As tо the general grounds, the evidence amply sustains the verdict. It was argued that the whisky could have been “planted.” The jury very well could have reasoned that anyone wishing to “plant” whisky would not have sown so abundantly for such a contemplated harvest; that a muсh smaller quantity would have produced the same yield. While it is true also that the defendant submitted his general reputation for good character, and those who knew him sustained him in this regard, a reputation for good character is a substantive fact and may within and оf itself be sufficient to create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt; nevertheless, if the jury should believe the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it is their duty to convict him notwithstanding evidence of his good character. General reputation for good character which the law contemplates is what the public in the community in which the defendant lives say about him. His real character is locked within his own bosom. It may, perhaps, be that the jury concluded that the key which unlocked the stоrage room unlocked the view as to the defendant’s real character, of which his neighbors knew, nothing. At any rate, whether the jury reached their verdict by this process of reasoning or some other, from the record they were warranted in returning a verdict of guilty. This being true, this court is without authority to disturb it.
*490
When the defendant was called on to plead to the indictment he filed a challenge to the array of the jurors empaneled to try him. The court, after hearing evidence, overruled this plea on November
22,
1944. His conviction bears the same date. There were no exceptions pendente lite to the overruling of the challenge to the array. The defendant’s motion for a now trial was overruled on February 23, 1945. His bill of exceptions to the overruling of the motion for a new trial was presented and signed on March 2, 1945. The exception to the judgment overruling the challenge to the array is made in the motion for a new trial in the first special ground thereof. A challenge to the array of jurors empaneled to try a defendаnt is in the nature of a preliminary plea and rulings thereon, as in the case of demurrers, pleas in abatement, and motions to change the venue, are not proper grounds for a motion for new trial. In
Hargroves
v.
State,
179
Ga.
722 (
The September term of the supеrior court of DeKalb County convened on September 4, 1944, after the defendant had been apprehended. The grand jury did not indict the defendant; but filed its presentments and dispersed. The petit jury was discharged for the term. Thereafter, the judge reconvened thе grand jury and reminded them that they had a right to consider the case
*491
against the defendant even though the city court of Decatur had jurisdiction of the offense. The grand jury returned an indictment against the defendant for the offense for which he was convicted. The shеriff, without consulting the court, accepted a bond for the appearance of the defendant, returnable to the December term of court which convened on the first Monday in December, 1944. The condition of the bond was that the accused bе and appear at the December term of court. The bond was for $1000. The court called a special term to convene on October 26, 1944. On this date the court convened. The case was called and the defendant did not answer. His attorney was present and stated to the court that the defendant was not there — that the bond was returnable to the December term; whereupon the court stated in effect that he had not authorized a bond to be taken returnable to the December term of сourt. Thereupon, the sheriff went through the statutory form of' forfeiting the bond. The court issued a bench warrant increasing the bond to $2500, and set the case for trial on the 22nd of November. On the last-named date the court convened, with the same petit jurors who were рresent on October 26, 1944. The case was called and the defendant put on trial. He first invoked a hearing upon a challenge to the array of jurors, which we have referred to in the second division of this opinion. After overruling the challenge to the array the court stated to counsel for the defendant that the court would put the jurors on their voir dire; whereupon the jurors were put upon their voir dire and were propounded the statutory questions provided in the Code, § 59-806, except question four. The jurors, in resрonse to the questions propounded to them on the challenge to the polls, qualified. The attorney for the defendant, at this point, requested the court to propound two additional questions as follows: “(1) Did the juror consider that the defendant had engаged in flight and was a fugitive from justice by reason of the proceedings which occurred in their presence on October 26 wherein the defendant’s bond was forfeited and the defendant was ordered rearrested under an increased bond? (2) ' Was the juror prejudiced against the defendant on that account ?” The court refused to permit the additional questions to be propounded to the jurors. To this ruling the defendant excepted and assigns error as follows: “Movant contends that these additional voir-dire questions wеre pertinent because
*492
each of the jurors then being questioned was in the courtroom on the date previous to the date of the trial when the bond of the defendant was illegally forfeited and when the court directed the rearrest of the defendаnt under an increased bond, and because each of the said jurors heard said proceedings and received the impression, it is contended by movant, that the court had charged the defendant with having engaged in flight which implied guilt. Movant contends further that the аnswers to'these questions would have affirmatively disclosed that some, if not all, of said jurors, were disqualified as such jurors.” It does not appear from the record that the defendant introduced aliunde evidence concerning the disqualification of the jurors in thе challenge to the polls. Therefore the judge was not called upon to act as the trier of the jurors’ qualifications. "When the jurors qualified under their oaths in response to the questions on the voir dire, this rendered them prima facie competent. Thе judge committed no error in refusing to permit the additional questions to be propounded to the jurors. The Supreme Court held in
Brown
v.
State,
141
Ga.
5 (5) (
*493
As stated in the second division of this opinion, this court is without authority to pass upon the question as to whether the court committed error in overruling and denying the .challenge to the array. Even so, the writer, reаlizing that what he might say on this question is obiter dictum, still has no -hesitancy in saying that even if the ruling of the court denying the challenge to the array had been properly preserved, and this court had thus obtained jurisdiction to pass upon the same, the court did not commit errоr. The challenge tc¡ the array set up the premature forfeiture of the bond in the presence of the jury who were empaneled to try and did try the defendant, and that they heard what the court said in reference to the forfeiture of the bond'; and also in response to the plea the State’s attorney admitted in open court that the jurors received the impression that the defendant was a fugitive from justice and had breached the terms of his bond. Admitting everything alleged-in the challenge to the array as being true, a challenge to the array was not the proper remedy. The defendant was confined to a challenge to the polls. Eor a distinction between a challenge to the array and a challenge to the polls, see
Humphries
v. State, 100
Ga. 260 (2)
(
When the sole commissioner was on the stand the defendant’s counsel propounded to him the following question: “Who was it that made that complaint?” The court refused to permit the witness to answer the question. Error is assigned on this ruling for the following reasons: (a) The defendant contended that the whisky was “planted” for the purpose of harming him or the department of county police to which he belonged; (b) the identity of the commissioner’s informant would materially aid him in resisting thе charge for which he was being tried; (c) the person who made the complaint was not privileged under any rule of law. It appears from the record that Mr. Candler, in the discharge of his duty as commissioner of DeKalb County, had exclusive authority to employ аnd discharge at will, the chief of police of the county and the other members of the county police force. The Code, § 38-1102, provides, among other things: “Nor shall official persons be called -on to disclose any State matters of which the policy of the State and the interest of the community require concealment.” So far as1 our individual research goes, we have been
*494
unable to find any case where our appellate courts have passed on this identical question. Perhaps the reason is that heretofore that portion of the Code section quoted above has been interpreted to be so clear that counsel deemed the question precluded by the Code section itself. We admire the zeal with which able cоunsel for the defendant presents the question, even though for the first time. We admire equally as much his candor when in oral argument on this point he was questioned as to whether he had any authority for his position and replied that it would seem that the authorities were against him and he did not insist upon a new trial upon this ground. Even so, we think it might be well here (and of some benefit to the profession perhaps) to call attention to decisions of other States where the question has been decided. The solicitor-general citеs them in his brief. They are: Lykens
v.
Bouchelle,
The court did not err in refusing to allow the witness to answer the question propounded.
Judgment affirmed.