151 Iowa 479 | Iowa | 1911
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a mule driver in the entries of its coal mine. While hauling a loaded car from the face of the coal in the direction of the hoisting shaft the mule ran away, and, on reaching a point where the track turned at or near a right angle into another- entry, the car left the track striking the rib or wall of the passage and crushing and severely injuring plaintiff. The petition charges the defendant with negligence causing such injury: First, in furnishing the plaintiff with a mule known to the defendant to be vicious and addicted to the habit of running away; and, second, in allowing the sides of the passage through which the track was laid to become so filled and incumbered with piles of slate and other material that plaintiff- was unable to leave the car when the mule became unmanageable, and thereby avoid injury; for such reason said passage was not a reasonably safe place to work.
In argument in this court the plaintiff abandons the first specification of negligence as not being sustained by the evidence and relies solely upon the second ground above stated. The trial court appears to have directed a verdict on the theory that if the negligence charged has any support in the evidence it does not appear to have been the proximate eause of the injury complained of. We are constrained to hold the ruling correct. While it appears that the entry through which plaintiff drove his mule was more or less obstructed on either side of the track with accumulations of rubbish, the connection between such condition and plaintiff’s injury as a matter of cause and effect does not appear from the evidence. The passage down which the mule ran was some three hundred feet in length and eight feet in width. The car trucks were three feet wide
The question of proximate cause in personal injury cases is often a most troublesome one, and as a rule is for Jhe determination of the jury. But neither court nor jury can ' properly indulge in conclusions '• which are ' at' best matters of mere conjecture or mere speculation concerning possibilities. No accident or injury .ever occurs which is not in more or less degree influenced by many remote causes. Beginning with any human event the curious inquirer may follow back the course of' its evolution and discover a multitude of remote circumstances, of any one 'of which it may truthfully be said “Had this been otherwise, that could not have occurred.” In the practical ádministration of justice, such exploration into the field
Taking for illustration the case before us, who can S'ay that even with the entry free from all rubbish, the plaintiff clinging to his uncertain perch between the car ,and the mule, and stooping low to avoid collision with the roof, enveloped in intense darkness, unrelieved save by the faint illumination afforded by his miner’s lamp, and with the frightened or vicious animal plunging down grade, he could have jumped and freed himself from the car which otherwise would have run over him? Or if he had jumped free from the car, was there not at least the equal chance that he would have been hurled against the rib or wall of the entry to his death or'serious injury? He did in fact ride the full length of this entry in safety, and it was only when at the turn into the main entry the mule swerved in the wrong direction that he was thrown with the ear against the wall.. But for this incident it is quite evident the accident would not have occurred. Here would seem to be the proximate cause of the derailment, and in. this connection no negligence of the . defendant is
To use the language of the cited case, too many “links in the chain of circumstances are involved in doubt and speculation” to sustain a verdict for plaintiff upon the single charge of negligence submitted by him, and there was, therefore, no error in directing a verdict for the defendant. Had plaintiff been thrown from the 'car in the obstructed entry and injured upon the rubbish piled therein, or had he in the exercise of reasonable prudence jumped from the car and received injury by reason of such obstructions, a very different question would be presented, and-the law applicable to such a case we have no occasion now to consider.
Eor the reasons stated, we find no .ground upon which to disturb the judgment appealed from, and it must be affirmed.