Andover LP I v. Board of Tax ReviewAndover LP I v. Board of Tax Review
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Berdon
The sole issue in this appeal is whether, in a tax assessment appeal under
The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, Andover Limited Partnership I, commenced this action to challenge a decision by the board of tax review of the town of West Hartford (board) affirming a 1989 tax assessment on improved real property owned by the plaintiff and located at 630 Oakwood Avenue in the town of West Hartford (town). On July 24, 1990, the plaintiff filed an application with the trial court appealing the decision.1 The application included a
The town filed an appearance on August 21, 1990, “for all defendants” (emphasis in original) in the action and subsequently filed an answer to the complaint on August 28, 1991, that was signed “Defendant, Town of West Hartford.” Two years later, on September 20, 1993, the town filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
The trial court strictly construed
In order to determine whether the plaintiff’s failure to name the town as the defendant in its citation was fatal to its cause of action,6 despite proper service of the citation upon the assistant town clerk of West Hart
We previously have explained that
Similarly, in Lussier v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 228 Conn. 343, we permitted the plaintiff to amend a summons that misnamed the intended defendant. In Lussier, the plaintiff named the “State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation” as the defendant on the civil summons form instead of the commissioner, as required by .
Furthermore, we recently determined that an error in the process that failed to comply with a statutory
We, therefore, have refused to permit the recurrence of the inequities inherent in eighteenth century common law that denied a plaintiffs cause of action if the pleadings were technically imperfect. As Professor Edward L. Stephenson points out, remedial statutes such as
In sum, we decline to interpret
In this case, it is evident that the town, rather than the board, was the intended defendant and that the town had actual notice of the institution of this action. The plaintiffs intent was to appeal the alleged excessive tax assessment under
We conclude that the naming of the board instead of the town was a circumstantial error, mistake or defect under
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded with direction to grant the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the citation, and for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
“[T]he citation is the writ of summons that directs the sheriff or some other proper officer to seek out the defendant agency and to summon it to a particular sitting of a particular court on a specified day. 1 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (2d Ed. 1970) § 18.” Tolly v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 Conn. 13, 18, 621 A.2d 719 (1993).
“(b) Process in civil actions against the following-described classes of defendants shall be served as follows: (1) Against a town, upon its clerk, assistant clerk, manager or one of its selectmen . . . .”
“The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . .•. . This motion shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law, and where appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record.
“If an adverse party objects to this motion he shall, at least five days before the motion is to be considered on the short calendar, file and serve in accordance with Sec. 120 a memorandum of law and, where appropriate, supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record.”
Under § 12-177a the plaintiff had two months within which to appeal the board’s decision and, although the date of the decision is not included in the record, the application to appeal apparently was timely filed on July 24,1990. If the trial court’s dismissal is upheld, however, the plaintiff will be unable to reinstitute this action because the deadline to make such application has long passed. Therefore, such an outcome would be fatal to the plaintiff’s cause of action.
See footnote 2.
“(b) Such amended process shall be served in the same manner as other civil process and shall have the same effect, from the date of the service, as if originally proper in form.”