This is an action in eminent domain. In its appeal, defendant State of Nebraska, Department of Roads, alleges error in the exclusion of evidence of comparаble sales of land and in the taxation of attorney’s and expert witness’ fees. We reverse the judgment of the district court.
The record discloses that defendant called an expert on real estate values to give his opinion of the value of plaintiffs’ land before and after the taking. As a basis *469 for his opinion, he sought to compare the lands of plaintiffs with other lands in the area which had been sold. One such sale is referred to as the Walz-Phelps sale consummated about 2 months prior to the appropriation of plaintiffs’ land. It was investigated by the witness in the usual manner. He inspected the premises, found the sale to have been an open-market transaction and the land to have numеrous points of similarity to plaintiff's’ property. Both places adjoined the south bank of the South Platte River; were in the same, general area; had accretion land, similаr type soils, high water tables, hay and pasture land in native grass; and were used as wintering areas for cattle. There were some dissimilarities. The Walz-Phelps tract was larger, had a small set of improvements, and had 125 acres irrigated. The plaintiffs’ land was irrigable but not presently irrigated. The Walz-Phelps place sold for $189.18 per acre whereas the jury awarded plaintiffs for land taken on the basis of $290 per acre. The court sustained an objection to evidence that the sale was an open-market transaction on thе ground it was hearsay. Evidence of this sale was barred entirely. The court stated: “There are certain features of it that are based on hearsay on the witness’s part, and other phases that depend on matters as to which an expert’s opinion is not available.” In view of the fact that it was a duly qualified expert witness testifying, there would not apрear to be any basis for the latter portion of the ruling made. The question of admissibility of hearsay evidence under such circumstances is one not heretofore specifically determined in this jurisdiction.
The authorities are not agreed on whether or not the testimony of an expert witness, as to comparable sales, is admissible over a clаim of hearsay based on his lack of personal knowledge relating to sales of comparable property. See Annotation, 95 A. L. R. 2d 1217. The majority rule, and we believe the better reasoned, admits such testimony. In International Paper Co. v. United
*470
States (5th Cir.),
In State v. Oakley,
Defendant also objects to the ruling of the court barring evidence of another sale. The objection made was, among others, on the ground that the sale wаs not of comparable land. There were many dissimilarities and bearing in mind that the court is vested with a reasonable discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence of this nature, we сonclude that, in this instance, there was not an abuse of discretion. See Swanson v. State,
Plaintiffs called as an expert witness a man with a wide knowledge of local real estate values in the vicinity of plaintiffs’ land. Arrangements had been made with this individual to appraise plaintiffs’ land, testify in regard to such appraisal and to damages sustained, and for compensation for his services. He was not a licensed real estate salesman or broker. The court allowed an expert witness’ fee for the services of this witness tо which defendant excepts. A witness who testifies as an expert on a subject requiring special knowledge and skill is, in the absence of special contract, entitled only tо the statutory fee. See, Hefti v. Hefti,
Defendant also challenges the award of attorney’s fees allowed in this case. Plaintiffs retained as counsel the firm of McGinley, Lane, Mueller & Shanahan. The case is one in which the allowance of an attorney’s fee is proper under the provisions of section 76-720, R. R. S. 1943. That section provides that under сertain circumstances “* * * the court
may
in its discretion award to the condemnee a reasonable sum for the
fees of his attorney
* * (Emphasis supplied.) The statute is not mandatory but enables the court, in instances where it may be deemed proper and statutory requirements are present, to make such allowance. The purpose of the statute is to proteсt condemnees against harassment by the institution of groundless appeals on the part of condemned and its use should be limited to the purposes for which it was intended. In the present instance, we find there was no abuse of discretion in allowing an attorney’s, fee, but a question arises as to the amount allowed. The fee allowed is somewhat in excess of that requested by plaintiffs. The evidence further shows that two members of the firm employed by plaintiffs participated in the trial and perhaps the preparation therеfor. A claim was made for the fees of both attorneys notwithstanding that at least, insofar as the trial was concerned, these fees were in a measure for the work of onе attorney duplicating that of the other. The statute contemplates but one fee and the amount allowed should be fixed as though the services were performed by one attorney unless the circumstances are such as to require the services of two or more attorneys. See, Hamilton v. Nunn,
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.