The Nebraska Student Loan Program, Inc., appeals from the September 2, 1998, and October 16, 1998, orders of the bankruptcy court 1 holding that two of the debt- or’s student loans were discharged in her Chapter 7 case under the undue hardship provision of § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.
We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.
Johnson v. Border State Bank (In re Johnson),
Because we conclude that the bankruptcy court correctly interpreted § 523(a)(8) as applying to each student loan individually and not to an aggregate obligation of cumulative student loan debt, and because the bankruptcy court’s determination that the debtor would experience undue hardship if two of her student loans were excepted from discharge is not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
*129 BACKGROUND
The debtor, Donna Mae Andresen, obtained three student loans, 3 one each year in 1986, 1987, 1988, while attending school to become a licensed practical nurse. The loans were each guaranteed by NSLP, which is still the holder of the three loans. The loans are not consolidated.
Andresen filed her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on January 7, 1991. In 1993, Andresen sustained a severe back injury with a disability rating of 43% for workers’ compensation purposes. After her injury, Andresen was unable to find work in Nebraska and commenced a nationwide job search. Eventually she found an employer willing to accommodate her disability, and she moved to Nevada to take that job.
On May 1, 1996, Andresen filed this adversary proceeding seeking determination of dischargeability of her three student loans pursuant to the undue hardship provisions of § 523(a)(8). The bankruptcy court tried the matter on June 16, 1998. On September 2, 1998, the court entered an order finding thаt Andresen had satisfied the requirements of § 523(a)(8) for a hardship discharge of two of her three student loans, and found that she could pay the third loan without undue hardship. 4
NSLP contends that the bankruptcy court erred when it found that excepting Andresen’s student loans from discharge would impose undue hardship on her and her dependents, and argues that the court had no authority to grant “partial discharge” of Andresen’s student loan debt. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the bankruptcy court.
DISCUSSION
Partial Discharge
Section 523(a)(8) provides:
A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt — for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for any obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 5
Across jurisdictions there is wide disparity among treatments of student loans under § 523(a)(8). For the past two decades, a split has developed regarding whether a court may partially discharge a debtor’s student loan or whether the courts are restricted to all-or-nothing dischargeability.
The courts practicing revision of student loans, granting partial discharges, and fashioning other case-specific equitable relief have found authority to do so implicit in § 523(a)(8) due to its policy objectives, and alternatively in the discretionary equitable powers reserved to the bankruptcy court by § 105(a). See Thad Collins, Note, Forging Middle Ground: Revision of Student Loan Debts in Bankruptcy as an Impetus to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 528(A)(8), 75 Iowa L .Rev. 733, 757-61 (1990).
*130
Critics of the partial discharge theories, however, note the “well-accepted principle that if Congress is able to specify something in the statute but does not, then its silence controls.”
Id.
at 758, citing
NLRB v. Bildisco,
The legislative history clearly identifies the policies behind the exception to discharge for student loans. Congress excepted student loans from discharge in order to close what it deemed a loophole in the student loan program.
Id.
at 734; see also
Johnson v. Missouri Baptist College (In re Johnson),
Nevertheless, as clear as the legislative history is, it suffers a lack of scope. While it identifies the legislative purpose of excepting student loans from discharge, the legislative history offers little to define the nature of the exception (undue hardship) to the exception (nondischargeability). That Congress wanted to save the student loan programs and bar the undeserving student borrower from abusing the bankruptcy process does not directly identify how Congress intended the discharge to be granted in cases of undue hardship. 7 The legislative purposes do not illustrate the legislative position on the propriety of partial discharge and other revisions of student loans in undue hardship cases under § 523(a)(8).
Nevertheless, some cоurts have found that revising student loans, partially discharging them, or deferring payments by maintaining or extending the automatic stay, are proper applications of the undue hardship exception to the nondischarge-ability of student loans because such manipulation upholds the policies behind non-dischargeability generally and attributes
*131
significance to the fresh start policy at the same time.
8
These courts find that partial discharge of student loans protects the solvency of the student loan programs and deters undeserving debtors while protecting the honest but unfortunate debtor better than the all-or-nothing approach which can lead to harsh results, either for the creditor or the debtor depending on the whether the outcome is all or nothing.
See, e.g., Georgia Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Bowen (In re Bowen),
Other courts granting partial discharge and other partial relief under § 523(a)(8) rely on the equitable powers of § 105(a), which provides, in relevant part, “The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title ... shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate ... to prevent an abuse of process.”
See, e.g., Conner v. Illinois State Scholarship Commission (In re Conner),
However, § 105(a) has been found by some courts to be restricted to exercising equitable powers only within the enumerations of the Code.
See Johnson v. First Nat’l Bank of Montevideo,
Accordingly, the question arises whether § 105(a) provides authority for a bankruptcy court to grant an undue hardship discharge under § 523(a)(8) in any manner less than full discharge when the language of § 523(a)(8) does not itself include any particular limiting or broadening language. On its face, the statute asks only whether or not excepting the loan at issue from discharge will impose undue hardship upon the debtor or the debtor’s dependents. The telling word in the section is unless, which therefore casts the determination as: if excepting the student loan from discharge will impose undue hardship, then the debt is discharged.
In spite of the unstable foundation upon which rests the authority, if any, to revise student loans or partially discharge student loan debt, courts continue to do so on the basis of implicit statutory policy or § 105(a) discretion because the literal interpretation and its sometimes harsh results seem at odds with the legislative intentions for § 523(a)(8) and with the purposes of the Code overall. 9 These courts, *132 at least, have apparently deemed fairness principles a concern supreme to arbitrary or unpredictable results and consistent with, or within the confines of, express provisions of the Code. See Collins at 761 (whether or not revision or partial discharge of student loans pursuant to § 523(a)(8) constitutes intolerable judicial lawmaking depends on whether the practice furthers or corrupts the legislative intent).
For example, in
Tennessee Student
As
sistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby),
A number of courts finding partial discharge and other modifications of student loans appropriate rely on
Heckathorn v. United States Dept. of Educ. (In re Heckathorn),
Construing the exceptions to discharge “in light of equity” requires that bankruptcy court to recognize that the relief that Congress afforded the debtor under § 523(a)(8) centers around undue hardship, which is necessarily a “matter of degree.” Id. at 195. “Financial hardship is not all-or-nothing, but is more or less.” Id. The Heckathom court further relied on the premise that partial discharge or other revision of student loan debt accomplishes both legislative policy objectives, fresh start and maximum repayment of student loans, instead of “[ijnsisting on complete discharge or complete repayment [and] unnecessarily sacrificing] one policy to the other.” Id. Finally, the Heckat- *133 horn court relied on the general canon of statutory interpretation that a court should not interpret a statute plainly if so doing would lead to an absurd result, “meaning a result which furthers no purpose, i.e. is arbitrary or fortuitous.” Id.
The theоry of partial discharge and its progeny of assorted other equitable responses by courts facing debtors for whom a whole discharge seems overly generous (usually due to the debtor’s potential for increased future earnings) appears to have begun with the bankruptcy court’s opinion in
Littell v. State of Oregon Bd. of Higher Educ. (In re Littell),
Since the
Littell
opinion in 1980, the number of courts granting partial discharges and other equitable relief under § 523(a)(8) has increased considerably.
See, e.g., Wetzel v. New York Higher Educ. Services Corp. (In re Wetzel),
Contrariwise, other courts have found that there is absolutely no authority for the bankruptcy court to do anything but make the undue hardship determination and accordingly find the student loan at issue either discharged or excepted from discharge. In
Hawkins v. Buena Vista College (In re Hawkins),
In construing § 523(a)(8) and concluding that it does not authorize the courts to fashion partial discharges, the
Hawkins
court noted that “Congress has not given
*134
bankruptcy courts the authority to rewrite student loans,” and that “Congress could have provided that student loans will be dischargeable ‘to the extent’ excepting such debt will impose undue hardship upon a debtor and her dependents,” especially in light of the fact that “Congress used that phrase numerous times elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code, including three other subdivisions of the dischargeability statute, 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), 523(a)(5), and 523(a)(7).”
Id.
at 301. The court noted the well-known canon of statutory construction that “Congress’ failure to include language is presumed intentional where it has used the language elsewhex*e in the same statute.”
Id.;
citing
Bildisco,
465 U.S at 522-23,
In
Skaggs v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Skaggs),
Finally, the court in
Skaggs
explained that § 523(a)(8) is so clearly unambiguous on its face that the limit on the court’s power “to act only on the entire student loan” is self-evident: “ ‘Debt’ is defined in section 101(12) of the Bankruptcy Code as ‘liability on a claim.’ Plainly understood, ‘liability on a claim’ encompasses the entire hability, not merely some portion of the debt or merely selected terms of repayment. Congress might have used language to authorize the discharge of partial liability or the modifications of conditions of liability but did not.”
Skaggs,
Interestingly, few opinions, including Skaggs which included consideration of the statutory definition of debt and analysis of the meaning of hability on a claim, address the premise that a debtor’s liability on a claim for repayment of a student loan made, or of another educational debt or obligation (or overpayment), as provided by § 523(a)(8), speaks to one or to each loan. Many of the cases on both sides of the issue completely overlook the apparently express wording of the statute which mandates an undue hardship evaluation for each individual educational loan obligation. The cases deal with the debt in aggregate, perhaps misled merely because multiple loans are often held by one lendеr, servicer or guarantor which may subtly manage to blend multiple liabilities on actually different claims into one single debt.
Other courts have distinguished among a single debtor’s multiple loans but nevertheless held that the all-or-nothing rule requires the hardship discharge to operate on either ah or none of the debtors loans. In
Young v. PHEAA (In re Young),
In
Brown v. Salliemae Serv. Corp. (In re Brown),
However, the court deferred to the Ninth Circuit BAP’s holding that the plain language of § 523(a)(8) precluded partial discharge of a student loan, and accordingly discharged all of the debtor’s student loans.
See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Taylor (In re Taylor),
In
Taylor,
the Ninth Circuit BAP did indeed hold that the plain language of § 523(a)(8) does not authorize a partial discharge of student loans.
Taylor,
However, the BAP in Taylor did not hold that individual treatment of each of a debtor’s student loans under § 523(a)(8) constituted partial discharge. The BAP did not define partial discharge with that much particularity. The BAP simply did not address whether the statute’s undue hardship exception, to the otherwise general exceрtion to discharge of student loans, is to be applied all-or-nothing as to the debtor’s “debt for an educational ... overpayment or loan,” as opposed to a debtor’s summed debts or aggregate debt for educational overpayments or loans. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
The debtor in Taylor originally borrowed educational funds from different lenders, and some of the loans were later consolidated. Taylor at 749. Accordingly, the BAP in Taylor also overlooked the significance, if any, of the effect of consolidation on some or all of a debtor’s student loans. The court did not answer whether or not, for purposes of applying the all-or-nothing undue hardship rule, consolidation transforms a debtor’s original several loans into a single loan. Its treatment of the debtor’s student loans nevertheless, was comprehensive in that the all of all-or-nothing included all of the debtor’s student loans, consolidated and not, as opposed to all (dollars) of each loan.
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has not specifically decided the issue of partial dischargeability. However, in
Pagnac v. Minnesota Dep’t. of Revenue (In re Pagnac),
The cases finding partial discharges and crafting a myriad of equitable relief varieties illustrate the unpredictability and lack of uniformity of outcomes resulting from courts not following an all-or-nothing rule. While the courts endorsing theories of a broad grant of discretion or an implicit prevailing policy objective rely on principles of fairness and lack of better way to properly address the multitude of factors unique to each student loan bankruptcy case, the pervasive lack of certainty and the diversity of results may in fact produce an entirely different set of in equities. It seems reasonably possible that Congress in fact wrote § 523(a)(8) as plainly as it did because the all-or-nothing approach actually strikes a superior equilibrium by sorting student loan cases along a bright-line and containing judicial discretion within the confines of defining and determining undue hardship, rather than vesting the bankruptcy court with the authority, much less the duty, to interfere as much as the judicial tinkering demonstrated by the cases practicing partial discharge and other revision of student loans.
In this casе, we hold that the bankruptcy court did not grant Andresen a “partial discharge” of her student loan debt, at least not in the sense contemplated by NSLP or contained by the term of art definition of partial discharge as it has developed over the last twenty years. The language of § 523(a)(8) expressly refers to a student loan, an overpayment, or any obligation. The words provided in the section are clearly singular. The Code does not refer to a debtor’s sum of student loans, aggregate student loan debt, or other accumulated, consecutive, or consolidated loan obligations. 10
The bankruptcy court found that Andre-seris Chapter 7 discharge operated on two of her three individual student loans by reason of the undue hardship provision of § 523(a)(8). The court found that one of her student loans was excepted from the discharge because paying that loan would not cause undue hardship to her or her dependents. 11 This is not a case where a court found that the discharge operated to relieve part of a single loan, or part of a sum of consolidated loans, by some pro *137 rata, percentage or other truly partial measure.
We hold that the bankruptcy court’s application of § 523(a)(8) to each of Andre-sen’s educational loans separately was not only allowed, it was required.
To determine whether § 523(a)(8) permits partial discharge is to determine whether the statute permits a single student loan to be divided into discharged and excepted portions due to the undue hardship that would otherwise be imposed upon the debtor and her dependents if the whole single obligation were excepted. While it appears plain to us that there is no authority in the Code or elsewhere for partial discharge or other revision of a debtor’s individual educational loan obligations, that question is not before us and we therefore decline to decide it.
Undue Hardship
Undue hardship is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. The legislative history demonstrates that Congress was concerned about abusive student debtors and protecting the solvency student loan programs, but the history does not shed light on exactly what Congress meant by the use of the term undue hardship. See Ve-ryl Victoria Miles, Fairness, Responsibility, and Efficiency in the Bankruptcy Discharge: Are the Commission’s Recommendations Enough? 102 Dick.L.Rev. 795, 824-830 (1998).
Primary arguments over enactment of § 523(a)(8) addressed the lack of empirical evidence of student debtors in fact constituting a threat to the continued viability of student loan programs and whether the exception to discharge was actually a collection device for lenders not being aggressive enough with collection efforts. Id. Appreciation for the fact that undue hardship would accordingly be “subject to disparate multi-factоr approaches” has occurred only with the benefit of hindsight. Id. at 828, citing Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Final Report, ch. 5 at 52 (Oct. 20,1997) (dissent).
Indeed, a number of tests for undue hardship have been developed over the last two decades, each trying to accurately reflect and enforce the policies Congress intended by enacting the exception to the exception, and yet each containing significant differences. See Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors be Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans? 71 Tul.L.Rev. 139, 170 (1996) (Undue hardship is an empty vessel, susceptible to being filled with whatever policy objectives courts deem appropriate).
The Brunner Test
In its determination, the bankruptcy court relied on the test set forth by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp.,
Many bankruptcy courts, including several in the Eighth Circuit, have followed the
Brunner
test.
See
e.g.,
In re Rose,
The Johnson Test
The
Brunner
test is a popular variation of what appears to be the first § 523(a)(8) undue hardship test, articulated years earlier by the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v.
*138
Johnson (In re Johnson),
The Bryant-Poverty Test
On the other hand, some courts have declined to follow
Johnson
or
Brunner.
In 1987, the bankruptcy court in
Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant),
Miscellaneous Variations
Other courts have added other levels of precision to certain factors of different tests, perhaps clarifying an ambiguity within the test a jurisdiction applies but adding to the confusion overall. For example, in 1993, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Brunner
analysis of future income potential requires certain and not temporary hopelessness in order for a discharge to operate of a debtor’s student loans.
See In re Roberson,
In 1995, the Third Circuit defined undue hardship as unconscionable hardship.
See PHEAA v. Faish (In re Faish),
The Cheesman and Pena Tests
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel rejected
Brunner
in favor of the test enunciated by the Sixth Circuit in
Cheesman v. TSAC (In re Cheesman), 25
F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir.1994).
See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena),
The
Pena
court also rejected
Brunner
based on its good faith test limitation, as enunciated by the district court in that case, precluding the debtor from offering evidence that the education for which the loans paid was of little or no use or benefit to the debtor.
Id.
at 923, citing
Brunner,
The Rule in the Eighth Circuit: Andrews
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has not expressly adopted or rejected the
Brunner
or any other test for undue hardship. However, we think the Eighth Circuit expressed its preference for a totality of the circumstances test a long time ago in
Andrews v. South Dakota Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews),
The Eight Circuit’s opinion in Andrews resulted in a test for undue hardship under § 523(a)(8) that requires an analysis of (1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) calculation of the debtor’s and his dependents’ reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding that particular bankruptcy case. Id. The Eighth Circuit’s Andrews case, while not a finely detailed test as those pronounced in Brunner or Frech, is the authority in this circuit on the matter of undue hardship discharge under § 523(a)(8).
Moreover, the Andrews test is less restrictive and less narrow, yet it maintains the essential core considerations. For example, the Frech test asks whether and to what extent the debtor received benefit from his or her education financed by the loans sought to be discharged. We think that, absent unique circumstances, this inquiry would ordinarily be irrelevant. On the other hand, it may speak to a debtor’s future earning capacity. The Brunner *140 test extends the issue of the debtor’s ability to repay to the term of repayment of the loan. We think this limitation may not be appropriate in every case.
Totality of the Circumstances
There are many courts applying a totality of the circumstances test for undue hardship under § 523(a)(8).
13
For example, in
Law v. Educational Resources Inst. Inc. (In re Law),
In
Strauss v. Student Loan
Office—
Mercer University (In re Strauss),
Finally, the bankruptcy court in
In re Rose,
The test for undue hardship binding bankruptcy courts in the Eighth Circuit is that held by the Court of Appeals in Andrews. We interpret Andrews to require a totality of the circumstances inquiry with special attention to the debtor’s current and future financial resources, the debtor’s necessary reasonable living expenses for the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, and any other circumstances unique to the particular bankruptcy case.
A careful review of the record in this case reveals that the bankruptcy court, although it explicitly applied the Brunner test, did not err when it found that excepting two of Andresen’s student loаns from discharge would impose undue hardship on Andresen and her dependents. The Brunner test and the Andrews test are similar, with the controlling Andrews test simply allowing a broader consideration of the case and any factors specific to a given debtor’s particular situation. We find that the bankruptcy court’s finding of undue hardship is supported by the evidence under either test.
*141 We reject NSLP’s contention that An-dresen did not prove that her financial situation is unlikely to improve in the future. The bankruptcy court specifically found that due to her disability, Andre-sen’s income will not likely increase “at any time in the future.” Moreover, the bankruptcy court noted that although An-dresen’s son would soon reach the age of majority and no longer be her legal responsibility, the child support she receives for his care will also be eliminated at that time.
Finally, although NSLP argues that An-dresen will have extra income in three years when her second mortgage is paid off, the bankruptcy court noted that An-dresen’s minor daughter has medical problems the treatment of which results in extraordinary expenses from time to time. This may indicate that although Andre-sen’s legal responsibility for that child will terminate before the second mortgage is satisfied, she may nevertheless be required to continue caring for the child, or face accrued medical bills, and without the benefit of the child support she currently receives for that child.
The bankruptcy court made a careful analysis of the debtor’s situation. Without second guessing the bankruptcy court, we cannot find that its factual findings are clearly erroneous. Based on those findings, we agree that excepting the loans from discharge would impose undue hardship on Andresen and her dependents.
CONCLUSION
Because the bankruptcy court did not allow a partial discharge of a student loan, we need not address the issue of the permissibility under thе Code of partial discharges of student loans under § 523(a)(8).
The court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous but are supported by the record and indicate that, under the Andrews totality of the circumstances test for undue hardship, Andresen and her dependents would suffer undue hardship if two of her student loans were excepted from discharge. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the bankruptcy court.
Notes
. The Honorable John C. Minahan, Jr., United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Nebraska.
. But see
Cheesman v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman),
. The original dates and principal balances of the loans are:
March 31, 1986 — $2,500.00
February 10, 1987 — $2,625.00
April 7, 1988 — $1,177.00
. The debtor does not appeal this part of the court’s judgment.
. The noted version of the statute became effective October 7, 1998. The earlier version contained a provision controlling the dis-chargeability of student loans the due date of which arose more than seven years prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. That provision was repealed and undue hardship is now the only basis for discharge of student loans. However, the prior version of the statute would not produce a different result in this case. Andresen filed her Chapter 7 petition less than seven years after her student loans first became due.
. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) includes the language “but not to the extent that ...” in order to qualify the exceptions to the nondis-chargeability of debts to the debtor’s children, spouse or former spouses, and other matrimonial related debts. Such language presumably vests the bankruptcy court with the latitude and duty to find which parts of a debt under this section are discharged and not, as opposed to limiting the outcome of the determination to all-or-nothing. Section 523(a)(7) also includes "to the extent” language to preclude the all-or-nothing discharge and presumably require the court to make specific findings as to the extent to which the debt is nondischargeable.
. In this regard, it is worth noting the significance of § 523(a)(8) prior to its most recent amendment: the original section allowed student loans to be discharged without demonstrating undue hardship as long as a period of 5 years (subsequently amended to 7 years and most recently completely eliminated) following the first due date of the loans had expired. That the original statute contemplated a point at which a debtor could discharge student loans completely and without a showing a undue hardship may explain the apparent all- or-nothing approach to the undue hardship discharge exception. Congress simply wasn't contemplating any situation in which a loan would require revision by a bankruptcy court because either a loan would be fully dis-chargeable before the five (or seven) years on the basis of undue hardship, or it would be fully dischargeable in any event upon expiration of the applicable number of years. Under the original statute, therefore, a debtor would be unlikely to seek relief in bankruptcy prior to the expiration of the applicable number of years since repayment on a student loan became due, unless the debtor's undue hardship made it imperative.
. But see Craig A. Gargotta, Column, Affairs of State, Congress Amends § 523(A)(8) to Eli-mibate Seven-Year Discharge Provisions for Student Loans, 17-NOV Am.Bankr.Inst.J. 8 (1998) (Congress nоw views undue hardship not as a debtor protection, but rather as a creditor protection, and consequently fresh start is no longer the issue, but whether the non-payment of the student loans violates public policy).
. Interestingly, there are so many cases in which bankruptcy courts have granted partial discharge under § 523(a)(8) that some commentators and even some courts in cases addressing the exception to discharge for nonsupport divorce debts under § 523(a)(15) have recognized a partial discharge theory operating in § 523(a)(8) and applied it to § 523(a)(15) by analogy.
See
Stephen Joseph,
How Courts Have Interpreted the Phrases "Ability to Pay” and "Outweighs the Detrimen
*132
tal Consequences” Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A) and (B) of the Bankruptcy Code in Cases Involving Non-Dischargeable Divorce Obligations
— Part
I,
103 Conn.L.J. 67, 78 (1998); Richard H.W. Maloy,
Using Bankruptcy Court to Modify Domestic Relations Decrees: Problems Created by § 523(A)(15),
31 Fam.L.Q. 433, 453 (1997);
Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky),
. At least one other court appreciates this distinction.
See Hinkle v. Wheaton College (In re Hinkle),
.
But see Raimondo v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. (In re Raimondo),
. The Eighth Circuit relied on the Commission's recommendation that student loans "should not as a matter of policy be dis-chargeable before (the debtor) has demonstrated that
for any reason
he (or she) is unable to earn sufficient income to maintain himself (or herself) and his (or her) dependents and to repay the educational debt.”
Andrews,
.
See, e.g., Moorman v. Kentucky Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Moorman),