonses initiated on March 11, 2010, reveals that the words “name unknown” are not contained in the body of the summonses.
{¶ 16} Despite appellant‘s assertions, we do not interpret the incidental inclusion of the words “name/address unknown” in the caption of the summons as fulfilling the requirements of
{¶ 17} More recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the application of
{¶ 18} The Supreme Court of Ohio went on to find
{¶ 19} The Supreme Court of Ohio further stated:
To construe the rule to allow the use of placeholders for unidentified defendants would eliminate the statute of limitations for every cause of action. That is not the purpose of
Civ.R. 15(D) , and any indication that such a use is sanctioned by the court is disavowed. The Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated to govern the procedural aspects of litigation. Establishing state policy, including imposing a statute of limitations for a cause of action * * * is the province of the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government. Neither the Rules of Civil Procedure nor our case law ought be interpreted or understood to set policy or change existing statutes of limitation for causes of action.
{¶ 20} In the instant case, appellant sustained his alleged injuries on August 7, 2007. Thus, in order to comply with the two-year statute of limitations and the other principles governing strict compliance with
{¶ 21} Other appellate districts have also followed the rationale in Erwin. See Schura v. Marymount Hosp., 8th Dist. No. 94359, 2010-Ohio-5246 (reiterating that
{¶ 22} Whether we analyze this case under Erwin and its progeny or simply using the principles cited by the trial court that we previously set forth in Easter, we find the trial court did not err in granting appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, as appellant failed to strictly comply with
{¶ 23} Accordingly, appellant‘s assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
KLATT and SADLER, JJ., concur.