Valdemar C. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, COMMERCIAL FISHERIES ENTRY COMMISSION, Appellee.
No. 6107.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Nov. 12, 1982.
Michael Sewright, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, and Wilson L. Condon, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This case involves an administrative appeal filed seventeen days late. The superior court dismissed the action as untimely under
On November 29, 1978, the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) denied Anderson‘s application for a limited entry permit. Anderson requested an administrative hearing. On April 12, 1979, the CFEC denied that request. On April 26, Anderson requested that the CFEC reconsider its decision to deny him a hearing. On May 7, a hearing officer wrote Anderson that:
Commission regulations do not provide for such reconsideration. This case was closed to further consideration by the Commission on April 12, 1979 when I denied the hearing request and exhausted Mr. Anderson‘s administrative remedies.
Anderson filed an appeal on May 29.
The superior court ruled that the time for appealing the April 12 denial of Anderson‘s
Availability of Reconsideration
Former Appellate Rule 45(a)(2), now
The time within which an appeal may be taken to the superior court from an administrative agency shall be 30 days from the date that the order appealed from is mailed or delivered to the appellant. If a request for agency reconsideration is timely filed before the agency, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the agency‘s reconsideration decision.
Implicit in this rule is the requirement that the pertinent statutes or regulations provide for reconsideration within specified time limits if a timely request for reconsideration is to toll the thirty-day period. Cf. Oaks v. Grocers Wholesale, Inc., 377 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Alaska 1963) (where there is no provision for reconsideration, the decision is final and the time for taking a civil appeal commences to run).
(a) The commissioners may order a reconsideration of their decision on their own motion or on petition of the applicant or other party. A petition for reconsideration by the applicant or other party shall set forth specifically the grounds upon which the petitioner believes the decision to be erroneous or specify new evidence he believes will have a substantial bearing on the decision.
(b) The power to order a reconsideration expires 30 days after the hand delivery or mailing of a decision to the applicant or other party. If no action is taken on a petition for reconsideration within the time allowed for ordering reconsideration, the petition is considered denied.
(c) The commissioners may reconsider a matter in the original record or order a supplementary hearing in accordance with 20 AAC 05.845(e).3
(Emphasis added.)
The Commission reads the regulation as limiting reconsideration to administrative adjudications, i.e., the Commission‘s decisions in reviewing previously held hearings. We think this interpretation neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the wording of § .850. Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage School District, 631 P.2d 67, 78 n. 30 (Alaska 1980). By its terms, § .850 au-
Abuse of Discretion
Anticipating this result, Anderson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to relax the strictures of
REVERSED.
MATTHEWS, Justice, joined by RABINOWITZ, Justice, concurring.
In my opinion the appeal to the superior court was timely under 20 AAC 05.850. That regulation is expressly applicable to “a decision” of the Commission. The denial of a hearing under 20 AAC 05.8051 is a decision of the Commission. It therefore is subject to reconsideration under § 850.
In fact, the denial of a hearing under § 805 is a determination that the written request for a hearing has demonstrated no right to relief. As such, the denial is akin to a judgment on the pleadings in a civil action and is a final decision on the merits of the controversy. It makes no sense to conclude that such a decision should not be subject to reconsideration by the Commission while all other final decisions by the Commission are. There is certainly no language in the regulations which suggests that this unusual conclusion is warranted.
For these reasons I conclude that the appeal to the superior court was timely and that the court erred in dismissing it.
