82 Ky. 564 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1885
delivered the opinion of the court.
In 1873 and 1874 Win. Anderson, being the'owner of several parcels of land in tlie counties of Grayson ■and Edmonson, some personal property and evidences of debt, he conveyed to appellee,. Merideth, four tracts
The divorced wife and mother also filed an answer and cross-petition alleging substantially what had been alleged for tlie son, and, in addition, claiming that, at
The first inquiry is, was this transfer and alleged sale .by Anderson to ax>pellee fraudulent as to one or both % It axqjears to us 'from a careful reading of the entire voluminous record that there can be no doubt that the ■alleged contract was intended by both' the parties to it to defraud and defeat the claim of Mrs. Anderson. The letters written by apxoellee to Anderson after he went to Missouri, and the letter of Anderson to appellee, are in themselves to our minds conclusive. The explanation attempted to be made of them by appellee in no way ■qualifies their meaning axqDearing on their face. The letter from Anderson to appellee asks for money; says times are hard and work hard to get; inquires how aXTpellee is getting on with his (Anderson’s) business; asks what is being done with the mill property (being a portion of the x>roperty conveyed to apxmllee), and urges appellee to hurry up collections and send him what apxjellee has “of mine on hands.” The first letter from appellee to Anderson informs him that there is .bad news. “The mill got burned down last March.”
The next letter from appellee to Anderson mentions having before written to notify Anderson of the suit above mentioned as having been brought to subject the property to the claim of Mrs. Anderson, and informs .Anderson that he has compromised the claim by assigning to Mrs. Anderson one of the notes transferred by Anderson to appellee, and complains of having been ■compelled to pay large attorneys’ fees in the case ; says he has paid out more money than he has collected; that he has contracted to sell all the lands. Says he would like Anderson to come back, but didn’t think it advisable, as Lawless (attorney for and father to Mrs. Anderson) “would put you in prison.” He again urges Anderson to authorize appellee to collect from 'Yanmeter, as he (Yanmeter) had sold all the stock and -contracted to sell the land.
The next letter refers aaain to the settlement with
The order referred-to in these letters was never returned by Anderson, and, on the return of Anderson to Kentucky, Vanmeter appears to have accounted for the property he received from Anderson.
There is no explanation given as to the meaning and object of this correspondence that renders it consistent with the claim that the pretended sale from Anderson to appellee was for a consideration and in good faith. The evidence tends' to show that Anderson had no-money while in Missouri, and that he had none when he returned.
There is no evidence of any payment by appellee to Anderson, , except the repeated statements made by Anderson to the effect that he had received the money for the land, and the testimony of ’two witnesses that' Anderson had money, a large sum, immediately after the date of the pretended sale. Several witnesses testify to statements by appellee to the effect that the-sale and transfer was without consideration. In some-cases these statements are contradicted by the witnesses-for appellee, but we consider it unnecessary to notice-
That conclusion being reached, the inquiry is, does the record exhibit a state of facts that will give a court of equity the right to entertain appellant’s complaint %
The general rule is, in cases of executed contracts, where both parties are guilty of actual fraud, a court of equity will not lend its aid to either, but leave each •to the consequences of his own wrong-doing. To apply this rule the parties must be in pari clelictu, each equally guilty of the fraudulent intention and the fraudulent acting, with equal knowledge and equal willingness. When that is not the case, when there is imposition, duress, oppression, threats, undue influence, taking advantage of necessities or weakness, the party thus placed at disadvantage, although participating in the fraud, may be relieved in a court of equity as against his co-wrong-doer. •
The exception to the general rule applies in all cases-where the mind of one of the actors in the fraud exercises an undue dominion over that of the other, whether it results from the intellectual or physical weakness of the one overreached or from too confiding and trusting a nature. (Pomeroy on Equity, volume 2, sections 941, 942.)
The evidence in this case shows that the mind of Anderson was weak, and that he was so trusting and confiding in those with whom he was brought in contact, and so subject to the influence ,of stronger wills as to-indicate that his mind bordered on imbecility. He is shown to have been very forgetful, to have shrunk.
There is reason to believe from the record that appellee exercised this superior capacity and will over Anderson to induce him to make the trade, to leave Kentucky and to remain away, with the view of ultimately securing to himself the whole property without paying any thing therefor. Much of the evidence in this voluminous record, leading to this conclusion, is circumstantial and of such a character as not to render it practicable to discuss it in detail in the limits of an opinion; but the whole atmosphere surrounding the transaction produces a moral conviction that the conelusion stated is correct,
It is insisted that the court erred in giving appellee judgment for any tiling^ because it was not claimed in the pleadings, appellee insisting throughout the progress of the case that he did not hold as trustee, but as a purchaser for valuable consideration. It is particularly insisted that there should be no allowance to appellee for services in taking care of and managing the property, because of his established fraudulent conduct in the transaction. As to these matters, the •original petition filed by Anderson recognized appellee’s right to compensation for services and expenditures ; but this is immaterial, as the court having taken .jurisdiction, as we have held, properly, it was its duty
We will not inquire into the correctness of the rulings of the court in allowing or disallowing items in the commissioner’s report, because the assignment of error in reference to them is too general to present anything for our consideration. Notwithstanding this, conclusion, it is proper to say that we have carefully read all the evidence in the case and that, on the whole-case, we see no error in the rulings of the court in this, or in any other respect.
Judgment affirmed both on appeal and cross-appeal.