Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
Judgment reversed without costs and judgment directed to be entered in favor of defendant against each plaintiff in the sum of $800.
The relationship between plaintiff and Pace University is contractual in nature (Prusack v State of New York,
In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of contract are based upon defendant’s alleged failure to deliver the course described in the university’s catalog and as represented by Dr. Murthy during their consultation. The plaintiffs’ testimony at trial in substance was that although the course was described as a basic Pascal programming course in the catalog and Dr. Murthy had assured them that their math background would be sufficient, it was taught at an advanced level, and the Pascal textbook chosen by Professor Zahn inappropriately focused on math and science based problems which were beyond their level of comprehension. It is clear that the essence of plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim necessarily entails an evaluation of the adequacy and quality of the textbook used and the effectiveness of the pedagogical method chosen by the professor to teach the graduate Pascal programming class. In order to determine whether "Condensed Pascal” was inappropriate because of its focus on math and science based problems, this court would be required to examine not only "Condensed Pascal”, and its earlier, allegedly simpler version, but also other possible available textbooks on Pascal programming language, and to conduct a comparative analytical review in order to ascertain their relative merits and appropriateness for this particular course. Additionally the court would be engaged in a comprehensive review of a myriad of educational and pedagogical factors, as well as administrative
The court erroneously dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for the remaining balance of the tuition due. The plaintiffs were well aware of the defendant’s tuition refund policy, and that withdrawal after the fifth week of class would not entitle them to any refund. Although plaintiffs did not obtain an appointment with the Dean until October 25, 1993, there is no indication in the record that the plaintiffs’ delay in their official withdrawal from the course was not a matter of personal choice, with full knowledge of the consequences upon their ability to obtain a refund of the tuition (see, Cardo v Pace Univ., supra).
Dissenting Opinion
dissents and votes to modify in the following
DiPaola, P. J., and Ingrassia, J., concur; Collins, J., dissents in a separate memorandum.
