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Anderson v. United States
857 A.2d 451
D.C.
2004
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*1 ANDERSON, Appellant, Steven STATES, Appellee.

UNITED

No. 01-CF-1432. Appeals.

District of Columbia Court

Argued March 2004. Aug.

Decided *3 McBride, Assistant United States

Patricia appellee. Attorneys, were on the brief SCHWELB, Judge, Before Associate Retired,* STEADMAN, Judge, Associate BELSON, Judge. Senior Judge, Retired: STEADMAN, Associate Anderson, con- Appellant, Steven *4 counts fol- of of assault victed a number be- that occurred lowing an altercation ex-girlfriend, tween and his appellant challenges Appellant Tameika Butler.1 grounds his on the convictions (1) gov- permitting trial court erred appel- ernment cross-examination act regarding prior lant bad (2) act appellant, reference to (3) cross- closing .government arguments, regarding police examination of a officer scene, at the person the statements of a (4) Appel- tape. arid of a 911 admission lant also contends failed sufficient evidence present Butler suf- finding warrant a that Ms. bodily injury, prerequi- fered serious affirm. We aggravated site for assault.

I. Facts day question, appellant, with On the Ohm, Eugene K. Public Defender Ser- Kelley, his Leonard step-grandfather, vice, Klein, with whom James Public De- son, three-year-old picked Butler’s up Ms. Service, brief, fender appel- was on the for Kelley’s in Mr. Doné placing Doné. After lant. car, walked from Ms. Butler and a friend Deha, alley Bernard to a store on through J. Assistant United her home an Attorney, States appellee. Roscoe C. Minnesota Avenue. Before she reached Howard, Jr., store, Attorney Ms. Butler. appellant approached United States at the filed, time brief R. as to the and John Fish- and Ms. Butler differed Appellant er, Valliere, Florence, Barbara Toni J. events that followed.

* Judge Judge (1981) (recodified Steadman was an Associate § 22-504.1 at D.C.Code argument. court at the time of His status (2001)) § and two counts D.C.Code 22-404.01 Retired, changed Judge, to Associate on Au- assault, simple of D.C.Code violation gust 2004. (recodified § at D.C.Code (2001)). merger arguments § 22-404 No are Specifically, appellant two was convicted of appeal. made on assault, aggravated counts of in violation of on must have fallen that Ms. Butler appellant trial

Ms. Butler testified the altercation. during her knife going yanked her hair and told her was her into Appellant guided to kill her. then that she Brown testified Ms. Jeanette alley, appellant alley. an Once Minnesota Avenue driving had been down punched Ms. Butler several times Butler be- appellant and Ms. and saw the herself, Ms. Attempting face. to defend alley. While they fore entered waist Butler retrieved a knife from her Brown saw light, a red Ms. at stopped Butler to pouch. Appellant knocked Ms. told the slap Ms. Butler. She leg that,” to cut ground, appel- and she tried his not to “do which your grabbed you, “fuck mind Appellant responded, with the knife. lant Butler appellant pushed As Ms. began stomp- He business.” knife from Ms. Butler. alley, Brown called the toward the Ms. lay with his feet she ing on her face while police. ground, struggling on the to cover her Ms. Butler

face. then stabbed step-grandfa- Kelley, appellant’s Mr. body. Ms. Butler the left side her ther, from appellant emerged testified testified she could not recall what occurred Appel- alley up” in a “worked state. *5 after that until the arrived. ambulance had Ms. But- lant admitted he beaten him Kelley to drive to a ler and asked Mr. Appellant upon testified that encounter- later, a friend’s house. About two months Avenue, ing Ms. Butler on Minnesota she deputy fugitive apprehension on the war- inquired he bring when would Doné home. squad rant of the U.S. Marshals Service After bring stated he would at apprehended appellant step-grandfa- his day, Doné back the next Ms. Butler indi- George’s County, ther’s house Prince get cated she should Doné some clothes Maryland. began walking and the two back her route, home. While en Ms. Butler told II. Drew Evidence appellant not to take Doné around other Rankin, trial, Judge Prior to before women. Appellant testified that sought approval to use government court grabbed Ms. Butler to calm her. Once prior of acts evidence three incidents bad alley, appellant claimed that Ms. But- Only at at trial. the third incident is issue. punched ler him in slapped the face so he sought show that response. her in Appellant testified that prior the summer of several months the two shoved each other until Ms. Butler altercation, to the indicted Ms. Butler ar- himself, produced a protect ap- knife. To man. home in a vehicle with another rived arm, pellant grabbed Ms. Butler’s twisted jealously, Appellant, in a fit of stabbed her, her arm behind and knocked her to car, man, smashed the windows of the ground. Upon falling, Ms. Butler hit passenger. to attack another attempted against her face a fence. Ms. Butler to re- Finding the incident to be relevant grabbed appellant’s self-defense, it off ripped shirt and claim of butting appellant’s him. Appellant Judge fell on Ms. Butler and she Bush ruled Judge both Rankin grabbed appellant’s legs. Appellant onto of the incident could pretrial that evidence stomped his and ran No evidence of the incident feet free himself be admitted.2 case in alley. government’s out of contended at introduced evidence, Originally, Judge tially proposed addressed the Drew the case was before Ran- kin, Judge issue was reevaluated before but before trial commenced the case was and the Judge Judge ini- Bush. transferred to Bush. Rankin sues).” chief; however, Riley did v. United cross- (citing 539-540 Drew incident, appellant regarding examine U.S.App. United D.C. 15- objection.3 to which made no On (1964)) (other F.2d cita appeal, appellant adequacy contests the omitted). tion, footnote, emphasis To government’s pretrial proffer regard- evidence, warrant of Drew admission “our evidence, ing asserting its Drew cases that the defendant’s com have held government failed to establish the crime must be estab mission of the other crime by clear and convincing Appel- evidence. and convinc by clear preliminarily lished challenges government’s lant also (citation 2n. ing evidence.” Id. at 540 appellant regard- cross-examination of the omitted). ing government’s the incident and the ref- closing erence to the incident its re- A admission Drew trial court’s marks. is reviewed upon proffer evidence based “In Daniels v. for abuse of discretion.

A. The Proffer a ‘trial court United held that we While “evidence of a crime for to conduct its may act within its discretion which the accused is not on trial is ‘inad admissibility of the pretrial inquiry on prove disposition missible to to commit of a ‘de by means other evidence crimes crime, jury may from which the infer that in government’ tailed from effect, defendant committed the crime trial of holding, in a bench stead of charged,’ crime, [o]ther crimes evidence is admis will be presumably which the other ... if important’ sible when it is admit fully ‘relevant and before the replicated ” (among issue of intent other is- ted.’ *6 Crutchfield 3. The cross-examination of that either. oc- A: I don’t recall Q: curred as sitting follows: in the back a third man There was Q: summer, fall, seat, go early Let’s back that? you to the remember do year night 2000. Tameika was out late one A: No. her, you looking Q: and you this, were out Well, do you you ask do remem- let me remember that? cap approaching pulling and ber down ski A: I don't recall that... a knife? the car with Q: you actually And went in the kitchen and No, A: I don’t remember. knives, got you two do remember that? Q: person stabbing the you Do remember A: I don’t remember that either. sitting of the car? the driver's seat in Q: your pocket you You had one knife in and No, A: I don't. your jacket? had one in knife Q: going around to you ... do remember A: I don’t remember that. smashing and in of the car other side Q: you you Do remember waited outside Ta- the back window? meika's door until she came home? No, A: I don't remember. A: No. Q: any of that? You don't remember . Q: you Do remember that when she drove A: I none of that... don't remember up to the house she was in the car with two j; Q: you got into an- And then and Tameika men? that, you fight do remember other over A: I don’t recall that. that? Q: you ranting And earlier had been No, that. A: I don’t recall raving you knew Tameika was out with Q: say[ing] you And do remember Tamekia men, you do remember that? Bean, you, that didn't make sense at all. to A: I don’t recall that either... Q: in the back seat. Do up That was Doné’s father is that correct? When she drove sitting passen- you the car she was in the front remember that? ger sitting seat and there was another man A: No. seat, you in the driver's do remember that? young man was ro- thought defendant (quoting A.2d Daniels (D.C. with Ms. Butler.” mantically involved 1992)). government “In proffer, its Rankin, government Judge Before trial that the evidence must show the court fall of early in the summer or averred that during the trial proposes present that it “the [Ms. Butler] victim believed, would, clearly convincingly if car, two other men. The defen- as were uncharged crime oc establish romanti- that the victim was dant believed connected curred and the defendants were the men. The cally involved with one of Daniels, it.”4 A.2d at 347 supra, go after that victim saw the defendant added) (footnote omitted). (emphasis man, him, and also smashed some of beat the windows in the car.” case,

In government made sev- Bush, proffers regarding Judge eral the incident: Before Rankin, stated, inci- writing, Judge regard before and before to the summer “With Judge Judge In prosecutor Bush. its filed “Notice of Intent dent she before [the Evidence,” proffered to Introduce Other that there Crimes Court Rankin] government proffered, eyewitness or that incident.” “[i]n about late was an saw Fall, 2000, Moreover, early acknowledged Summer or the defendant defense counsel young vicinity Judge stabbed man Bush that summer of 2000 “[t]he Street, S.E., 1209 30th young allegation after the incident ... is an Mr. man drove up somebody the car which Ms. Anderson stabbed because riding. jealous person Butler was also of the who was with the defendant complaining smashed some of the windows of the vehi- witness. The cle in an attempt passen- proffered they testimony to attack another have ger. stabbing Prior to the to that complaining [Ms. Butler] and destruction witness as property, testimony defendant indicated that of another witness who’s a angry young complain- he was at the man relative-a live-in relative " course, Appeals 4. Of '[a] is not evidence at States Court of for District of Colum *7 all,’ bia, judge’s longer applies which makes the trial task of a court that no stan Huddleston’"), determining proposed testimony by whether itself because it is bound dard denied, 1148, another crime constitutes 'clear and convinc 520 U.S. 117 S.Ct. t. cer 1323, (1997). ing’ evidence a difficult one.” Parker v. Unit L.Ed.2d 484 In Huddleston 137 States, 943, 681, 685, States, (quot ed A.2d 751 949 v. United Daniels, (Schwelb, (1988), ing supra, Supreme the 613 A.2d at 349 99 L.Ed.2d 771 concurring)). difficulty, conjunc unanimously J. the trial court need Such Court held evidence, requirement government preliminarily tion with the that all find that the not evidence, including by pre subject other "other a crimes to has established the crimes” Instead, ponderance the strictures of Federal Rule of Evidence of evidence. the Court 403, whereby "may even that other crimes evidence is ad relevant evidence be determined probative substantially excluded if its value is missible "if there is sufficient evidence outweighed by danger preju support finding by the a the that the defen unfair dice,” act,” support subject lends to the dant committed the similar and contention balancing adopt position probative prejudicial versus this court should the Nonetheless, Supreme regard repeated en Court with to other crimes of Rule 403. Daniels, convincing supra, at of the clear and stan evidence. See 613 A.2d 349 dorsement (Schwelb, panel concurring); by prevent dard this court would Johnson J. (D.C.1996) (en considering standard for 683 A.2d 1107 from an alternate J., banc) Ryan, 310 (King, concurring) (noting M.A.P. v. 285 A.2d the tenu admission. (D.C.1971); origin convincing 564 A.2d ous of the clear stan Groves v. United and dard, (D.C.1989), per "having modified evolved from dictum in a twen n. 374— curiam, 1990). (D.C. ty-six-year-old by 574 A.2d 265 case decided the United ing government (government proffered eyewitness reit- that an witness.” Later that, government’s proffer testify erated “the specifics would as to the of drug eyewitness that we an had Ms. Butler and association and the reason for the murder challenged to this ...” Appellant the ad- question, while other witnesses would mission on proffer the basis of the con- account); corroborate that Bolanos v. cf. tending, “but for those two individuals 532, 535, 539, United there’s no corroboration the sense that (D.C.1998) (Reid, J., concurring n. 8 with made, police no 911 call was were Ruiz, J., holding alternative and concur contacted, alleged never victim of that ring) that the victim (government’s proffer know, isn’t-you government assault eyewitness would another unnamed person.” Judge doesn’t have that Bush beating of the testify regarding prior ruled, complain- “The court finds that the sufficient). by victim the defendant was mean, ing testimony-I witness’s the Gov- here, proffer Given the detail of the jurors ernment’s-the will hear from the the trial court did not abuse its discretion complaining witness on the instant of- believed, that, in finding if presented fenses as well as prior incident-prior government’s proffered evidence would proof incidents and that’s the core of here convincing.6 be clear and and so court finds that that would he added).5 convincing.” (Emphasis clear and B. Cross-Examination The trial not court did abuse its con the extent that To discretion in admitting the other crime im tends that the cross-examination upon evidence based the fulfillment of the permissible failed government’s proffers. fulfill its and demonstrate furnished general both the time and the crime clear and con commission of the specific location Specific of the incident. evidence, vincing plain we review for er details of the incident were asserted to the ror. See Watts United trial upset court: that the defendant was (D.C.1976) (“errors objected not because he believed Butler was in Ms. on review un to at trial are unreachable car, volved with another man they purview less fall within car, broke the windows of the and he rule”). argues that plain error person stabbed the whom he believed with and discourse pretrial motion limine Finally, Ms. Butler gov was involved. of the Drew evi regarding the admission ernment indicated that both Ms. Butler any challenge to the preserved dence eyewitness testify another would regarding that evidence cross-examination believed, the events. This information “if *8 States, appeal. for See Wilkins United clearly convincingly establish [would] (D.C.1990). 939, n. 7 The 582 A.2d 942 uncharged that the crime occurred and the objection only applies doctrine continuing it.” connected to Dan defendant[][was] added) iels, already had an (emphasis 613 A.2d at 344-47 where the trial court “has court, discretion, may, example, Appellant argues ruling for 5. that the trial court’s in its contingent upon proof argument, was not at trial of the closing government’s restrict incident, ruling or, but we read the otherwise. jury, give limiting to the instructions probability a of a where it deems there is party present proffered If a fails to evi- justice, miscarriage declare a mistrial.” of deficient, opposing dence or evidence is such Daniels, (citation supra, at 347 omit- 613 A.2d request, court would counsel can and the trial ted). obliged provide, "remedy according be a severity proof. of The trial the failure

459 opportunity to point judge may decide the at issue” later so that the decide whether purpose while “the of the contemporane- An intervening ruling. events affect the objection ous give rule is to the trial court objection in such a case an appeal without an opportunity any potential to correct judge at trial would bushwhack both the they errors at the time are made.” (citations omitted); opponent”) and the 36, McGrier v. United 597 A.2d 45 Graves, 1546, United States v. 5 F.3d 1551 14 (appellant’s objection n. (5th Cir.1993) (and therein), cases cited government good lacked a faith basis denied, 1081, 1829, cert. asking question for a on cross-examination (1994); McGrier, 128 L.Ed.2d su cf. preserve did not appeal appellant’s for pra, 597 A.2d at 45 n. 14. challenge government’s discussion In order to establish the exis questioning such in closing argu- its

ment) (citations omitted). error, Here, plain tence of must show appel- pretrial objection lant’s argued that allowance cross-examination “(1) government had not constituted demonstrated the ex- error that was obvious or readily istence of the apparent, other crime clear and and clear under current convincing law; evidence. After clearly prejudicial the trial court so to sub permissibly ruled that government’s stantial rights jeopardize very as to proffer, fulfilled, once “would be clear and integrity fairness and of the trial.” John convincing,” appellant required to son v. United 840 A.2d fact, (D.C.2004) (citations alert the court if proffer, such omitted); had Clayborne not been satisfied in order to request (D.C. 751 A.2d prohibit trial court 2000) (citations omitted). “Plain error from questioning regarding where, only exceptional found case the other crime. per- Where a trial court reviewing record, after the entire it can be mits the subject admission of evidence to said the claimed error is a fundamental condition, the fulfillment of a an opposing error, basic, something prejudicial, so so so party object must if it believes that condi- lacking justice in its elements that cannot tion has not been disput- fulfilled when the have been done.” Bates v. United See, ed is presented. evidence e.g., United (D.C.2003). Archdale, (9th

States v. 229 F.3d error, if any, was not ob Cir.2000) (“Absent a thorough examination with, begin vious. To it is far from clear objection raised in the motion why judge it should be obvious to the trial explicit limine and an ruling definitive produced had not by the district court that the evidence is substantive evidence accordance with admissible, party a preserve does not its when fact did not occur to of admissibility appeal issue a absent Moreover, general, defense counsel. contemporaneous objection”) (emphasis regard a added); Williams, cross-examination of witness Wilson v. 182 F.3d (7th Cir.1999) (“conditional that has not in a ing crime resulted rulings permissible upon showing conviction is require further at action trial... for exam- *9 (1) question of a factual basis for the ple, judge says the that certain evidence directly upon will that the crime “bears the unduly be admitted unless it would be given veracity respect of the witness in prejudicial way the the trial devel- ops Murphy issues involved in the trial.” v. may later events lead to recon- —then (D.C.1995) Bonanno, sideration, 505, litigant adversely and the af- 663 A.2d 509 (citation by subject omitted); the ruling fected must raise the v. United Sherer 460

States, (D.C.1983), self-defense, of 732, cert. claim pellant’s 470 A.2d 738 would be imp denied, 931, 325, 83 substantive evidence or considered (1984). said that L.Ed.2d 262 We have See, e.g., Wesley v. United eachment.7 “impeachment the should not be rules States, (D.C.1988) 1022, 547 A.2d 1025 doc analytically confused with the distinct (“when a defendant testifies to certain introduction, as trine that restricts the n factsor issues his direct examina during evidence, prior substantive an accused’s of tion, ‘opens inquiry the to further he door’ crimes or ... Drew.” bad acts [under] matters cross-examination. into those (em Sherer, 470 at n. 5 supra, A.2d 738 scope that cross-exami The extent and of added). phasis Our cases have not made discretion subject to the broad nation are clear whether the under standard elicited Howard v. Unit judge.”) trial or Drew Sherer the standard under (D.C. States, 524, 528 n. 6 663 A.2d ed apply to questioning should of the defen 1995) in exception for (noting the Drew regarding dant himself or herself other state of applies tent when the defendant’s Compare crimes. Portillo v. United issue, of a claim self- including mind is at (D.C.1992) States, 687, 609 A.2d 690-91 defense, evidence addressing extrinsic but (holding that the cross-examination of the defendant). the not of cross-examination ques defendant was improper where the Thus, in' any error the allowance tioning did not fulfill the strictures of Sherer), deemed not be cross-examination could and Jamison v. United Johnson, su “clear under current law.”8 (D.C.1991), 600 A.2d with Galin at pra, 840 A.2d 1280. do v. United A.2d 207 (D.C.1993) (stating applies to Sherer Argument Closing C. cross-examination of a “non-defendant wit ness”). argues further Nor have our cases elucidated gov- the light ap- whether such of questioning, improperly permitted trial court Questions, course, evidence, assuming "plain,” we of are not 8. Even such error jury the was so instructed. SeePrice United to say prejudicial it sub cannot that was so (D.C.1997) 697 A.2d 818 n. very rights fair jeopardize as to stantial J., Nonetheless, (Schwelb, concurring). integrity No extrinsic of trial. ness and " government may evidence not 'manufacture by the evidence was introduced by creating impression an in the minds of the stabbing While regarding the other incident. through questions jurors imply exis- question did facts,' predicate tence of the factual unless occurrence, questions them about the (cid:127) question 'grounded good is faith jury was so were not evidence and selves susceptible proof belief that those are facts Price, supra note instructed. See ” by competent evidence.’ Plummer (Schwelb, J., concurring); at 818 n. cf. (cita- Johnson, (the "jury supra, 840 A.2d at 1280 omitted). hand, responses tions On the other court’s instruc presumed to follow the trial Here, questions are evidence. substantive tions”). this to government emphasized brought by upon himself harm stating, jury closing arguments in its own addressing directly not detailed accusations based on "you cannot come to conclusions that, false, expected deny if he be would defendant.” questions that I asked WIGMORE, outright. See 3A EVIDENCE Moreover, it the court instructed 995(1), (Chadbourn rev.1970) ("the § at 931 "to crimes evidence could not consider other testing capacity a witness’ of recollection a bad character [the find that has defendant] upon other circum- cross-examination personality because stances, or that he has criminal with the case in unconnected even person hand, you allow to convict a the law doesn’t recognized is a and common method (em- things simply may done bad weight testimony”) have measuring the of his omitted). past.” phasis *10 ernment, objection, appellant’s over to re- whether certain statements were made Brown, witness, stabbing fer to the other incident in its testifying Ms. Jeanette closing argument During because there was no or someone else. the cross-exami- Brown, evidence on the record that such an event nation of Ms. defense counsel initially occurred. review for abuse of discre- asked her We whether she had told tion and find none. police appellant See Gordon v. United that she witnessed the (D.C.2001). punch, At kick and stab Ms. Butler. Ms. appellant’s testimony least where the was telling police, answering, Brown denied so already objection, jury person before the without “I not the police was told the the trial court did not its sought abuse discretion that.” Defense counsel then to im- in permitting closing argument the on the peach testimony Ms. Brown’s as to what grounds appellant’s by calling answers she said she had witnessed Offi- “did not recall” stabbing the other were cer Latania Nicholson. Officer Nicholson credibility. relevant to his “As the trier of stated that police Ms. Brown had told fact, jury the was entitled to disbelieve “she observed kick [a Steven Anderson testimony... if jury victim, defendant’s] And hit complainant, and also [him], did disbelieve it further was entitled stab her in the back.” After Officer Ni- to consider whatever it concluded to be cholson testified that she also interviewed perjured testimony as affirmative evidence a woman named Ms. Wood about the inci- West, guilt.” Wright dent, government requested a side bar 120 L.Ed.2d 225 during which it govern- stated: “It’s the (1992); Earle v. United position ment’s that she Nichol- [Officer cf. (D.C.1992). Here, confusing is son] these two witnesses. where the appellant answered that he did IAnd would like to be able to ask her not recall stabbing someone rather than person Appellant objected what the said.” stating that he did not commit the stab- questioning to such ground on the bing, jury permitted to find such hearsay “this witness statement of Ms. answers apply credibility incredible and its going very Wood is to come ... [and] determination to appellant’s claim of prejudicial.” government responded The WIGMORE, self-defense. See supra note that “defense brought up. counsel court, thus, 7. The trial did not abuse its trying I’m What do is not for the truth discretion allowing government to of the per- matter asserted...” The court testimony refer to the regarding that inci- questioning mitted limited toas “whether dent in closing purpose for the attacking report states that Ms. Brown claims appellant’s credibility.9 happened that she observed what alley agreed or if Ms. Brown with another Questioning

III. of Police Officer happened witness as a rendition of what Appellant contends that trial alley.” appellant again objected court erred in permitting hearsay, prejudice and confrontation question police officer to grounds, determine which were denied.10 Furthermore, answers; (3) any potential prejudice appellant's ate the the trial assuaged by juiy the trial court's court's instruction to the that it could not jury government’s any convict the bad acts he had instruction to the evidence; (2) past. questions committed in the govern- were not closing argument, advising ment's own that it could not make conclusions based 10. The continued the cross-exam- prosecutor's questions on the but could evalu- ination of Officer Nicholson:

462 65, Peyton v. United did 709 A.2d 74 n. trial court not abuse (D.C.) 21 questioning (grand testimony in the not permitting its discretion was because, it hearsay Ms. was not offered to regarding of Officer Nicholson asserted, prove truth of the adoption ac the matter but Brown’s of another witness’s that an exculpatory establish lie was testimony count because was not hears the oath), cert. grand jury, told to the under ay.11 “If a is not statement offered denied, 854, 134, 119 142 asserted, S.Ct. the truth matter it prove is (1998). The trial court did L.Ed.2d 108 hearsay... not admission not [its] [is] permitting not in the abuse its discretion part an abuse of on the discretion Moreover, non-hearsay.12 as testimony v. Burgess United trial court.” 786 the not abuse its- discretion (D.C.2001) (citation trial court did 561, 570 foot was questioning in the line of omitted). finding that testimony note The officer’s probative not than prejudicial more that “Ms. Wood said that” not offered —the govern to rehabilitate questioning was truth of for the what Ms. Wood said —that witness, witness, Miss ment’s the other she saw stab the victim —but mentioned, Wood, barely govern to show that Ms. did not Brown make such testimony any re ment cut additional off See, e.g., Taylor statements. witness, govern and the garding other (D.C.) 451, (holding 461 in witness ment refer the other did not that accusation that someone was a ‘snitch’ arguments. its subsequent hearsay was not it was not offered truth, for its that but to show the accusa Tape 911 IV. cert, made), in denied sub tion was fact nom., Jones v. 852, trial court United alleges 506 U.S. 155, (1992); admitting, over 113 S.Ct. 121 L.Ed.2d 105 abused its discretion Q: Q: testimony you your And stop when testified on direct exami- there. it You can Is report, only thing this now you that nation about what Ms. Brown said did report, from Ms. George is Thomas’ independent have an recollection of that or merely that the same Brown is she stated you your did use a document to refresh place? occurrence of events took memory? A: true. That’s gave A: I read over the notes that he all me Q: So, fact, said Okay. never Ms. Brown today... the defendant defendant —she saw Q: Okay. say there Does it that Ms. victim, punch correct? is that and kick actually Brown said that the defendant-that A: correct... That’s punch she observed the defendant and kick any give, did nor at 11. The trial court not body pro- the victim in the face and before point request, limiting instruc- did ducing stabbing knife and the back. tion. Yeah, that’s said. A: what the note Q: actually The note said that she used those testimony violat- Appellant’s claim that the words? ed fails because the Confrontation Clause also today, I she A: That read over observed hearsay. the Su- was not In statement complainant punched kicked and in the preme of the re- Court's recent clarification punched back and then stabbed-kicked Clause, quirements of the Confrontation the face and stabbed back. also does not Court noted that Clause "[t]he Q: true, officer, report, Isn't it pur- bar of testimonial statements the use only thing says that it the witness establishing poses the truth other than took stated same occurrence events Washington, v. matter asserted..’’ Crawford place, only thing 1354, that’s the mention in this 36,-n. 1369 124 S.Ct. U.S. report. entire (emphasis add- n. 158 L.Ed.2d Street, ed) A: Yes. Yes. Wood-Ms. Wood said that U.S. (citing Ms. Tennessee (1985)). and Ms. L.Ed.2d Brown- *12 States, (D.C. objection, 1216, portion a of a 911 call in which 666 A.2d 1225-1226 caller, Brown, 1995) (where Ms. man stated “a fact complain “[t]he beating a woman in the alley” because the misrepresented a fact to the ant/declarant declarant, in alley, who was not lacked police during the 911 call was relevant to a personal knowledge of the statement. determination of sponta whether it was a testifying “Just as witnesses must have neous utterance” be but was harmless personal knowledge subject of their spontaneous cause “the witness whose ut testimony, hearsay declarants must have terance was at issue was available at trial personal knowledge they of what assert in fully by and cross-examined defense coun order for their declarations to be admissi- sel, [a]ppellant obtained information” of States, Ginyard ble.” 816 A.2d discrepancy “in time to seek corrective 21, Smith United (citing measures in the trial court and to use it to (D.C.1990)). 583 A.2d 983-84 impeach during the witness cross-examina Assuming, deciding, without tion” such that opportuni “the had an portion admission the contested ty complainant’s to consider the admitted tape discretion, the 911 was an abuse of fabrication in assessing credibility”) his the error was nonetheless harmless under (footnote omitted). Kotteakos v. United (1946). 90 L.Ed. 1557 Ap Sufficiency V. of the Evidence pellant knew in advance of the discrepancy Bodily Injury for Serious between the statement on tape that a man beating a in alley woman an and Finally, appellant claims that Ms. grand jury Brown’s testimony that she evidence was insufficient to demonstrate did not see what alley. occurred beyond a reasonable doubt Ms. Butler Furthermore, Ms. Brown testified at trial. bodily injury had suffered serious consis She only was not available for cross-exami requirements tent with the aggra nation, was, fact, but fully cross-exam vated assault statute.13 a claim of in On ined on admitted, the issue. Ms. Brown evidence, sufficient we view the evidence contrary to her tape, statement on the “I light most to govern favorable did not see him up. my beat her That was ment, drawing all reasonable inferences assumption, my that was fear for her that favor of deferring she going to be beaten.” On cross- jury’s province credibility to determine examination, the declarant admitted the evidence. Owens v. United weigh taped error her statement. (D.C.1996). 688 A.2d admitted, at in part, least to the conduct only “It is pro where the has referred tape by to on the stating that he duced no evidence from which a reasonable slapped alley; Ms. Butler in the and Ms. might fairly guilt beyond mind infer Butler, victim, testified as to what reasonable doubt that this court can re happened in alley. can say We with verse a conviction.” Zanders v. United fair any assurance that error the trial (D.C.1996) (cita court, therefore, substantially did not sway See Smith v. United tions omitted). judgment. "(a) § per- manifesting Under D.C.Code 22-504.1: A extreme indifference to human life, aggravated son commits the person intentionally knowingly offense of assault or (1) means, By any person knowingly engages grave if: in conduct which creates a risk purposely bodily injury or bodily injury person, causes serious of serious to another person; thereby bodily injury.” another or Under circumstances causes serious assault, imme- taken aggravated “significant.” For Ms. Butler was “[s]er knife had bodily injury injury surgery “the bodily diately ious means death, surgery through kidney.” uncon gone [her] involves substantial risk of sciousness, scar on Ms. pain, pro in a six to eleven inch physical extreme resulted *13 and, respond to pro belly, tracted and or order to disfigurement, Butler’s obvious first sur- impairment resulting tracted loss or the function from the complications of member, bodily required undergo of a mental fac Butler was to organ, gery, or Ms. ulty.” Gathy surgery. v. United a second n. 3 (quoting D.C.Code resulting bodily injury As to the serious 22-4101(7) (1996)). § jury may A infer foot, testified Butler from the shod Ms. description from a of the nature and ex my on jumping that the “started injuries of tent that an individual has suf to trying his I’m face with both feet so injury” fered “serious bodily as defined. Norma Smalls my face.” Dr. up cover Gathy, Gathy, 754 A.2d at In 918-19. was bro- “nose that Butler’s testified Ms. court found that government present eye the left below ken and the sinus... ed sufficient a rea evidence from which broken..; correction, right.” was also find, jury sonable could a beyond reason bone and sinus that a broken nose Noting doubt, able the victim had suffered someone with injuries consistent were I) bodily injuries involving: serious a sub face, Dr. Smalls on another’s stomping stantial risk of unconsciousness because to Ms. injury each sustained opined “ the victim testified being to ‘semi-uncon forehead, face, the Butler’s swollen shock,’ ‘in total totally and ‘[not] scious/ bone, nose, sinus and broken broken ” ii) physical pain coherent’ and extreme bones are as pain would cause “broken although [his “he never described indicated Dr. Smalls also painful.” pain] terms that would indicate it was injuries such term of potential long effects ... juror ‘extreme’ in reasonable could ... sinusitis infections and include “sinus injuries, fer from the nature of his debilitat- painful, kind of very can those be them, pain from his reaction pre- was Finally, ...” Butler ing Ms. Id.; compare was extreme.” with Nixon pain “[b]ecause medication scribed had sur- recently broken bones she’d (D.C.) (holding not did gery injury.” and the face provide support sufficient con evidence to light most in the Construing facts aggravated victions for “due to the assault govern- government, favorable victims], of or testimony absence from [the for the evidence presented ment sufficient professionals from health treated who Ms., Butler suffered jury to conclude them, detailing or medical the na records stabbing in her bodily injury from serious injuries”), ture and extent of cert. their Al- her face. stomping and the side denied, U.S. [her Ms. Butler described though “never (1999). L.Ed.2d 196 ju- reasonable ‘extreme’... a pain]... [as] [her] nature of regarding The could infer from presented evidence ror .the them, from reaction stabbing injuries, Ms. Butler’s testimo [her] included knife, Gathy, See ny that she felt that “It was was extreme.” pain It Butler testified burning. very painful.” phy Her 754 A.2d at 918. Ms. sician, Smalls, very painful and her doctor stabbing Dr. Norma testified that sig- cause injury Butler was in she came to such an would pain Ms. when indicated stabbing resulted hospital, characterizing pain pain. as nificant surgery provision pain and the stop pretending medi- we should that a cation. Her doctor convincing testified that each of clear and it evidence when obvi- injuries, including bones, her facial ously Nothing intervening broken is not. painful would be and that years persuaded medicine was has twelve me that our prescribed to alleviate such pain. illogical handling There- superior this issue is fore, beyond could conclude straightforward approach adopted reasonable doubt that Ms. Butler suffered all nine Justices in Huddleston.

extreme pain stabbing from both the as-

sault and the shod foot assault. sum,

In grounds we find no for reversal

in any appellant’s arguments appeal.

Accordingly, judgment appealed from

is B., In re KYA.

Affirmed. K.B., In re SCHWELB, Judge, Associate concurring: I concur in the judgment join Kye.B. In re opinion. Nevertheless,

court’s I continue to adhere to the I expressed views in my D.B., Appellant separate opinion in Daniels v. United 00-FS-1231, 00-FS-1230, No. (D.C.1992). A FS-1232. 00- proffer is a statement of counsel. A state- ment of counsel is not evidence. There- District of Appeals. Columbia Court of fore, proffer is not and cannot be “clear Argued Dec. 2003. and convincing evidence.” Sept. Decided explanation prosecutor’s that a prof- fer as to what the evidence will show is

itself clear and convincing evidence if it is

credited reminds dog me of a chasing its

own tail. Evidence is credited because it “convincing”;

is if it is not convincing, the

trier of fact will not believe it. Our cur- doctrine, hand,

rent on the other supposes (and too)

that a convincing clear

“if Maj. believed.” op. at 457 (quoting

Daniels, 347). 613 A.2d at Apparently, as very colleague able told me about anoth-

er joined court, case soon after I

“common nothing sense has to do it.” with

I opinion years ago, twelve decided,

when Daniels was that we should jurisprudence

conform our to Huddleston 681, 685, (1988),

S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d 771 and that

Case Details

Case Name: Anderson v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Aug 19, 2004
Citation: 857 A.2d 451
Docket Number: 01-CF-1432
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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