Andrew Teter v. Anne E. LopezAndrew Teter v. Anne E. Lopez
FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
Alan C. Kay, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 14, 2023 Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: Carlos T. Bea, Daniel P. Collins, and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Bea
SUMMARY*
Civil Rights/Second Amendment
Reversing the district court‘s summary judgment in favor of Hawaii officials and remanding, the panel held that Hawaii‘s ban on butterfly knives,
The panel determined that plaintiffs had standing to challenge
The panel denied Hawaii‘s request to remand this case for further factual or historical development in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass‘n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), determining that further development of the adjudicative facts was unnecessary.
The panel held that possession of butterfly knives is conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Bladed weapons facially constitute “arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment, and contemporaneous sources confirm that at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment, the term “arms” was understood as generally extending to bladed weapons, and by necessity, butterfly knives. The Constitution therefore presumptively guarantees keeping and bearing such instruments for self-defense.
The panel held that Hawaii failed to prove that section 134-53(a) was consistent with this Nation‘s historical tradition of regulating weapons. The majority of the historical statutes cited by Hawaii did not ban the possession of knives but rather regulated how they were carried and concerned knives that were distinct from butterfly knives, which are more analogous to ordinary pocketknives. Hawaii cited no analogues in which Congress, or any state legislature, imposed an outright ban on the possession of pocketknives close in time to the Second Amendment‘s adoption in 1791, or the Fourteenth Amendment‘s adoption in 1868.
COUNSEL
Alan A. Beck (argued), Law Offices of Alan Beck, San Diego, California; Stephen D. Stamboulieh, Stamboulieh Law PLLC, Olive Branch, Mississippi; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Robert T. Nakatsuji (argued), First Deputy Solicitor General; Ryan M. Akamine and Caron M. Inagaki, Deputy Attorneys General; Kimberly T. Guidry, Solicitor General; Holly T. Shikada, Attorney General; Attorney General‘s Office; Honolulu, Hawaii; for Defendants-Appellees.
Pamela W. Bunn and Wendy F. Hanakahi, Dentons US LLP, Honolulu, Hawaii; Janet Carter, William J. Taylor, Jr., Lisa M. Ebersole, and Carina B. Gryting, Everytown Law, New York, New York; for Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety.
Kevin O‘Grady, Law Office of Kevin O‘Grady LLC, Honolulu, Hawaii; David T. Hardy, Tucson, Arizona; for Amicus Curiae Hawaii Firearms Coalition.
Cody J. Wisniewski, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Lakewood, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Mountain States Legal Foundation.
John W. Dillon, Dillon Law Group APC, Carlsbad, California, for Amici Curiae San Diego County Gun Owners Political Action
OPINION
BEA, Circuit Judge:
In Hawaii, it is a misdemeanor knowingly to manufacture, sell, transfer, transport, or possess a butterfly knife—no exceptions.
I.
The butterfly knife, also known as the “balisong,” has a disputed origin. Some sources say it originated in France; others, the Philippines. It is anywhere from a few hundred to over a thousand years old. Regardless of its origin, the butterfly knife resembles an ordinary pocketknife, a tool that has been used by Americans since the early 18th century (at the very latest). See State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 613–14 (Or. 1984). Like a pocketknife, the butterfly knife comprises a handle and a folding blade, the cutting edge of which becomes covered by the handle when closed. Unlike a pocketknife, however, the butterfly knife‘s handle is split into two components. Together, these two components fully encase the blade when closed and rotate in opposite directions to open. With a few short, quick movements, an experienced user can open a butterfly knife with one hand.
Hawaii first criminalized carrying butterfly knives in 1993. See 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 404. Today, its butterfly knife ban reads in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly manufactures, sells, transfers, possesses, or transports in the State any butterfly knife, being a knife having a blade encased in a split handle that manually unfolds with hand or wrist action with the assistance of inertia, gravity or both, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Plaintiffs Andrew Teter and James Grell are law-abiding Hawaii residents who wish to purchase butterfly knives for self-defense. They sued Hawaii‘s Attorney General and Sheriff Division Administrator (“Hawaii“). Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief to establish that section 134-53(a) violates the Second Amendment and injunctive relief against its enforcement. Plaintiffs alleged that, “[b]ut for Hawaii law,” they would purchase butterfly knives. Plaintiffs further stated, in sworn declarations presented on cross-motions for summary judgment, that they owned butterfly knives before moving to Hawaii. They were “forced to dispose of” their knives because of section 134-53(a), but they would purchase butterfly knives again “[i]f Hawaii‘s ban were lifted.” During discovery, Hawaii‘s deposition witness and Plaintiffs’ expert witness agreed that the butterfly knife “is just a tool” that can be used offensively and defensively.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court applied then-binding precedent1 to conclude that section 134-53(a) does not violate the Second Amendment, granted Hawaii‘s motion, and
II.
We address two threshold issues before reaching the merits of this appeal. First, Hawaii argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge section 134-53(a). Second, Hawaii renews its argument that we should remand for “further factual or historical development.” We reject both arguments.
A.
We first consider Article III standing. “To satisfy Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Here, the parties primarily dispute the injury in fact requirement. In particular, they disagree on the applicable framework governing that requirement in the Second Amendment context.
Citing Jackson, Plaintiffs contend that the forced dispossession of their butterfly knives, combined with their inability to acquire replacements, constitutes a present injury which creates Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. See Id. at 967. But, citing San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, Hawaii argues that this amounts to the mere “chilling” of one‘s ability to purchase an outlawed arm, which is not a cognizable injury. 98 F.3d 1121, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated in part by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Hawaii‘s view, Plaintiffs have not established a present injury and must therefore satisfy the traditional requirements for a pre-enforcement challenge. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (describing those requirements); Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Holder (”Oklevueha“), 676 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2012) (same). For reasons explained below, we conclude that Plaintiffs have established standing to challenge section 134-53(a) under both Jackson and Driehaus.
1.
The plaintiff in Jackson sought to enjoin San Francisco‘s ban on the sale of hollow-point ammunition. 746 F.3d at 958. San Francisco argued that Jackson had “not suffered an injury in fact because she could easily obtain hollow-point ammunition outside San Francisco.” Id. at 967. We disagreed. We held that Jackson established an injury in fact because she “allege[d] that the Second Amendment provide[d] her with a legally protected interest to purchase hollow-point ammunition, and that but for [the ban], she would do so within San Francisco.” Id. (cleaned up). Jackson had not been threatened with prosecution under the ban—which prohibited only the transfer of such ammunition in San Francisco, not its possession—and we required no proof of such prosecution before concluding that she had suffered a
So too here. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that, “[b]ut for Hawaii law,” they would purchase butterfly knives, an allegation which mirrors the one found adequate in Jackson. Plaintiffs stated in sworn declarations that they were “forced to dispose of” their butterfly knives because of section 134-53(a) and that, “[i]f Hawaii‘s ban were lifted,” they would purchase replacements. As in Jackson, Plaintiffs “allege[] that the Second Amendment provides [them] with a legally protected interest to purchase [butterfly knives], and that, but for section [134-53(a)], [they] would do so
within [Hawaii].” Id. Accordingly, Jackson compels the conclusion that “section [134-53(a)] constitutes an injury in fact to [Plaintiffs], and [they have] standing to challenge it.” Id.
Hawaii‘s reliance on San Diego County for the contrary proposition is misplaced.
Decided in 1996—before Heller—San Diego County involved a challenge to the federal Crime Control Act of 1994 (“CCA“). 98 F.3d at 1124. The plaintiffs argued that they had standing to enjoin the CCA‘s enforcement because they “‘wish[ed] and intend[ed]’ to engage in unspecified conduct prohibited by the [CCA].” Id. In concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, we stated that “the chilling of [the plaintiffs‘] desire and ability to purchase outlawed firearms” was not a cognizable injury. Id. at 1129–30. Instead, we required the plaintiffs to identify some other injury-in-fact, which they failed to do. Id. at 1126–31. Hawaii argues that San Diego County forecloses any reliance on Jackson. We disagree.
As relevant here, San Diego County addressed a narrow question—whether a subjective, unspecified “chilling” of one‘s ability to acquire an arm constituted an injury in fact. Id. at 1124, 1129–30. Plaintiffs here do not allege that their ability to purchase butterfly knives has been “chill[ed].” Id. at 1129–30. The sale of butterfly knives is completely banned in the Hawaiian Islands. See
And to the extent San Diego County could be read as contradicting Jackson, it has been abrogated. When San Diego County was decided, our precedent held that “the Second Amendment [was] a right held by the states, and [did] not protect the possession of a weapon by a private citizen.” 98 F.3d at 1124 (cleaned up).3 In other words, to the extent San Diego County categorically held that a plaintiff cannot be injured by his inability “to purchase outlawed firearms,” id. at 1129–30, that was because our precedent had not yet recognized any individual right to keep
Hawaii‘s broad reading of San Diego County is also irreconcilable with Teixeira v. County of Alameda, which adopted Jackson‘s conclusion that the Second Amendment protects “the ability to acquire arms.” 873 F.3d 670, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).4 Thus, we conclude that Heller and Teixeira foreclose Hawaii‘s attempt to expand San
Diego County‘s holding in a manner that would contradict Jackson.
Because Jackson compels the conclusion that Plaintiffs have established an injury in fact, it is not apparent that we must analyze the traditional requirements for a pre-enforcement challenge. See Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘y, Inc., 307 F.3d at 855. But for the sake of thoroughness, we choose to “consider the familiar preenforcement claim ripeness analysis” to this case. Oklevueha, 676 F.3d at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). We reach the same result under Hawaii‘s theory of the case, which requires Plaintiffs to prove a justiciable threat of prosecution.
2.
To establish a justiciable threat of prosecution, a plaintiff must allege “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 159. Plaintiffs have alleged such an intention. Each Plaintiff declared under penalty of perjury that he wishes to purchase a butterfly knife, and would do so but for Hawaii‘s ban. That conduct is arguably affected with a constitutional interest—Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights—and is proscribed by the statute here. See
Citing San Diego County, Hawaii contends that Plaintiffs must go further and show a “genuine threat of imminent prosecution,” which San Diego County suggests would include a showing as to the “particular time or date on which plaintiffs intend to violate” the challenged statute. 98 F.3d at 1126–27. But these stricter requirements in San Diego County cannot be reconciled with Driehaus‘s rejection of the Sixth Circuit‘s similar view in that case, and these aspects of San Diego County are therefore no longer good law. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 899–900. As Driehaus makes clear, all that is required is that the plaintiff establish “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution.” 573 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added). Driehaus also confirms that exact dates and times are not necessary and that it is sufficient on that score to identify, as Plaintiffs have done here, the specific conduct (here, the acquisition and possession of butterfly knives) that they affirmatively intend to engage in if Hawaii‘s criminal prohibition is invalidated. Id. at 161.
Hawaii also argues that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing under the three-factor test we use “to determine whether plaintiffs have shown . . . a credible threat” under Driehaus. See Unified Data Servs., LLC v. FTC, 39 F.4th 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2022). Those factors are: “[1] whether the plaintiffs have articulated a concrete plan to violate the law in question, [2] whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings, and [3] the history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute.” Id. Consideration of these factors confirms that Plaintiffs have sufficiently established a credible threat of prosecution.
Here, Plaintiffs “have articulated a concrete plan to violate the law in question.” Id. They have stated, under penalty of perjury, that they previously possessed butterfly knives but were forced to dispose of them because of Hawaii‘s ban. They further declared that they wish to purchase replacement butterfly knives and would do so were the law not in place. Based on Plaintiffs’ disposal of their butterfly knives and their stated desire to purchase replacements, it is clear that their commitment to engage in conduct prohibited by Hawaii‘s ban is no mere “‘some day’ intention[].” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). Moreover, Hawaii‘s history of prosecution under its butterfly knife ban, is “good evidence” of a credible threat of enforcement. Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 164.
Hawaii‘s suggestion that a plaintiff must always prove “a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings” has no basis in our precedent. These factors must be considered as a whole, in light of the totality of the circumstances, and not as a mandatory checklist. See Unified Data Servs., LLC, 39 F.4th at 1210–11; Oklevueha, 676 F.3d at 836 (finding standing even though the “[p]laintiffs [did] not allege any threat of prosecution” (emphasis added)). On balance, we conclude that Plaintiffs have established a credible threat of enforcement of section 134-53(a), and therefore have established an injury in fact under Driehaus.
The remaining elements of standing are not seriously disputed. The injury Plaintiffs complain of is directly traceable to the defendants, who are the officials responsible for enforcement of Hawaii‘s butterfly knife ban. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. And their injury would be redressed by a remedy that the district court could provide them, namely, an injunction against enforcement. Id. at 561. We are therefore satisfied that Plaintiffs have met the requirements for Article III standing.
B.
Second, we deny Hawaii‘s request for a remand. Hawaii has not explained what further factual development necessitates this relief. At oral argument, Hawaii‘s counsel argued that further historical research is needed in light of Bruen. Oral Arg. at 14:58–16:50. But the historical research required under Bruen involves issues of so-called “legislative facts“—those “which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process,” such as “the formulation of a legal principle
Having cleared these two threshold hurdles, we now address the merits of this appeal.
III.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to Hawaii, as well as the denial of their own motion for summary judgment. “When the district court disposes of a case on cross-motions for summary judgment, we may review both the grant of the prevailing party‘s motion and the corresponding denial of the opponent‘s motion.” Rearden LLC v. Rearden Com., Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Specifically, we must determine whether section 134-53(a) violates rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment, which is a question we review de novo. United States v. Oliver, 41 F.4th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2022).
The Second Amendment guarantees the individual right to keep and bear arms, Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, and is incorporated against Hawaii through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). Before analyzing the parties’ Second Amendment arguments, we discuss Bruen.
A.
Bruen abrogated the two-step approach we had adopted following Heller and McDonald to analyze Second Amendment challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111. Under our pre-Bruen approach, we would: (1) determine whether the challenged law affects conduct historically protected by the Second Amendment; and (2) if so, apply varying levels of scrutiny to review the constitutionality of the arms regulation, depending on how close the conduct affected by the law lay to the “core” of the Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms.” E.g., Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 783–84 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc), vacated, 142 S. Ct. 2895. Bruen rejected this two-step test, reasoning that it was “one step too many.” 142 S. Ct. at 2127. Instead, Bruen held
that when the Second Amendment‘s plain text covers an individual‘s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation‘s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation‘s historical tradition may a court conclude that the
individual‘s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment‘s “unqualified command.”
Id. at 2126 (cleaned up). Although Bruen discussed “firearm regulation[s],” that was because the arm at issue in that case was a firearm. We see no reason why the framework would vary by type of “arm.”
Applying the above standard, the first question in Bruen was “whether the plain text of the Second Amendment protects [the plaintiffs‘] proposed course of conduct—carrying handguns publicly for self-defense.” Id. at 2134. In answering it, Bruen analyzed only the “Second Amendment‘s text,” applying ordinary interpretive principles. Id. at 2134–35. Because the word “‘bear’ naturally encompasses public carry,” the Court concluded that the conduct at issue in Bruen (public carry) was protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. at 2143.
The second question addressed in Bruen was whether New York had met its burden in proving its “proper-cause requirement is consistent with this Nation‘s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 2135. In answering this second question, Bruen noted that “not all history is created equal.” Id. at 2136. It reasoned that the most apposite historical sources from which to derive a comparable historical analogue to the challenged statute are those close in time to 1791 (when the Second Amendment was ratified) or 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified). Id. at 2136–38.7
We similarly structure our analysis. First, we examine whether possession of butterfly knives is conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Concluding that it is, we then analyze whether Hawaii has demonstrated that its complete prohibition of that conduct is consistent with this Nation‘s historical tradition of regulating arms.
B.
We first consider whether the possession of butterfly knives is protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The plain text provides:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
In Heller, the Supreme Court held that a handgun was an “arm” within the meaning of the Second Amendment. 554 U.S. at 581, 628–29. In reaching that conclusion, the Court began by noting that, as a general matter, the “18th-century
We similarly conclude that, just as with firearms in Heller, bladed weapons facially constitute “arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment. Like firearms, bladed weapons fit the general definition of “arms” as “[w]eapons of offence” that may be “use[d] in wrath to cast at or strike another.” Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, contemporaneous sources confirm that, at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment, the term “arms” was understood as generally extending to bladed weapons. See 1 Malachy Postlethwayt, The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (4th ed. 1774) (including among “arms” fascines, halberds, javelins, pikes, and swords). Because the plain text of the Second Amendment includes bladed weapons and, by necessity, butterfly knives, the Constitution “presumptively guarantees” keeping and bearing such instruments “for self-defense.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2135.8
Hawaii presents two arguments to the contrary. First, Hawaii argues that only “ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens” are included among “the people” referenced in the Second Amendment‘s plain text. From there, it argues that “banning weapons associated with criminals“—such as, in Hawaii‘s view, butterfly knives—“should not violate the Second Amendment.” This argument fails because Hawaii‘s ban is not limited to criminals. See
Second, we similarly reject Hawaii‘s argument that the purported “dangerous and unusual” nature of butterfly knives means that they are not “arms” as that term is used in the Second Amendment. Heller itself stated that the relevance of a weapon‘s dangerous and unusual character lies in the “historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of
dangerous and unusual
Because the historical tradition of prohibiting the carry of dangerous and unusual weapons was recognized in Heller, Hawaii had more than an ample opportunity to present arguments to the district court that butterfly knives are of that type. And Hawaii, in fact, proffered some evidence to that effect. Indeed, this appears to have been Hawaii‘s primary argument below; at the summary judgment hearing, Hawaii‘s counsel stated that “our initial argument is that the butterfly knife is a dangerous and unusual weapon.” But Hawaii failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether butterfly knives are dangerous and unusual.
To determine whether a weapon is dangerous and unusual, “we consider whether the weapon has uniquely dangerous propensities and whether the weapon is commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111. The record does not support a conclusion that the butterfly knife has uniquely dangerous propensities. The butterfly knife is simply a pocketknife with an extra rotating handle. The ability of an experienced user to expose the blade with one hand is not the sort of “astonishing innovation” that “could not have been within the contemplation of the constitutional drafters.” Delgado, 692 P.2d at 614.
There similarly is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether butterfly knives are commonly owned for lawful purposes. Most notably, Hawaii‘s own witness conceded that butterfly knives may be used for self-defense. Moreover, in opposing passage of
Having rejected Hawaii‘s arguments to the contrary, we conclude that the possession of butterfly knives is conduct covered by the plain text of the
C.
Because the possession of butterfly knives is covered by the plain text of the
In this historical-analogue inquiry, we cannot “uphold every modern law that remotely resembles a historical analogue.” Id. at 2133. “On the other hand, analogical reasoning requires only that the government identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin.” Id. In determining whether the modern regulation and the historical analogue are “relevantly similar,” we must look to the “how and why” of the two regulations; that is, “whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified are central considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry.” Id. at 2132-33. (cleaned up).
Hawaii argues that
As Bruen put it, the “how” of the proffered state statutes is different—they regulate different conduct. 142 S. Ct. at 2133. The vast majority of the statutes cited by Hawaii did not ban the possession of knives; they regulated only their carry. True, four of these statutes (by our count) banned the possession of slung-shots, metal knuckles, and an undefined category of “deadly weapons.” See supra note 11. But no statute cited by Hawaii categorically banned the possession of any type of pocketknife.
Hawaii‘s best historical analogue is an 1837 Georgia statute. That statute states that no one shall “keep, or have about or on their person or elsewhere . . . Bowie, or any other kind of knives.” 1837 Ga. Laws 90. It is not apparent to us that “other kind[s] of knives,” would have been understood to include pocketknives. Even so, the Georgia statute must have permitted at least some possession of knives because it provided an exception for open carry. Id. It thus was substantially less restrictive
Of the remaining knife-regulating statutes cited by Hawaii, the most restrictive category banned the sale of bowie knives, Arkansas Toothpicks, dirks, or daggers.12 The second-most restrictive category banned the carry of such weapons, concealed or otherwise.13 But even these two categories are outliers.
The vast majority of the statutes cited by Hawaii prohibited the concealed carry of bowie knives, Arkansas Toothpicks, dirks, daggers, or other “deadly weapons.”14
Other statutes were even more targeted. Some prohibited carry by certain individuals,15 carry in certain places at certain times,16 or carry for certain purposes,17 and still others regulated dangerous conduct, such as dueling with a weapon.18
Notably, the cited statutes regulated kinds of knives that are distinct from butterfly knives. The butterfly knife is clearly more analogous to an ordinary pocketknife than to an Arkansas Toothpick or a bowie knife. And none of the statutes cited by Hawaii prohibited the carry of pocketknives, much less their possession outright. Four of these statutes, in fact, exempted pocketknives by name.20
when a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the
Second Amendment . Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.
Here, the 1999 Hawaii Legislature addressed the perceived social problem of an “increasing trend in minors and gang members armed with knives and daggers,” who preferred butterfly knives “as they are easy to conceal and are more intimidating when brandished.” But the problem of people using easily concealable, foldable knives in violent crimes predates 1999 by hundreds of years:
Of the many varieties of knives, none has been a more constant or enduring companion to man than the pocket knife. Specimens of folding pocket knives have been discovered in Roman archeological sites, indicating that such knives were popular at least from the first century A.D. They have been manufactured for their utility as both instruments of labor and combat. One of the most common of the specific named knives is the jackknife, a word of uncertain origin, which was a large single-bladed folding knife, ranging in size from four to seven inches when closed. By the early 1700s, when the eastern seaboard had become a highly settled area with large towns and cities and relatively good roads, men normally carried a folding pocket knife. Even when they joined the American army during the revolution, the knife they carried was the jackknife, which was mentioned frequently in colonial records. During the American Revolution at least two states, New Hampshire and New York, required their militiamen to carry a jackknife. . . . The folding pocketknife, in particular, since the early 18th century has been commonly carried by men in America and used primarily for work, but also for fighting.
Thus,
IV.
We conclude that
REVERSED AND REMANDED.