24 Tex. Ct. App. 705 | Tex. App. | 1886
Lead Opinion
One Green Wright was tried before a justice of the peace for carrying a pistol, on or about his person. The-trial was had upon a complaint, and upon the hearing appellant was a witness, and, being charged with giving false testimony, was indicted and convicted of perjury.
There is evidence in the record strongly tending to prove that the complaint was not sworn to. This being the case, it is insisted that the court should have instructed the jury that, if they had a, reasonable doubt as to whether the complaint was sworn to, they should acquit the defendant. Concede the fact that the complaint was not sworn to, does it follow that defendant could not commit perjury upon the trial under such complaint? There is-no question as to the jurisdiction of the justice to hear and de
Upon this subject Mr. Bishop says: ‘‘ Thus we are led to the further proposition that not only must the tribunal have jurisdiction of the cause, as before explained, but the cause must be properly in court.” (l Bish. Crim. Law, sec. 1028.) To the same ■effect are all the authorities accessible to us at this place, for we have examined very carefully all of them. . We have found two English cases bearing upon this question, one of which is directly in point. In Regina v. Millard, Dean’s C. C., 166, an information, not under oath, was laid before a justice against a prisoner for unlawfully damaging a carriage, and the prisoner was-indicted for perjury committed on the hearing of that information. It was objected that the information ought to have been made under oath,.but it was held that, as the law did not require the information to be sworn to, therefore the justice had jurisdiction. It seems very clear that the converse would have been held if the law had required the information to be on oath.
But we have a case precisely in point in Regina v. Scatton, 5 Queen’s Bench, 493. The act of Parliament rendered it necessary that an information should be verified on oath of a credible witness before any proceeding be taken for summoning the party accused or compelling his appéarance. The information not Leing thus verified, it was held that the justice had no jurisdiction, and consequently a person giving false evidence on such .an occasion is not guilty of perjury. We deem it unnecessary to cite further authority in support of Mr. Bishop’s proposition, namely, that the court must not only have jurisdiction of the cause of action, but that the jurisdiction must have attached in the particular case.
From these authorities it would se'em to follow that the position of appellant is correct. We have -no doubt of its correctness at common law. But how stands the question when viewed in the light of the provisions of our Constitution? At common law, and, we suppose, in most of the States, to plead successfully former acquittal, the first trial must have been upon a good and sufficient indictment, information or complaint. Is this the case in this State?
Section 14 of the Bill of Rights reads: “No person for the
How, if this be so, why provide that no person shall again be placed upon trial for the same offense after a verdict .of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction? Is it not evident that this is inhibited by the jeopardy clause of the Constitution? Would any court permit a party to be again tried for the same offense, when he had been tried upon a good and sufficient indictment, before a court of competent jurisdiction, and acquitted by the jury? Does it require a constitutional provision to shield him from a second trial under the above facts? We think not.
But, as it frequently occurs that an accused is placed upon trial for an offense before a court of competent jurisdiction upon indictments vicious in substance, and that long and tedious trials are had, resulting in verdicts of acquittal, was it not the intention of the Constitution to say to the State that the accused shall not be tried again for the same offense though the indictment was in substance insufficient? After a most thorough examination of this subject, we are of the opinion that this was the intention of the framers of the Constitution. We could enlarge upon this subject, but have not the time.
Before leaving this subject we desire to give some illustrations as to what we mean by the same offense. A is charged, in the first instance, with the murder of B by shooting him. He is acquitted. In the second indictment he is charged with the murder of B by stabbing him with a knife or by striking him with a stick or bludgeon. The offenses are not the same, and, if the first indictment had been good, A could not have been convicted of the offense charged in the second indictment.
Again: A is charged with the theft of a bay horse, the property of B, and is acquitted. He is again placed- upon trial for the theft of a white horse, the property of B. Though the transaction be the same, the offenses are not the same. But let us suppose that the indictment charging the theft of a bay horse, the property of B, fails to allege that it was fraudulently taken,
If, therefore, the accused can be acquitted under a bad indictment, information or complaint, the court having jurisdiction ■of the cause of action—the offense—and this acquittal can be successfully pleaded to a second prosecution, may not a witness be guilty of perjury for false swearing upon the trial, though the jurisdiction of .the court may not have lawfully attached? For, if the court has jurisdiction of the offense—the subject matter— and a trial results in a verdict of not guilty, the State is forever ■debarred from another prosecution for the same offense; and the false testimony of a witness may, and no doubt would, in many cases contribute to an acquittal, and thus defeat the ends of justice.
Just here let us give another illustration. All prosecutions -originating in the county court must be presented by informa"tion, and the information must have for its support a complaint verified by the affidavit of some credible person. How, let us suppose the accused is placed upon trial upon a good information, and is convicted and fined one hundred dollars. He pays liis fine and is discharged. Afterwards it is discovered that there was no complaint. • How, then, the jurisdiction of the county -court had not properly attached, and yet the accused has been tried upon a good information before a court of competent jurisdiction. Will it be contended that because there was no complaint, a witness who swears falsely,” deliberately, willfully and intentionally can not, and should not, be convicted of perjury when it may be that the accused was convicted solely upon Ids false testimony? We would hesitate long before we would sanction such a doctrine. But, suppose the accused be acquitted by verdict of not guilty, this would be a bar to another prosecution, when it may be that this verdict was obtained by the false testimony of a witness who, if we are wrong in our views upon this subject, is beyond the reach of the penal laws of this State. To this we can not agree.
Concede that the jurisdiction of the court had .not properly attached to the particular case, yet there was a trial before a court
In the indictment, perjury is assigned upon both material and immaterial matter. The court below” very carefully confined the jury to that which was material and properly assigned as perjury, requiring the jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt, from the evidence, the material matter which had been properly assigned as perjury, before they could convict; thus eliminating all immaterial matter from the issue. But the jury were instructed to look to all the evidence before them which, in their judgment, bore upon the question, in determining whether or not defendant testified on the trial of Green Wright that he (appellant) saw Wright have a pistol on the occasion referred to in the charge above, and, if so, whether such statement was true or false.
Counsel for appellant objects to this part of the charge because, as it is urged, the jury were authorized by it to convict upon immaterial matter. We do not so understand the charge. Perjury can be established by circumstances, as well as may other offenses. Let us suppose that the witness in his testimony gave a -circumstantial account of the material facts, and that perjury is assigned upon the material facts, the prosecution would be permitted to prove that he swore falsely as to the circumstantial, though immaterial, in aid or corroboration of the evidence adduced to prove that he swore falsely as to the material facts.
There are other objections urged to the charge, but we do not believe they are obnoxious to the criticisms urged by counsel, and, taken as a whole, it is a good application of the law to the facts of the case.
Counsel assigns for error the overruling of the motion for new trial, because the verdict is unsupported by and contrary to the
After a mature consideration of this case, we have found no-such error as will justify9 a reversal of the judgment, and it is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Rehearing
On Motion for Rehearing.
The question herein raised arises on a motion for rehearing. While it was considered and passed upon in the opinion affirming the judgment, it was not discussed at length. Being again pressed in support of the motion, it will be more extensively treated.
Perjury was assigned upon the statement that appellant Anderson saw Green Wright have a pistol at the Masonic hall in Henderson county, where the colored people were holding a festival. The charge of the court in the most explicit terms directed the jury to a finding upon the truth or falsity of this statement. The instruction on this head was to the effect that, though they might believe that the other evidence given at the same time and upon the same trial by appellant was false, yet, in order to convict, the jury must conclude that this particular statement upon which the perjury was assigned was false. After this instruction, in which the court carefully confined the issue to the truth or falsity of the statement, the further instruction was given that the jury would look to all the evidence given before them, which, in their judgment, had a bearing upon the question, in determining whether or not defendant testified on the trial of Green Wright that the said Wright had a pistol on the
. Upon the trial of Wright for carrying a pistol, appellant, Anderson, testified, in addition to the fact that 'Wright had a pistol, to certain attendant circumstances, such as that he (Wright) took it out from a pair of saddle bags in the presence of certain named persons. Perjury was assigned upon the concomitant statements also. There was evidence strongly tending to show that each of them was false.
It is evident that, although the charge confined the jury to the statement assigned as perjury, viz., the appellant saw Wright have the pistol at the festival at the time and place named, the jury are required by the Charge to look to all the evidence, and hence to all the statements made by Anderson, whether assigned for perjury or not, in determining whether the statement assigned was true or false. To the instruction requiring the jurjr to look to all the evidence in determining the truth or falsity of the material statement assigned as perjury, counsel for defendant earnestly and with great confidence objects, and in support of the objection relies upon the case of The State v. Brice, 43 Texas, 532. The case is in point, and most clearly supports the objection.
Before entering upon a review of the Brice case, we desire to make some observations, with regard to a question sometimes used with reference to perjury. It frequently happens, in well considered decisions of the court, that the words “material,” “immaterial,” or “facts” are incautiously used. Ho “facts,” “matter,” or “statement” is materiál unless assigned as perjury, nor unless the fact or statement thus assigned is relevant to the issue in the case. This is the case in a particular sense, but not in a general sense. If not assigned as perjury, the fact or statement, though material, and though it could have been properly assigned, and though evidently false, a conviction upon it can not be had.
But suppose the matter or statement is not assigned for perjury, does it follow that because not asssigned it can not be relevant and competent evidence in determining whether the statement assigned is or is not false? The Brice case so holds, but to this conclusion we do not agree. Instance the case before the justice against Green Wright for carrying the pistol. Appellant, Anderson, is a witness upon the trial. He swore that he saw Wright have a pistol at the old Masonic hall in Henderson
In harmony with this is the case of Rex v. Gardener, 8 C. P. 737. Gardener was indicted for perjury in “falsely deposing before a magistrate that the prosecutor had a venereal affair with a donkey, and that the defendant saw that the prosecutor had the flap of his trousers unbuttoned and hanging down, and that he saw the inside of the flap.. To disprove this, the prosecutor and his brother were examined. The former negatived the whole satement, and both witnesses swore that they went to the field mentioned in the deposition, and that the prosecutor parted from his brother to see whether the donkey, which was full in foal, was able to go a certain distance; that he was absent about three minutes; that the trousers he had on (which were produced) had no flap. In this case the evidence was held not only admissible but sufficient corroborative proof to sustain a conviction. It must be remembered that perjury was not assigned upon the statement relating to the flaps of the prosecutor’s pants, but if in fact there was no flaps to his pants, this would be a very cogent reason for believing that the entire statement with regard to the “venereal affair” with the donkey was a sheer fabrication.
Believing the doctrine of the Brice case to be unsanctioned by reason and authority, it is hereby overruled. As also establishlishing the doctrine that, on a trial for perjury, cognate perjuries may be proved, see Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, section 53, and The State v. Raymond, 20 Iowa, 528.
Separately and in consultation we have carefully examined the statement of facts, with the result of reaching the same conclusion as that announced in the opinion heretofore filed in the
Viewing the testimony in this light, we can not say that it does not support the finding of the jury, and the motion for rehearing must therefore be overruled.
Motion overruled.