Andre Watkins v. City of Southfield, Mark Wood, L. Porter, and Jane Doe

WATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Andre SOUTHFIELD, Wood, Mark OF

CITY Doe, Porter, and Jane L. Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-2336. Appeals, United States Court Sixth Circuit. March Submitted: July Decided and Filed: (briefed), MI, Detroit, L.

Ernest Jarrett Appellant. for (briefed), Joseph Cummings, Nimako Acho, Livonia, MI, McClorey, Davis & Appellee. WELLFORD, SILER,

Before: GILMAN, Judges. Circuit WELLFORD, J., opinion delivered the court, SILER, J., joined. in which - GILMAN, 94), (pp. J. delivered a separate concurring opinion.

OPINION

WELLFORD, Judge. Circuit appeals

Andre Watkins grant summary judg- court’s decision to ment in favor of the defendants in this suit arising out of a of Watkins’ car. He alleges that Lawrence Porter and Mark Wood, both officers of the Southfield (Michigan) Department, Police violated his when, rights constitutional a rea- without so, doing they forcibly sonable basis for Evergreen him out eled east towards Road. Wat- pulled stopped Watkins’ him, him into pushed handcuffed kins claimed that once he was on gunpoint, 8-1/2 car, ques- patrol Road, of their very the back seat Mile he continued to drive him, him eventually released tioned slowly. cautiously and He estimated disobeying offi- a ticket for traveling only he was fifteen miles signal cer’s twenty-five per hour in a mile hour zone.1 alleges that and Watkins Porter Wood be- Porter, Wood, against filed suit Watkins matter, gan intimidating to drive in an officer, City and the another unidentified him approaching following very and close- Southfield, deprivation of his alleging of ly. stopped stop signs Watkins at and rights under U.S.C. constitutional going he “was to make a turn.” and the intentional infliction when The distress under state law. emotional eventually Evergreen Watkins reached that defendants district court ruled the Road, right. Immediately and turned af- summary judgment entitled to were so, doing ter defendant Wood turned on below, we claims. For the reasons both it police spotlight the car’s and aimed to- AFFIRM the district court. wards the rear windshield of Watkins’ car. Watkins, however, continued to drive for I. BACKGROUND two, maintaining another block or his in question, At time of the incident the speed approximately per fifteen miles high seventeen-year-old was a Watkins why deposition hour. When asked his passenger, school senior. His friend and driving, he continued Watkins said that Gabriel, years older. was few Jermaine driving] only officer had on his side “[the between four and five o’clock Somewhere the lights.” The officers then activated early morning July Wat- flashing lights. car’s red and police blue driving home after kins was Gabriel stated that he “slowed down and Watkins A home. evening spent Watkins’ signaled to the officer that [he] [he] Department pa- Police marked Southfield station, gas to at the which was going by defendants Porter operated trol away.” half only a block and a The record Wood, traveling the passed and Watkins not indicate how or what manner does direction, the then opposite and officers intending “signaled” Watkins he was not, They follow did began to Watkins. nearby Al- gas to at the station. however, immediately signal for Watkins not though deposition Watkins’ does indi- Watkins, he pull According to over. why sought gas to reach the sta- cate “at driving speed under limit tion, a well lit he claims his brief was miles The district per about 20 hour.” about “the area because he concerned judicial court in this case took notice manner” in which the were bizarre officers limit posted speed particular on the driving. cars arrived at patrol Other forty per being road traveled was miles and was forced to scene Watkins brief, hour. In his Watkins asserts speed, minimum the de- road had no and included the fol- The officers’ affidavits questioned that asser- fendants have not lowing explanation regarding decision tion. The record does not indicate wheth- stop: “Due to [Watkins]’ to initiate the er there was more than one lane each crime in suspicious driving and the recent direction. area, perform decided to an inves- [we] also as- tigatory stop.” Porter and Wood commonly turned down a street

Watkins that, Road, having activated their despite and trav- serted referred to as Mile 8-1/2 finding gave no basis for its in that 1. Our that the limit on assertion 8-1/2 Mile miles hour is taken from regard, Road is 25 we will that the limit on assume 6, 1998 order the district court’s November light per hour in Mile Road is 25 miles 8-1/2 partially dismissing plaintiff's opinion that Watkins has not contested fact granting summary judgment complaint and finding. district court’s Though p.at 3. the defendants. See Order and out- alleged was not “extreme “failed conduct lights, Watkins and blue car’s red down,” and that rageous.” over or to slow pull stop, car was forced once the substance, court held that cooper- not suspicious and was “very acted slowly at four o’clock driving so approached then Wat- ative.” in an area where there had morning drawn, and guns with their kins’ vehicle violent, recent, activity, criminal been directed racist allegedly several subsequent his light considered in and Gabriel. toward Watkins remarks activated their when the officers conduct “ordered conceded that Watkins was They were sufficient to arouse flashing lights, handcuffed, vehicle, patted down out of provide justifica- reasonable placed in a vehicle weapons, for stop. The court investigatory tion for an Watkins, questioning.” According half “[d]riving at one concluded “forcibly” placed him into the officers then provide a limit at 4:00 a.m. would cars, patrol “ram[ming] [his] the one of alia, suspecting, inter the basis for top the of his car.” Wat- up against head drunk, trying high drugs, on or driver was that he suffered no cuts or kins admits suspicion for a provide [sic] so hard to bruises. actually highly police stop as to establish police in the being placed After Second, behavior. suspicious length, pri- at questioned Watkins investigation recent [of] aware of an were marily asking him how he knew Gabriel area; activity criminal in that there violent going. the two were Watkins and where shooting had been a and several robberies being issued eventually released after Furthermore, days.” within the two disobeying officer’s a ticket for rejected court the Watkins’ claim district ultimately charge The signal. unreasonable force that the officers used dropped. executing stop. Finally, filed subsequently and Gabriel Watkins that the defendants were enti- court found The suit the court below. instant governmental immunity with re- tled to court, by stipulation parties, of the district intentional infliction of emo- spect to the claims because dismissed Gabriel’s concluded that tional distress claim and located. state law could not be Watkins’ morning, it is not four o’clock “[a]t imprisonment, causes of action for false outrageous gun to draw a and handcuff a arrest, battery and assault and were false driving strangely, and who suspect who is by the district court. later dismissed yield police signals pull over.” fails to mo- separate The defendants filed two appeal, does not take In this Watkins summary judgment, one directed tions for rulings the district court’s dis- issue with claims, remaining state law Watkins’ claims, nor missing state constitutional one aimed at his federal cause City of the challenge does he the dismissal (1) dismissed action. The district court Rather, he of Southfield from his suit. constitution- prejudice with Watkins’ state material fact argues genuine issues of (2) claims; prejudice with al dismissed summary preclude judgment exist City against the those claims asserted § claim and his regard to his with (3) Southfield; summary judg- granted infliction of emotional distress intentional immunity in qualified on the ment basis cause of action. respect with favor of the defendants action; 1983 cause of summary judgment in favor of the granted II. ANALYSIS re- respect to Watkins’ defendants A. Standard of Review claim of intentional in- maining state law novo a district court’s We review de fliction emotional distress grant deny summary judg- or decision protected grounds that the officers were Ameritech, 129 F.3d ment. Smith v. by governmental immunity and that their See (6th Cir.1997). Summary judg tiff must evidence sufficient to cre- no when there are appropriate genuine ment is ate a issue as to whether dispute fact in issues of material genuine defendant in fact committed acts that moving party judg is entitled to and the plaintiff violated the law.” Id. Whether a Fed.R.Civ.P. ment as a matter of law. See has met each of these two burdens is a 56(c). summary deciding a motion for of law. question See id. must view the evi judgment, matter, As an initial we note that and draw all reasonable inferences dence right “both the to be free from unreason non-moving party. See favor free able seizures and from the use v. Zenith Radio Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. of excessive force under the Fourth rp., 106 S.Ct. Co U.S. clearly Amendment are established.” judge 89 L.Ed.2d 538 is Adams, (citations 386-87 omit weigh not “to the evidence and determine ted). Thus, qualified immunity the sole truth of the matter but to determine question presented appeal this is genuine there issue for trial.” whether presented whether has evidence Inc., Lobby, Liberty

Anderson U.S. a genuine sufficient create issue as to 91 L.Ed.2d Porter and whether Wood fact violated (1986). A issue for trial exists genuine the law. there is sufficient “evidence on which reasonably find for the jury could Assuming police that the them 252, 106 Id. at S.Ct. 2505. plaintiff.” may the operated patrol selves have car Watkins, erratically following while the Qualified Immunity Analysis B. question remains whether there was basis performing officials Government for a reasonable and an investi entitled to discretionary functions are gatory stop under the circumstances based immunity from civil suits for qualified upon conduct. the case While damages arising performance out of the of presents question, a close we are inclined long as their ac their official duties “as affirm, finding appro that there was an reasonably thought been tions could have stop.2 priate Terry basis for a rights they alleged the consistent with are What occurred before the decided Creighton, v. to have violated.” Anderson subject differ- to follow Watkins was the of 3034, 107 97 483 U.S. S.Ct. factual and accounts. ing contentions We (1987). successfully 523 “To state L.Ed.2d dispute not deem such a to be one of do 1983, plaintiff a claim under 42 a U.S.C. genuine consequence, material or identify by a right must secured the Unit proceedings stage at this the we view deprivation and the ed States Constitution light evidence in the most favorable to the acting a under right person of that dispute, There is no substantial Watkins. City v. color of state law.” Russo Cin hand, on the other about Watkins’ conduct. (6th Cir.1992). 1036, 1042 953 F.2d cinnati key analyzing “The a claim of inquiry Watkins, at the high a school student qualified immunity is whether the defen time, dark of driving predawn, the alleged clearly dant’s conduct violated es activi in an area of recent violent criminal statutory rights tablished or constitutional officers, ty by the at about known as such person a would have of which reasonable limit, stopping not speed half the allowable Metiva, 375, known.” Adams v. 31 F.3d a only stop signs each time he made but (6th Cir.1994). 386 offi admittedly ignored turn. an inves cers’ clear indications to for in this situation must plaintiff these tigation. We find that circumstances “First, allega two hurdles: overcome objective level of constitute the “minimal tions must state a claim of the violation of Second, making stop.” Illinois justification for clearly plain- established law. Ohio, 1, 1868, (1968). Terry 20 L.Ed.2d 889 2. v. 392 U.S.

888 — U.S. -, -, objectively, [not] would Wardlow, position, 120 measured S.Ct. v. under 676, 145 clearly have understood that he was L.Ed.2d 570 have refrained from duty an affirmative reasoning agree We Telb, v. 831 Dominque conduct.” such Rickus, v. States Third Circuit United (6th Cir.1987); Pray F.2d see also (3d Cir.1984), where F.2d 360 Sandusky, 49 City F.3d requi- had the that the officers court held Cir.1995) Metiva, (citing Adams v. Terry make a suspicion to site reasonable Cir.1994)). Supreme F.3d traveling fifteen that was stop of a vehicle con- is consistent with our precedent Court appli- hour below twenty miles Williams, 407 In Adams v. a.m., clusion here. limit, in an area at 3:30 cable by a 32 L.Ed.2d victimized U.S. S.Ct. “recently that had been (1972), explained emphasized The court the duties of burglaries.” Court spate area for crimi- reputation of an suspicious officer: “[t]he upon articulable fact activity nal is an re- The Fourth Amendment does not may rely legitimately which a officer quire policeman precise who lacks the Rickus, 737 making Terry stop].” [in necessary proba- level of information also found the at 365. The court shrug his simply ble cause to arrest to inordinately slow rate of vehicle’s or and allow a crime occur shoulders suspicions aroused legitimately could have contrary, escape. a criminal to On (citing police officer. Id. experienced of an recognizes may Terry Holland, States United adopt an good police essence of work to (9th Cir.1975) making car (holding that A brief response.... intermediate progress at small hours inordinately slow individual, in suspicious order to of a have aroused the morning could identity maintain the determine his or to of a local officer who is alert suspicions obtaining momentarily while quo status beat); Carpen- the unusual within information, may more be most reason- Cir.1969) (8th ter v. 419 F.2d 169 Sigler, light in of the facts known to the able stop traveling slowly of a car (holding that officer at the time. valid)). recently burglarized area was Adams, 145-46, 407 U.S. S.Ct. circumstances, one very similar Under (citations omitted). “probable a cause” (applying state court Recently, upheld the Court standard) “appellant’s driving found that stop pedestrian and seizure of who speed during extremely at an slow rate of in a crime area high residential early morning hours on when he saw fled from the suspicious unusual or streets constituted Wardlow, them. 120 S.Ct. 675-76. sufficient probable which was behavior that individual’s “[a]n Court determined stop officer] defendant to [the cause for expected in an area of criminal presence Leaper automobile.” v. State appellant’s alone, enough to (Okla.Cr. activity, standing is not Oklahoma, 914, 753 P.2d of reasonable, particularized suspi support a po that a Ct.App.1988). That court noted committing is actually person observe the cion that lice officer “need not cause not any probable required violation of law to have crime.... But officers are Id.; that see also stop automobile.” of a ignore the relevant characteristics Stuart, 428, Virginia v. 192 W.Va. West determining the cir location in whether (1994) (officer’s stop 452 S.E.2d 886 sufficiently suspicious to cumstances are speed unusual slow upheld vehicle investigation.” Id. at 676 warrant further “de morning upon hours this early based (citations omitted). The considered Court drivers). tection clue” of behavior drunk factor flight pertinent as a pedestrian’s determining suspi whether reasonable that Similarly, we do not believe “[h]eadlong It reasoned that in cion existed. concluding, in error in district court was the consum- effect, flight it occurs—is “in the defendant’s that officer —wherever necessarily ignoring pull it is not We deem the of orders to mate act of evasion: certainly wrongdoing, equivalent but over the vehicle to indicative for these of such.”3 Id. suggestive purposes attempting to flee from upon signal case, that the In this the officers knew recently by been victimized vio- area had Moreover, “if officers of reasonable com- proceeding lent crimes. Watkins’ car was issue, petence disagree could on this im- morning in the dark hours at half munity recognized.” Malley should be limit of in the speed the streets residential Briggs, 475 U.S. may suspected area. The officers have 89 L.Ed.2d 271 We cannot find the of the car was intoxicated that the driver district court to have erred in concluding “casing” or that he was area. See the circumstances here indicated no Basey, 816 United States v. knowing violation of civil or constitutional (5th Cir.1987) (noting n. 14 slow-mov- law the defendant officers. See id. ing early morning may hours cars “cased”); being the area is suggest C. The court did err district not Pineiro, see also United States v. No. 95- it ruled that Porter and Wood were July 1997 WL 413656 Cir. summary judgment entitled to as to 1997) stop vehicle that (upholding claim Watkins’ of excessive force officers, upon seeing down slowed agree We also with the district traffic); impeding slow United court’s determination that the defendants Ramos, 93-6196, States v. No. 1994 WL summary judgment regard are entitled to 1994) (upholding Cir. Oct. ing excessive force cause ac traveling of vehicle that was 40 miles light tion. Even when viewed in the most minimum per hour on interstate where Watkins, favorable to the facts do not sup limit was 45 miles hour and port this claim. suspected falling officer that driver was got The officers out of their vehicles and addition, In the fact that asleep). Watkins get ordered out of the Watkins car. As refused to when he was directed do seatbelt, he reached to undo his suspicion so contributed to the officers’ him contends that the officer front of activity may that criminal afoot. have been said, it, if I circumstances, going “Go ahead and do as find light of these we gun.” for a An officer reached that the officers had a reasonable him Terry stop pulled to conduct a of Watkins’ car.4 undid Watkins’ seatbelt and out D., 621, 1128, Washington, 3. v. Hodari 499 U.S. United States v. 12 F.3d California 1547, (D.C.Cir.1994). (1991), impact of 111 S.Ct. 113 L.Ed.2d 690 1132 The Hodari significant determination Supreme suspect “[t]he held that a D. is Court when flees officer, suspicion sight at whether have founded [of] [officers] of an a “seizure” within justify stop may a take account all of meaning into of the Fourth Amendment does physi up to the time of ap the events that occur suspect physically occur not until the apprehension suspect cal of a who flees.” prehended actually or he submits to the au Santamaria-Hemandez, D., United States v. 968 thority U.S. of the officer. Hodari 499 at 980, 1992). 625-26, 1547; 983 Cir. Wardlow S.Ct. see also United States 111 may 572, clear that the "events” that be makes Taylor, 576 n. 2 Cir. flight suspect. See considered include Wardlow, of 1992) (citing stating Hodari D. and that sei S.Ct. at 676. during leading zure does not occur the time Therefore, up apprehension). any physical during “state pursuit 4. The Court in Wardlow noted that evidence discovered the hot of unprovoked suspect properly be at courts have differed on whether could admissible D., grounds flight to constitute rea- trial. See Hodari 499 U.S. at is sufficient Wardlow, (holding suspicion.” 120 S.Ct. at that no "seizure” had sonable S.Ct. 1547 and, partic- during pursuit 1. we do not address that occurred of defendant 675 n. While case, thus, we hold that the cocaine abandoned while defendant ular issue in the seizure). running flight suspect a be considered as was was not the fruit of the of should determining applies only to a in whether reasonable This rule not encounters factor foot, stops but also to of automobiles. See exists. was ex- that defendants’ conduct and claims being handcuffed car. After of the pri- was a weapons, outrageous. Watkins To establish treme and patted-down he squad car. As in placed the back infliction of facie case of intentional ma car squad get attempting was distress, must show plaintiff a emotional on, hit his handcuffs Watkins with the (2) “(1) conduct, outrageous extreme and of the door but once on the frame head (3) recklessness, causation and intent or Watkins was no cuts or bruises. cause (4) Roberts v. severe emotional distress.” after and then released briefly questioned Co., 422 Mich. Auto-Owners Insurance disobeying a ticket for receiving (internal 374 N.W.2d took Gabriel signal. Watkins officer’s omitted). Liability only im- will be quotes went home himself. home and then posed evidence There is no substantial has so outra- the conduct been “where force used unreasonable that defendants character, and extreme geous in so officers are of against “[P]olice Watkins. possible all beyond degree, go as split-second judg ten forced to make decency, regarded and to be bounds tense, are circumstances that ments^—in atrocious, in a utterly and intolerable as uncertain, evolving.” Graham rapidly and community.... [Liability civilized Connor, 490 U.S. insults, to mere clearly does not extend (1989). Therefore, 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 threats, annoyances, petty indignities, particular of a use ‘reasonableness’ “[t]he oppressions, or other trivialities.” from the judged perspec force must be Restatement, Torts, (quoting Id. 908-09 scene, officer on the tive of a reasonable d). Hence, plaintiff comment 2d hindsight.” vision of rather than with %o only able recover for intentional will (citation omit Id. S.Ct. “in infliction distress the most of emotional ted). indicated, previously As Watkins cases.” Bonelli v. Volks egregious of area where driving suspiciously America, Inc., Mich.App. wagen occurred, recently crimes had several had to force him to the side of 421 N.W.2d defendants As road before he would defen Here, he was ha- contends Watkins Watkins, they had no approached dants rassed, verbally assaulted intimidated dangerous. armed or idea whether “ram” they tried to by defendants Furthermore, does not reflect the record him off him from and then forced behind any per suffered serious or that Watkins claims that he was the road. He also damage. had physical manent pulled abused when defendants physically difficulty into the back getting Watkins him in the put him from his car and back squad car with handcuffs on. We do epithet their and a racial squad force, even when viewed not deem this noted, the him. As we have addressed to Watkins, have light favorable to most justified un- stop of vehicle was excessive under the circumstances. been Considering the der the circumstances. Thus, qual the defendants were entitled to officers’ ignored fact well. Ac immunity ified this claim as they stop, him to the force command for cordingly, we conclude that necessary. was stop to effectuate the used granting summary in court did not err Hence, actions could not be deemed those in favor the defendants on the judgment or excessive have so unreasonable to been claim. 1983 maintain this claim of required as is to of emotional D. Intentional infliction infliction of emotional distress. intentional distress epithet gives a racial us alleged use of are satisfied that pause, some but we also submits the dis granting not err in sum- district court did summary granting trict erred judgment in favor of defendants mary judgment as to his claim for intentional claim. distress because he this infliction emotional

891 stated, importantly, AFFIRM More controlling. we close re the reasons For is, court. of the district view of these decisions reveals that each the decision degree, greater distinguish to a or lesser GILMAN, concurring. Judge, Circuit Pineiro, able. States v. No. See United (6th 95-3923, 413656, at con 1997 WL *3 Cir. majority’s ultimate agree I 1997) (de 17, in July (unpublished opinion) court did not err clusion that the district summary judgment favor of granting violating fendant was statute Ohio no seizure oc lane); defendants. Because driving slowly in the passing too car was forced to a Ramos, curred until Watkins’s 93-6196, 1994 v. United States No. pull his admitted failure over stop, (6th 1994) 560870, 12, *2 WL Cir. Oct. him to do so was a police signaled (defendant (unpublished opinion) oper police to legitimate factor for the consider ating his vehicle below the minimum inter they had reason determining whether limit); Basey, state United States v. justify making suspicion able (5th 984, Cir.1987) (area 980, 816 F.2d D., v. See Hodari U.S. California residents had seen the defendant’s car 111 S.Ct. 113 L.Ed.2d “aimlessly wandering back and forth” on Fourth (holding that a “seizure” under the prior little-traveled rural roads to the dis “requires physical Amendment either force covery nearby burglary, of a the victim or, absent, ... where that is submission to shortly saw the car close to his home authority”) (emphasis in the assertion of burglary, before discovered the the vic v. original); United States Santamaria- description tim took note of the car’s (9th Hernandez, 968 F.2d Cir. number, plate license and the victim iden (“The 1992) [of] [of determination whether presence tified the in the car of the justify have founded ficers] passed officers when the car them after may all stop take into account crime); discovery United States physical the time of up events that occur (3d Rickus, v. F.2d Cir. flees.”). who apprehension suspect of a 1984) (car moving “extremely slow” however, factor, I this added Without past closed stores a commercial district contrary reach a con would be inclined to a.m., proceeded in an at 3:30 then us. I also clusion in the case before write “apparently aimless course” in a residen that, I separately regard believe Holland, area); tial United States v. alleged of whether the officers’ con less (officers Cir.1975) were outrageous,” duct was “extreme and Wat fugi dangerous” notified of an “armed and kins failed to sufficient evidence tive to be the intermediate believed emotional dis that he suffered “severe area, they traveling noticed a vehicle to tress.” eight “at ward them five to miles A.The lawfulness of the hour,” occupants stared at the officers long they as unusually for “an time” During analysis, of its course eventually and the vehicle slowed passed, may majority “[t]he writes that “walking speed”); Carpenter Sigler, suspected have was intoxi- [Watkins] (offi Cir.1969) ‘casing’ or that he the area.” In 170-72 cated majority out-of-county support proposition, of this cers that a car with noticed car proceeding states that Watkins’s “was very slowly past tags “moved several morning at half the dark hours pur closed business establishments and limit of the in a residential streets course” in a town of sued a rather erratic area.” I find such inferences on the facts 2,000 “un persons where approximately justify before us too attenuated routinely do not travel at identified cars Ohio, Terry under 392 U.S. State, time”); Leaper that v. 753 P.2d 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (car moving (Okla.Crim.App.1988) was only per miles “extremely five slow” majority eight on cases to

The relies Stuart, a.m.); conclusion, v. I find hour at 3:30 State justify its none of which stop the defendant reasonable 891-92 452 S.E.2d W.Va. (1994) investigation.” to the defen further Id. at alerted to make a (police were sufficiently-corroborat however, by a notably, dant’s vehicle the court 892. Most the defendant as that identified ed 911 call rejected the notion that a driv- specifically intoxicated). driving while the similar to those er’s actions give rise to reasonable case at bar could Stuart, case, worthy fur- This last suspicion: discussion because its ther comment that, anony- the regarding facts but call, anonymous the the [E]ven without In call, to our own. very are similar mous police the [that] trial court concluded Stuart, night anonymous late-Saturday a suspi- sufficient reasonable officers had that the police informed the had caller upon the defendant based stop cion to operat- the defendant had witnessed caller per miles driving 25 the defendant’s in an erratic manner. Offi- ing vehicle zone on a per 35 miles hour hour a (the had the car witness cers soon located relatively straight road at 1:00 a.m. number) traveling plate license the noted legal the con- disagree with court’s We thirty-five that had a straight a road on purely [T]he .... innocuous clusion limit. the When per hour miles court, by the trial with- facts mentioned oppo- the passed officers defendant more, es- clearly are insufficient to out direction, they and executed U-turn site the suspicion to stop tablish reasonable determining following him. After began defendant. going approx- car was the defendant’s that Id. at 891. hour, the imately twenty-five per miles the defendant signaled court, Like the Stuart I do not believe explained that he of the officers One miles hour the driving that ten below upon the defendant’s decision] [the “based limit, high-crime even in a area day, day the driving, the time of and slow of itself to night, is sufficient and consti Stuart, at 888. week.” 452 S.E.2d the suspicion “that illicit tute reasonable activ thereafter The was arrested and defendant v. ity progress.” Spear Sow might be In while intoxicated. driving convicted (6th ders, Cir.1995); see challenge to the defendant’s response Nicholas, also United States trial court stop, the of the the lawfulness Cir.1971) (distinguishing 624-25 of the tele- ruled that the substance first Sigler, F.2d 169 Cir. Carpenter v. relied the tip upon could not be phone 1969), holding stop the and that support making the police as a factor oc out-of-state which defendant’s an was from unknown high-crime p.m., area at 11:00 curred in an caller. The trial potentially unreliable (1) police the unjustified because the concluded, however, that the further any particular investigating were not justified fact that stop was based (2) crime, had no information police slowly driving down a the defendant (3) occupants, car or its regarding the night. late at Id. at 889. road straight that showing in the record there was no Supreme Appeals Court of of West suspicious police had been informed of highest Virginia, which is that state’s (4) vicinity, activities defen court, It first affirmed. ruled predominantly man in a dant was a black could in fact have taken into trial court Burrell, neighborhood); People black had that the officers received account N.W.2d 417 Mich. holding telephone tip. anonymous (“[A] justified by stop cannot be individu lawful, Supreme Court of alized, police suspicion when articulable “given the totali- Appeals then stated in a merely observes two black men officer circumstances, anonymous ty ’driving slowly through dark automobile call, and the officers’ observations community white predominantly or scene, white we con- they once arrived on the recalls that armed rob officer] and [the officers did have sufficient clude

893 passes the month before which “Emotional distress under vari- occurred beries by names, committed black allegedly were two suffering, ous such as mental vehicle.”); City in a dark Minot males anguish, mental mental or nervous (N.D. Johnson, 603 N.W.2d 488 v. shock, highly or the like. It all includes 1999) (holding that the officer’s reactions, unpleasant mental such as vehicle was based on of the defendant’s horror, shame, humiliation, fright, grief, vague illegal than a hunch of “no more embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disap- when, was therefore unlawful activity” and pointment, worry, and nausea. It is 4:00 a.m. in an area that approximately only liability where it is extreme that the burglaries, experienced had several recent Complete tranquility arises. emotional his car into a pulled the defendant world, is seldom attainable in this and and, slowing lot without lounge’s parking degree some of transient and trivial up, pub or returned to the speeding down part emotional is a price distress roads). lic The added factor in the case living among people. The law inter- us, however, is failure to before Watkins’s only venes where the distress is inflicted police signaled for him to stop when so severe that no reasonable man could by so. For the reasons stated do it. The expected intensity be endure jus majority, provided this and fac- the duration distress are to make a forced I there tification in determining tors to be considered its judgment fore concur the court’s on this severity.” issue. Co., Pratt v. Brown Mach. B.The intentional infliction of emotion- (6th Cir.1988) (quoting Restatement al distress claim (Second) j) cmt. (emphasis of Torts majority has also that the offi- held added). law, not, cers’ conduct was as a matter of Here, although Watkins stated in his and outrageous,” “extreme and therefore deposition that at certain he was times grant- err the district court did not “scared,” “frightened,” “surprised,” he summary judgment ed favor of the de- any has failed to set forth evidence that he respect fendants with to Watkins’s com- has suffered a level of distress that is “so claim for mon law intentional infliction of severe that no reasonable man could agree- emotional distress. Without either Pratt, expected to endure it.” 855 F.2d at ing or I find no need to reach disagreeing, 1240; Bonelli, 421 see also N.W.2d at 229 pres- this failed issue because Watkins (holding plaintiffs alleged harm that he has ent sufficient evidence suffered required “fell far short” of that to establish severe emotional distress as a result of the distress where he “made severe emotional alleged defendants’ actions. depression, no mention of severe substan- In Roberts v. Insurance Auto-Owners trauma, tial or even minor psychological Co., (1985), 422 Mich. 374 N.W.2d 905 though even physical consequences,” Supreme Michigan noted that Court ... testified that he was “shocked sur- the two essential elements for a claim of upset” as a result of the defen- prised, and intentional infliction of emotional distress Roberts, conduct); 374 N.W.2d at dant’s alleged are that the conduct must be “ex testimony (holding plaintiffs’ that the outrageous” treme and and that the con they disappointed, to the effect that felt plaintiff duct must cause the to suffer “se mad, approach not upset “d[id] even vere emotional distress.” See id. at 908. contemplat- the level of emotional distress “only in Recovery permitted the most drafters”); ed the Restatement egregious of cases.” Bonelli Volks cf. Powelson, Mich.App. Haverbush Am., Inc., wagen Mich.App. (holding 551 N.W.2d respect N.W.2d With dis- distress, that the element of severe emotional the element of severe emotional plaintiff, satisfied when the this court has written as follows: tress was (1) doctor, especially he was testified left an ax and a after the defendant

fearful (2) vehicles, the defendant’s hatchet on his harassment caused accusing him of letters him the defendant was concern that great (3) wedding, he to interfere with

going reputation because about his was worried him had said about of what the defendant others, concerned with his he was (5) the defendant’s safety, and patients’ worked). way actions affected majority that agree with the I therefore granted sum- properly the district of the defendants mary judgment favor infliction for intentional on Watkins’s claim distress, for albeit reasons of emotional majority by the other than those stated court. America, UNITED STATES Plaintiff/Appellee, Defendant, ANDREWS, Rita Apparel, Garnishee- Millers Childrens Defendant/Appellant.

No. 99-1147 Appeals, States Court of United Sixth Circuit. April Submitted: (briefed), Proprietor, Mil- Loretta Miller July Decided and Filed: Detroit, MI, pro Apparel, lers Childrens se. (briefed), Holzman Holzman

Sheridan V. Southfield, MI, Holzman, Appellee. & SILER, KENNEDY, Before: BATCHELDER, Judges. Circuit OPINION SILER, Judge. Circuit Apparel Defendant Millers Childrens (“Millers Childrens”) appeals judgment proceeding. garnishment it in a against garnishee of the is the Millers Childrens

Case Details

Case Name: Andre Watkins v. City of Southfield, Mark Wood, L. Porter, and Jane Doe

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 21, 2000

Citation: 221 F.3d 883

Docket Number: 98-2336

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.