*1 y. CONCLUSION au- Tim Cashman colorable
Because by Mayor appointment
thority to his due scope and and acted within
Lancaster office, authority of his we AF- apparent superior court. the decision
FIRM Justice,
FABE, participating. ANDERSON, Appellant,
Joseph L. Alaska, Appellee.
STATE A-8064.
No. Appeals of Alaska.
April Libbey Libbey, A. E.
Colleen and Daniel Anchorage, Appellant. for Diemer, Attorney Kenneth J. Assistant General, Special Office of Prosecutions and Anchorage, Renkes, Appeals, Gregg D. General, Juneau, Attorney Appellee. COATS, Judge, Chief Before: STEWART, Judges. MANNHEIMER OPINION COATS, Judge. Chief 1, 2000, early morning In the of December Anchorage police a 911 call from received woman; reported the woman that she had physically assaulted. When scene, officer arrived on the the woman told hurt. officer that someone else was nearby apartment, woman officer to led the lying where When a man was on the floor. hap- this man what had officer asked *2 proceedings that Facts pened, the man answered “Joe” —the defendant, Joseph L. Anderson —had hit him early In morning the December pipe. with a Zonyua placed a 911 Robinson call to the Anchorage Department. Police Robinson in- trial, injured
At Anderson’s
the
man did
Joseph
formed the
Anderson had
testify,
not
out-of-court statement
but his
just assaulted her.
through
presented
jury
was
to the
the hear-
say testimony
officer.
The trial
Anchorage Police Officer Pam Nelson was
judge
man’s
ruled that
statement was
dispatched to the Arctic Tern Inn to contact
admissible as an excited utterance under Robinson. When Officer Nelson contacted
803(2).
In
Alaska Evidence Rule
our first Robinson,
bleeding
was
very
she
and was
case,
upheld
we
decision Anderson’s
upset. Robinson
Officer
told
Nelson that
evidentiary ruling.1
there was
who
someone else
was hurt and
help.
needed
the officer
nearby
She led
Now, however,
question
must decide a
we
apartment,
injured
where an
man —Carroll
though
of federal constitutional law: Even
floor,
lying
Nelson —was
on the
covered with
injured
man’s statement was admissible
bedspread.
a blanket or
an
excited utterance under Alaska Evi-
803(2),
dence Rule
was
officer’s
According to Officer Nelson’s later testi-
hearsay testimony concerning this out-of- mony, Robinson asked Carroll
if
Nelson
he
by the
court statement barred
Confrontation
right.
all
replied
was
Carroll Nelson
that he
Clause of the United States Constitution?
hurt,
having
and that he was
a hard time
breathing.
Officer Nelson
When
removed
Washington,
In
541 U.S.
covering
body,
from Carroll Nelson’s
she
(2004),
124 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 177
observed that
was not wearing
Nelson
Supreme
the United States
Court construed
shirt, and that he had several obvious bruises
prohibit
gov
the Confrontation
Clause
According
Nelson,
on his torso.
to Officer
introducing hearsay testimony
ernment from
appeared
Carroll Nelson
to be in a lot of
describing “testimonial” out-of-court state
pain.
(unless
(a)
government proves
ments
him,
point,
At this
Nelson
Officer
asked
person
who
the out-of-court
made
state
respond-
“What
Carroll Nelson
(b)
ments is
witness and
unavailable as a
pipe.
ed that “Joe”
hit him with a
prior opportunity
the defendant
person concerning
cross-examine this
those
testify
Carroll
Nelson
did
statements). The
in Anderson’s
case is
However,
Anderson’s trial.
Officer Nelson
injured
response
whether the
man’s
testify concerning
was allowed to
this out-ofT
question,
happened?”, quali
officer’s
judge
court statement. The trial
ruled that
hearsay
fies as “testimonial”
Carroll Nelson’s
the officer’s
Crawford.
was admissible as
excited utter-
here,
explained
For the reasons
we con-
803(2).
ance under Alaska
Rule
Evidence
injured
clude
man’s
Later,
appealed
not “testimonial”
purposes
the Con-
when
his con-
Anderson
Court,
frontation
viction
Clause. Because
testimo-
to this
we affirmed this evi-
ny
conclusion,
concerning
dentiary ruling.
reaching
this out-of-court
In
this
statement
Clause,
barred
we relied on the
Confrontation
United
(as
Roberts.2 previous
and because
concluded in our
we
decision
Ohio
decision)
Roberts,
the statement was admissible as an
Court ruled that the
hearsay exception
excited utterance under Alaska’s evidence
for excited utterances was
rules,
judge
“firmly
properly
exception,”
Anderson’s trial
al-
rooted
testify
lowed the
concerning
quali-
officer
thus
injured
inherently
man’s out-of-court statement.
fied as
excited utterance
car-
State,
App.
1. See
Anderson
Opinion
Alaska
Memoran-
2. 448 U.S.
were made under circumstances which would
formal,
category
official,
to fall
within
of
objective
reasonably
lead
witness
to be-
systematic questioning.
lieve
the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.”13
addition,
pointed
Court
applies
out that the Confrontation Clause
explained
The Court
further
that “[w]here
issue,
“witnesses
the accused.”19
nontestimonial
is at
it whol-
ly
design
consistent with the
to Court defined witness as someone who
Framers’
flexibility
testimony”
“testimony”
develop-
afford the
in their
and defined
[s]tates
“bear[s]
ap-
ment of
law ... as
or
would an
solemn declaration
affirmation
“[a]
such
proach
exempts
purposes
establishing
from
made for
of
or
Id.,
Webster,
Dictionary
(quoting
Heritage
English
at
1 N.
9.
An
17.
American
American
of
(cid:127)
Dictionary
(1828)).
English Language
(4th
ed.2000) (visited
2005)
Language
March
<http://www.bartleby.com/61/72
00.-ht
/I01972
(footnote omitted).
10. Id. at 1374
ml>.
Id. at
11.
1365 n. 4.
(1996)
Dictionary
18. Merriam-Webster
Law
of
(footnote omitted).
Id.
(visited
23, 2005) <http://dict
March
ion
ary.lp.findl aw.com/scripts/ results.pl?co= dictio
nary.lp.
topic=
&
findlaw.com
94/94289c09ca6
73bf97beadcaff 2836254>.
Id. at
15. Id. at 1365.
proving some fact.”20
Court’s
utterance, particularly
ment was
excited
imply
certain
also seems
“witness”
ease, appears
under the facts of this
to be
formality.
case
structure
with the
that Carroll
inconsistent
conclusion
also
that testimonial statements were
stated
“witness,”
Supreme
was a
as the
Nelson
were made
circum-
“statements that
Court
the word in
or that
defined
objective
lead an
wit-
stances which would
his
“under circum-
statements were made
reasonably
that the statement
ness
to believe
objective
stances which would lead an
wit-
use
a later trial.”21
available for
would be
reasonably believe that the statement
ness to
wording
Although
could
would
use at a later trial.”25
be available for
given
interpreta-
be
a number
different
tions,
wording
light
when we consider this
analysis
have
All we
shown
this
is that
“interrogate”
“wit-
the definitions
appear
statement does
Carroll Nelson’s
ness,”
appears to be
category
to fall within the
of statements that
than the
speaking of more formal statements
Court defined as
the United
single
excited
clearly
testimonial
While the
Crawford.
ease.
explained
what core statements would
n
testimonial,
regarded
explain
be
it did not
Judge
previously upheld
have
Hens-
full reach of its decision.
The Court
ley’s
that Carroll Nelson’s
determination
*5
say
declined to
that all
which
statements
excited utter-
statement was admissible
an
in response
police
were made
to
ance.22
is “[a]
An excited utterance
state-
any hearsay
be testimonial or that
would
relating
startling
ment
event or condi-
directly implicated
statement which
a defen-
tion made while the declarant
under
dant would violate the Confrontation Clause.
by the event or
stress of excitement caused
We conclude that the out-of-court statement
condition.”23
at
this case can be deemed non-
utterance,
To
as an excited
be admissible
though
testimonial even
it was made to a
have
an
must
officer,
police
though
directly
and even
while the declarant was under “a
made
implicated Anderson.
temporarily
of excitement which
condition
capacity
reflection and We have reviewed
numerous decisions
still[ed]
[for]
produce[d]
interpreted
great
utterances free of conscious fa which have
Crawford.
spontaneity,
majority
a
brication.” The declarant’s
of courts which have considered this
product
being experienced
question
have
ut-
emotions
concluded that
excited
declarant,
officer,
key
police
is the
factor
deter
terance
crime victim to a
admissibility
response
mining
questioning,
to
statement^ made
minimal
24]
persuaded by
not
testimonial.26 We are
824,
Webster,
(Cal.2004);
(quoting
Rptr.3d
20.
2
Id. at 1354
1 N.
An Ameri-
P.3d
Leavitt v.
99
(1828)).
Arave,
663,
(9th Cir.2004)
Dictionary
English Language
371
683
22
can
of the
F.3d
n.
(murder
police night
victim calls
before death to
21.
report
that defendant had broken into her
home—court concluded
this was
ut
that
excited
803(2).
22. Alaska Evid.
R.
terance and non-testimonial because victim initi
contact,
interrogated,
ated
was not
and her mo
Id.
calling
only
"help
tive in
to obtain
in a
home”);
frightening
into
v.
intrusion
her
Stancil
State,
(Alaska
832 P.2d
591
Dezarn
States,
(D.C.App.2005)
United
A.2d
815
866
App.1992) (quoting Commentary to Alaska Evi
(holding
that excited
to
utterances made
(citations
803(l)-(2),
paragraph)
dence Rule
omitted).
third
only
given
are
officers
testimonial
when
in re
"questioning
sponse to
in a structured environ
Webb,
ment”); United States v.
2004 WL
at
(Officer
(D.C.Super.2004)
dis
*4
People Cage,
Cal.Rptr.3d
patched
to
See
15
848
scene of assault asks
"What
victim
(holding
(Cal.App.2004)
that
Victim
that
states
defendant
hospital
punched
made at the
to
her
face.
held
that
in the
Victim’s statement
defendant
State,
non-testimonial);
cut him was not testimonial because the
Fowler v.
N.E.2d
inter
(held
(Ind.App.2004)
view was
"unstructured" and "informal and un
961-66
statements
recorded") petition
granted
police question-
review
Cal.
to
to informal
for
position
statement which Carroll
determining
these cases that the
because in
gave
Nelson was not testi-
testimonial,
Nelson
to Officer
ap-
the statements are
monial
that admission of the statement
pellate
court stated that the
state-
does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
accusatory testimony
ments “bore
prove
which
[the defendant]
offered
arguably
three cases
arriv
have found
truth of the matter
specifically,
asserted
ing
contrary
at a
conclusion. Two of these
readily distinguishable
sexually
cases
from E.H.
assaulted her.”29 But
E.H.,27
In re
case
Anderson’s case.
is a
distinguishable.
case is
victims’
state-
victims, ages
alleged
where the
five and two
ments were
excited utterances and the
offense, reported
at the time
their
of the
were not
made to
authorities.
grandmother
thirteen-year-old
their
ba
Powers,30
the Court held
bysitter
sexually
assaulted
over a
them
tape-recorded
that a
reporting
911 call
year
trial court
before. The
allowed these
of a
restraining
violation
domestic violence
per
statements under an Illinois rule which
order was
testimonial statement. The
mitted
of a
thir
the statements
child under
Court concluded that
purpose
the 911
years
teen
prosecu
old to be admitted
report
call was to
a violation of the restrain-
physical
tion
sexual
assault if the child
ing
apprehend
order
allow the
was unavailable and there was “corroborative
the defendant
was not made “under the
subject
evidence of the act which is the
stress of immediate threat
harm nor
appellate
statement.”28
court
held
present.”
still
alleged
[the defendant]
children’s statements were testimonial
helpful
The case is
in response
victim’s statements were made
Crawford.
involved,
ing
shortly
only
a crime
the scene of
after crime
else
that defendant "was the
one”
Barnes,
testimonial);
occurred are not
State v.
was not in
to a "structured
(Me.2004) (Defendant
eye
854 A.2d
asked
with
towards trial” but was de
area,
charged
signed
of his mother.
murder
In an earli
to secure the
also
testimoni
*6
incident,
police
police
er
responses
question
the mother went to
al.
further
station
Victim's
to
testimonial);
stating
ing
tears
Griggs,
that defendant
tried to kill her.
were
United States v.
2676474,
(S.D.N.Y.2004) (Police
Statements admitted as excited
Moth
utterance.
2004 WL
at *5
dispatched,
er’s
say,
statements non-testimonial because she had
to
officer
scene hears declarant
gone
police
got
gun!”
on
to the
her own while
He’s
a
"Gun! Gun!
and observed de-
alleged
police only
gesture
stress of the
assault and
asked
clarant
towards defendant. Statement
nontestimonial);
Anderson,
questions
why
upset);
to
she
determine
was
Peo
held
State v.
2005
1882661,
(Mich.
ple Bryant,
(holding
v.
WL
(Tenn.Crim.App.2005)
2004
at
WL
*1
171441
that
(murder
App.2004)
police
victim’s
"Rick
statement that
excited utterances made to
officers re
police
sponding
reported
shot me” was not testimonial because
to
not
313977,
crime are
"testimoni
Forrest,
Maclin,
only
happened?”);
al”);
asked
State
v.
"What
v.
State
2005 WL
at *17
272,
22,
(2004)
(domestic
N.C.App.
(Tenn.Crim.App.2005)
164
596 S.E.2d
29
violence vic
(Kidnaping
police shortly
responding police
victim's
to
tim’s statements made to
offi
being
testimonial);
after
rescued were admissible
excited
cer
excited
not
as
were
utterances and
State,
467167,
-S.W.3d-,
Key
police
utterances and
testimonial.
asked
not
2005 WL
crime);
questions
gave
(Tex.App.2005)
no
(holding
and victim
account
at
*5
that excited utter
709,
People Mackey,
by
responding
Misc.3d
5
785 N.Y.S.2d
ance made
victim to officer
to
870,
Crim.Ct.2004) (assault
testimonial);
(N.Y.City
874
vic
scene of assault was not
State v.
781,
406,
police
Orndorff, Wash.App.
tim’s statements to
where
122
non-testimonial
95 P.3d
408
(2004) (where
immediately
police
she initiated
contact
officers
witness told
she saw man
downstairs,
leave,
punched
gun
after defendant
her—her statements
with a
saw
men
two
was
911,
protection
panic-stricken
were made to
immediate
rather
tried
seek
to dial
statement
non-testimonial).
prosecution,
than initiate a
and there was no
held to be
Moscat,
police questioning); People
formal
3
739,
875,
564,
443,
(N.Y.City
Ill.App.3d
Misc.3d
777 N.Y.S.2d
880
27. 355
291
823
Ill.Dec.
Crim.Ct.2004) (911
(2005).
by
call made
domestic vio
N.E.2d 1029
emergency help
lence victim to obtain
non-
is
567,
445,
get help,
testimonial. Call made to
initiate
Id. at
qualifies under
conceivable definition
criminal
even
the makers
“interrogation”].
brought
of these statements were never
[of
might
court so that
the defendants
cross-
53,124
Crawford,
at 1365 n.
541 U.S.
S.Ct.
42-55,
examine them.
541 U.S.
rogations”. change picture either. Justices peace conducting examinations under the that “in- Given admonishment Crawford’s magistrates Marian statutes were not terrogation” should be understood its col- today, we understand that office but had sense, loquial appears that what occurred essentially investigative prosecuto- arriving Anderson’s case —a officer England rial function.... did not have a asking, reported at the scene of a crime and professional police until force the 19th cen- happened here?” —does not constitute tury, surprising ... so it is that other interrogation. government performed officers the investi- This conclusion is bolstered the fact gative primarily functions now associated Court’s decision Craw- police. gov- with the The involvement of lengthy exploration rests on ford production ernment officers in the of testi- origins of the Confrontation Clause. risk, presents monial evidence the same As described in the Confronta- justices whether the officers repeated tion Clause was direct *8 peace. of the power inquest power abuses of the —the 52-53, S.Ct. at statement, appear give a people force and (citations (emphasis original) in the otherwise, government under oath or to a omitted). legislative body investigating official or to a potential According Crawford, passage my from reinforces crime. the This Crawford (Indeed, that, inquest conclusion when the Court abuse was the itself. interrogation”, grand jury inquest phrase “police and the coroner’s used the law.) brief, referring kind of inquest are still fixtures of American Court was not to the Rather, inquisitorial questioning that occurred in the abuse was that these on-the-scene Rather, proceedings employed to accusa- were obtain Anderson’s case. introduced, formal,
tory referring statements that later to the kind of were is, systematic hearsay, questioning at criminal trials. That that was characteris- these practices accusatory English inquisitorial used tic of the were decision, and the rationale of the Confrontation the enactment prompted Crawford apply does not thus the decision Clause. Crawford facts. these is consistent with interpretation This reasons, agree my col- For these I and his Michael Crawford facts of Crawford. leagues that the Confrontation Clause did to Richard Lee at wife, paid a visit Sylvia, visit, introducing the State from During this Michael bar apartment. Lee’s testimony in this case an- (purported- the victim and killed Lee Crawford stabbed sexually stating, “Joe attempted swered the officer’s ly Lee had because Crawford).3 night, pipe.” hit Later that me with Sylvia assault Crawford for the arrested Michael However, appears Sylvia homicide. having a role suspected of also to the United According crime.
in this opinion, both Mi- Supreme Court’s given warn- Sylvia were Miranda
chael and interrogated each
ings, “police detectives According to the facts recit- of them twice”.4 RODGERS, Appellant, D. Kemone opin- ined taped, ion, were all four of these interviews of interviews occurred Alaska, set Appellee. second STATE police [conducted] after [the] hours “[s]everal A-8841. No. the first [interviews]”.5 Appeals of Alaska. words, Sylvia Crawford was sub- In other systematic police jected prolonged and April And, regarding homicide. Privy interroga- Council
was true when investigation of in its Wal-
ted Lord Cobham treason, person Raleigh’s potential
ter interrogated Sylvia Crawford —knew
being — suspected complicity she herself investigation.
in the crime under facts, why can one see
Given these majority concluded that the Sylvia analo-
interrogation of Crawford was
gous parte interrogations by type of ex place English
royal that took officials sixteenth, seventeenth, eigh-
law in the and, thus, why the
teenth Con- centuries — government frontation Clause barred Sylvia’s introducing evidence of an-
from hearsay testimony of a through the
swers
police officer.
contrast,
the evidence at
single
ease is a
sentence uttered
the victim of a crime
*9
question,
officer’s on-the-scene
facts do not fall within
These
36-38,
Washington,
Washington,
v.
3.Crawford
1356-57;
S.Ct. at 1357.
147 Wash.2d
S.Ct.
State
54 P.3d
