97 So. 2d 369 | Miss. | 1957
Mrs. Cora James Anderson, by her bill of complaint against T. Gr. Owen and Son, Inc., and others, sought to cancel all claims of the defendants to an undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the land described in the bill, comprising’ in excess of eight hundred acres. These adverse claims stemmed from the sale of her one-half interest under execution. Complainant charged that the sale was invalid because (1) at the time, the judgment lien had been released; or, in the alternative (2) Dalton, the purchaser, was a tenant in common with her of the mineral estate; or (3) the consideration of $16 was grossly inadequate.
The answers of the defendants, which were also made cross bills, denied all of the material allegations of the original and amended bills, and sought the cancellation of the claims of the complainant and cross-defendant.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed the original and amended bills, and granted the relief prayed for in the cross bills. From the final decree entered, Mrs. Anderson appealed.
The salient facts in the record were as follows: On March 8, 1932, Armour Fertilizer Works and J. C. Crosby, Administrator, obtained a judgment against L. B. and Cora James Anderson in the sum of $984.53, and the same was enrolled on the judgment roll of Monroe County on March 26, 1932.
On August 17, 1932, L. B. and Cora J. Anderson, by special warranty deed, conveyed the land to Philip H. Dalton, making the following exception thereto: “The said L. B. Anderson and wife Cora James Anderson retains a one half interest in all the oil and mineral rights in the above described tracts or parcels of land herein described. ’ ’
Philip H. Dalton, several years after his purchase from the Andersons, had his title checked, when it was found that his land was subject to the aforementioned judgment lien. For the sum of $150, he procured a release as follows: “For value received, we release from the operation of the lien hereof the land described in the deed from L. B. and Mrs. Cora James Anderson to Philip H. Dalton dated August 17, 1932, and recorded in Deed Book 99 at Page 471. This Oct. 14, 1936.
“Leftwich & Tubb, Attorneys of record for the plaintiff
“Attest:
“S. D. Ritter
“Circuit Clerk.”
On September 29,1937, an execution was issued on the original judgment, and, pursuant to a levy, the interests of the defendants, L. B. and Cora James Anderson, in the lands, namely, one-half of the oil and mineral rights therein, were sold to Philip H. Dalton for a consideration of $16, and deed therefor of date of October 25, 1937, was executed and delivered by the sheriff.
Applicant contends that the release of date of October 14, 1936, supra, operated as a satisfaction of the judgment, and that until such entry had been vacated, no execution could be issued thereon; and that the sale of date of October 25, 1937, was therefore a nullity. She
When it is kept in mind that the Andersons, in their deed to Dalton, retained one-half of the oil and mineral rights, it is obvious that such rights were not conveyed and that Dalton received title only to the surface and one-half of the oil and minerals. Beyond question, the purpose of the instrument, which he obtained in 1936, was to release the property which had been conveyed by the Andersons in their deed. But, since they retained one-half of the oil and mineral rights, clearly the instrument in no way released their one-half.
If the instrument had been intended as a satisfaction or cancellation of the judgment lien, it should have so stated. On the contrary, it purported only to release therefrom “the land described in the deed from L. B. and Mrs. Cora James Anderson to Philip H. Dalton” as
Appellant contends that she and Dalton were cotenants insofar as the oil and minerals were concerned, and that he had no legal right to purchase her interest, and that even if he did so, it inured to her benefit under the rule that a confidential relationship existed between them and it would be inequitable to permit him to buy an outstanding adversary title and claim it for his exclusive benefit.
But in this case the judgment was against Mrs. Anderson. The debt on which it was based was incurred by Mrs. Anderson and her husband. Dalton had no part in contracting it, and was under no obligation to pay it. Although he had a deed from the Andersons, actually he was compelled to pay $150 in order- to get the land, which they had sold him, released from the judgment lien. The bill alleged that appellant did not even know that the sale had occurred until 1952, and her suit was not filed until 1954. The facts indicate that she was wholly unconcerned as to what happened to Dalton in respect to the judgment lien which attached by reason of her indebtedness. It would be an anomalous situation indeed if, under such circumstances, Dalton could not purchase this interest at the execution sale, or, if he did do so, his purchase would inure to the benefit of those who had misused him so badly. The law is not that unjust or inequitable. Applicable here is the principle found in 14 Am. Jur., Cotenancy, Section 50, pp. 119-120, which reads in part as follows: “In accordance with the principles stated in a subsequent section concerning the right of cotenants to deal with each other,
Appellant also contends that, even if the interest of Mrs. Anderson was subject to the execution and to the purchase by Dalton, still the attempted sale was null and void because of the total inadequacy of the consideration. Among the cases which she cites are Reynolds v. Nye, Freeman Chancery Reports, p. 462, and Bratton v. Graham, 146 Miss. 246, 111 So. 353. In the former, there was an execution sale to realize a balance of $11.66 and costs on a judgment, and property worth between $5,000 and $8,000 brought only $10. In the latter, the property at the execution sale brought only one twentieth to one-fiftieth of its value. In the former case, because of the gross inadequacy and the fact that the judgment creditor had procured the sale, and, in the latter case, because of the unconscionable amount of the consideration, the sales were set aside.
Tn the case here, Hon. Frank S. Leftwich, an attorney, who claimed to have been familiar with this land and the value of oil and mineral rights generally at the time of the sale, testified that this acreage was in a block on which a dry hole was drilled in 1927; that the con
From which it follows that the decree of the trial court must be, and is, affirmed.
Affirmed.