10 N.J. Eq. 91 | New York Court of Chancery | 1854
The complainant exhibited her bill against Hiram Farnham, to compel him to execute a trust in her favor respecting certain lands in the county of Essex, in this state. Joel Smith holds a mortgage on the property of f3000, executed to him by Farnham. The complainant alleges, that Smith took the mortgage with
The original bill alleges, that previous to, and at the time of the complainant’s marriage with her husband, Philo Andrews, who is deceased, she was seized and possessed, in her own right, of certain real estate in the county of Burlington, and that at the time of their marriage it was agreed between her and her husband, that in case of any sale of the said real estate, the proceeds thereof should be invested in other real estate for her sole benefit, and so with any future investment of such proceeds; that some time after her marriage she sold the Burlington estate, and invested the proceeds in real estate in the city of New York; that subsequently she exchanged the estate in New York for the farm in question in Essex county, and afterwards, by the advice of her husband, and for the purpose of keeping the same free of all claim or charge of her husband, the farm was conveyed to one James Madison Wells, who took the deed in his own ijame, but to hold in trust for the complainant; that then Philo Andrews saw fit, from circumstances arising from the situation of Wells, to take from him a deed for the farm in his own name, and finally, on' the 10th of April, 1837, the complainant and her husband conveyed to the defendant, Hiram Earnham; that although the said deed is absolute on its face, yet the said Earnham was told, and he understood, that the farm was to be held by him in trust for the complainant, until such time as she should choose to dispose of the same.
Earnham expressly denies the tryst, and puts in issue every allegation of tire bill from which such a trust could
But the complainant produced in evidence a paper writing, purporting to be signed by Hiram R. Farnham, bearing date about the time of the execution of the deed, which on its face is a declaration of trust. It is as follows: “ This may certify, that I have taken into my possession the farm on which I now live, to hold in confidential secret trust for Amelia Andrews; and, as consideration for rent, I am to keep the said farm in good condition and repair, and Philo Andrews; Amelia Andrews, and Caroline are to have with myself upon the farm, at any and all times that may suit their convenience, a home, and Caroline is to be treated as one of my family. The above farm was formerly owned by Abraham Reynolds, and exchanged for property in the city of New York, formerly held in trust by McNeil Seymour for Amelia Andrews. The above farm is to be convoyed at any time, subject to the order of Amelia Andrews or that of her husband and agent Philo Andrews.”
This writing is not alluded to in any way in the bill, nor is any reference made to it in the answer of Amelia Andrews to the cross-bill of Joel Smith, although she was called upon by that bill to disclose the nature of the trust. Why this paper was kept out of view in the pleadings, is not explained by anything appearing in the ease.
If this paper is genuine, does it help the complainant? By her bill, she claims the execution of a resulting trust. She has failed to prove the facts from which she alleges the trust results. This paper is admissible. as evidence for no other purpose than to prove the trust set out in the bill. If it proves the facts from which that trust results, it may be competent for such purpose. The counsel of the complainant admitted that the paper did not establish the trust alleged in the bill, but contended that it did prove the fact that Farnham held the property in trust for Amelia Andrews, and, therefore, the court ought to establish such trust. A complainant cannot make one case by his bill, and, having failed to prove it, abandon it, and recover upon a different one established by the evidence. The rule is not a technical one. Without it the pleadings are useless. The propriety of it is manifest in this ease. If this declaration of trust had been made the foundation of the suit, the issue between the parties would have been entirely different from that made by their pleadings. This paper is a naked declaration of trust. If the complainant relied upon' it, the defendant should have had the opportunity of making an issue upon that paper. This has been denied him. The trust upon which the complainant relied in her bill was