50 Tenn. 86 | Tenn. | 1871
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Three indictments appear to have been found against the plaintiff in error and one Thomas McBride, for the murder, in the first degree, of James Sparkman; two at the September Term, 1869, and the other at October Term, 1870, of the Circuit Court of White county; and it does not appear, either from .the bill of exception, or any other part of the record, upon which of the indictments the defendant was tried. His trial occurred at October Term, 1870, when he was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in the Penitentiary, and appealed to this Court. At the September Term, 1869, the plaintiff in error was admitted to bail on the first indictment; and the case was declared not bailable as to his co-defendant, McBride,
“State of Tennessee I v. V “Lot S. ÁNDersoN. J
Indictment for Murder.
“Came the Attorney General, who prosecutes for the State, and the defendant in proper person; and the defendant being arraigned and charged on the indictment, says he is not guilty, and for his trial puts himself upon the country; and the Attorney General doth the like. Then came a jury of good and lawful men,” &c., who were elected, tried and sworn, the truth to speak on the issue joined, &c., and were respited from rendering their verdict, from day to day, till Monday morning; upon which day the record states that they, “upon their oaths, do say the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter: and that he be, therefore, imprisoned in the State Penitentiary for five years; whereupon came the defendant by his attorney, and moved the Court for a new trial, and also for arrest of judgment; which motion was continued for further action of the Court.”
The transcript of record does not show, as it should, the different days and dates of the meetings and adjournments of the court during the progress of the trial; but the record shows that the motion was overruled, and that the defendant excepted and appealed; and it may be inferred that this action was had on a day of the term subsequent to the day of the motion. Nor does the record show that A. F. Capps, whose name is signed
It is impossible, from this transcript of the record, to determine whether the plaintiff in error was tried upon all or either of the indictments contained in it. The record does not contain any designation of the indictment by numbers, or any other evidence to enable us to discriminate between the indictments. It contains no indictment against the plaintiff in error alone, and does not show whether his motion for a severance was acted upon, or what disposition, if any, was made of the cause as to his co-defendant. Ordinarily, where there is an indictment against two, and one of the defendants is put upon his trial alone, it may be presumed that the other defendant was not arrested, or that a severance was permitted' by order of the Court. This presumption may well apply where there is but one indictment or presentment contained in the record, but can not attach where there is so much uncertainty as in this case. Nor do we perceive how the defect could be remedied by any statement or certificate from the Clerk, as such statement would be no part of the record itself. It may be that there are two separate files of papers in the court, and that two or more indictments are copied upon the minutes; but how could such a state of facts determine on which indictment the plaintiff in error was actually tried? It is a familiar principle that if, in a criminal case, the evidence shows, conclusively, that one of two persons committed an offense, but leaves it uncertain which of them is actually guilty, neither can be convicted. And how can it be said, in view of the constitutional pro
As appearing, however, in the transcript, the question is one of substance, and not of' form, and extends to the
We would willingly forego the labor of further investigation and remand the cause alone upon the error indicated, but feel that our whole duty will not be discharged without the consideration of other propositions urged in argument.
So far as the facts are disclosed in the record, but two witnesses were examined who were actually present at the homicide. One of them, John E. Witt, was assailed upon the trial and shown, by various witnesses, to be unworthy of credit on oath, in consequence of his general bad character. Other witnesses, who were related to him, or otherwise prejudiced in the cause, sustained his credit, and, upon this state of proof, such a doubt is thrown upon his testimony, that, while we do not hold he is utterly unworthy of credit, we do not feel called to analyze his statements, although we will advert to some of them, or to state how far he is corroborated, and leave the question of his credibility to be determined by the jury, under proper instructions from the Circuit Court. For the purposes of this opinion, the facts of the case may be stated upon the evidence of Levi W. Wood, the other witness, whose credibility is fully sustained. His statement is as follows: “Thomas McBride and James Sparkman were playing cards for a pistol. McBride said he was seven, Sparkman said they were six and six. Then Sparkman got up and started off, and said McBride would not play a fair game; McBride said he would play a fair game; Sparkman
Other witnesses prove that although the plaintiff in error is neither an idiot nor a lunatic, he is a youth, sixteen or seventeen years of age, and of dull and feeble intellect. It is also shown, that he was intoxicated at the time of the homicide.
The statements of Wood and Witt, the impeached witnesses, are similar as to the leading facts, but both are singularly defective in not detailing the particular circumstances which attended the direct act of shooting; how far the parties were from each other; whether they were standing or sitting; or were directly face to face; the particular manner in which the pistol was held; whether it was aimed or pointed at the deceased; whether the plaintiff in error held both hands near his person, or extended them so as to indicate a deliberate, or momentary, purpose to fire; and other particulars which might elucidate the transaction and show whether the homicide was accidental or intentional, are not stated. Witness says, after McBride presented the pistol and ordered Spark-man to come back, “Sparkman then came right back
Upon the facts detailed in the record, we are not satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict of the jury is correct; and as it is manifest that a fuller examination of the circumstances attending the homicide will shed light upon the whole transaction, and establish more satisfactorily the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff in error, it is due alike to the public and to him that a re-investigation shall take place. This is the more necessary, as the charge of his Honor may, in some respects, have misled the jury. It is to be regretted that the practice has so long prevailed in this State of sending indictments for murder in the first degree in all cases of homicide. There are many cases in which it is manifest that the offense, when tried, will amount to nothing more than manslaughter, or murder in the second degree; and there is no reason, under our statutes, why the indictment may not approach nearer to the facts of the case and be sent for murder in the second degree, or for manslaughter. When the bill is found for murder in the first degree, the case, prima fade, is not bailable, and much trouble and expense are often incurred in making a preliminary inquiry as to
Among other things, his Honor instructed the jury that, “if a party use a deadly weapon and kill, he is presumed to have intended to have taken life.” As an abstract proposition, this may be correct, but as the question before the jury was whether the plaintiff in-error used the pistol at all; that is, as the question was whether it went off accidentally or by design in his hands, the statement, without qualification, was calcula
After defining voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and pointing out the difference between the latter and homicide by misadventure, his Honor proceeded to observe, that, “in general, where an involuntary killing happens in consequence of an unlawful act, it will be either murder or manslaughter, according to the nature of the act which occasioned it. If it be in the prosecution of a felonious intent, or in its consequences naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be murder; but if [noj more was intended than a mere civil trespass, it is manslaughter.”
In view of the facts, the jury should have been told distinctly, that the mere act of picking up the pistol was not in itself, unlawful; that if it was picked up for the purpose of preventing its unlawful use by either of the parties, the act was not unlawful; but that, if it was picked up for the purpose of taking part in their conflict, or of aiding or intimidating either, then the act was unlawful. 'The language of his Honor is obscure, and may have been understood by the jury as meaning, that, if the act of picking up, or holding, or handling the pistol, “in its consequences led to bloodshed,” the plaintiff in error would be guilty either of murder or manslaughter. And yet the plaintiff in error may have handled the pistol in such a manner that led to bloodshed, and he may have been entirely innocent; as, for example, if he was attempting to 'let down the cock or
Without quoting his Honor’s charge, it may be observed that he instructed the jury as to what would be the law on various hypotheses mentioned by him predicated of the idea that the pistol was presented at Sparkman by the plaintiff in error, when there is no proof in the record to show that it was presented at all or for any purpose whatever. The charge as made, was calculated, though not intended, to create the impression on the mind of the jury that, in the opinion of the Court, there was proof to show that the pistol Avas actually presented; and the consequences of such a belief are too obvious to require comment. The deceased may have been shot by accident and without presenting the pistol; and it should have been clearly left to the jury to determine, from the proof, how the fact Avas.
Among other things, his Ho'nor was requested in behalf of plaintiff in error, to instruct the jury that “the absence of all evidence of an inducing cause is reasonably regarded, where the fact is doubtful, as affording a strong presumption of innocence.” In answer, his Honor stated: “The above is good laAL in a case of doubt, and I will add, that it is laid down in the same book, that Avhen the moral spring of action is once put in motion, then even a gesture or look may be the source of encouragement and impulse to the deadliest crimes, and subject the moral action even to the highest legal penalty. In other words, when a party is moved to the perpetration of an action, a very slight cause, a Avord, a gesture, may
Without considering various other errors which are urged in argument as existing in his Honor’s charge, let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.