Anderson v. StateAnderson v. State
The appellant, James P. Anderson, appeals from a conviction for aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The charges arose from an incident which occurred in the Flagler Village area of St. Johns County in a parking lot. The victim, Carlton Harris, testified that Anderson struck him with a pistol and as they subsequently wrestled over the gun, at least six bullets were fired. The treating physician testified Harris had powder burns on his right hand. According to Harris, after the struggle, he was shot in the ankle while running away from Anderson.
This appeal focuses on the testimony of two witnesses, the first being one Vernon Delafield. According to Delafield, he was visiting a friend in the apartment complex where the fight occurred and was standing on the back porch, together with one Shelly Brazel, at the time of the incident. They saw Harris and Anderson talking. Then an unknown third person came up and the shooting started, at which point Delafield and Brazel sought cover. Delafield saw Harris run away followed by another man. Delafield‘s testimony about who first pointed a gun at whom was confusing.
On cross-examination, Delafield testified that he had been out at the parking lot for approximate an hour and a half. He and Shelly Brazel were good friends from school and he knew “O.B.,” that is, Anderson, because they had worked together. The prosecution then asked Delafield how many times had he been convicted of a felony, and Delafield answered “four.” The cross-examination of Delafield then proceeded as follows:
Q. Did you have a gun that night?
A. No, I didn‘t.
Q. Do you normally keep a gun?
A. No, I don‘t.
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Q. What were you really doing in the parking lot of Flagler Village? Were you selling something?
A. No, I wasn‘t.
Q. Weren‘t you selling something along with Shelly Brazel to Mr. Anderson?
A. No I wasn‘t.
Q. And wasn‘t that something you guys were selling rock cocaine?
A. No.
Q. You wouldn‘t do that, would you?
A. Would I?
Q. Yes, sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I object to the question.
THE COURT: Objection be overruled. Go ahead.
PROSECUTOR:
Q. Please answer my question, Mr. Delafield.
A. No I wouldn‘t.
Q. Would you possess cocaine?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I object to the question. I don‘t understand the relevancy.
THE COURT: Objection be overruled.
PROSECUTOR:
Q. Would you possess cocaine?
A. I was arrested on some cocaine.
Q. And that was just in January of this year, right?
A. Yes, it was.
Then the prosecution proceeded to cross-examine Delafield at length about the circumstances involved in the prior arrest. Generally speaking, the testimony about the prior criminal incident included some testimony regarding a gun, a high speed chase,
The appellant argues that under
The state argues that the only objections defense counsel made to the impeachment were based on relevancy, leading questions and hearsay. They argue that Delafield himself brought up the accident caused by the high speed chase and defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor questioned him about it until after the prosecutor had already asked him four questions about the chase.
Essentially the state argues that the grounds for the objection now asserted on appeal were not raised below and that under our holding in Winters v. State, 425 So.2d 203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), it is clear that to properly preserve the issue for appeal, the objection must specifically point the trial judge to the error complained of. As stated in Winters: A question may be improper for a variety of reasons, and the trial judge should not be made to guess at the basis for counsel‘s objection. The purpose of this rule is to permit the judge to understand the issue raised and to give the adverse party notice of the alleged defect in his question. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 104.2 (2d ed. 1984).
The question “Would you possess cocaine,” is improper because the propensity of the witness to possess cocaine is not proper impeachment under
After the witness‘s statement “I was arrested on some cocaine,” the prosecution asked some nine questions in an attempt to elicit the factual circumstances surrounding the collateral offense. After the somewhat belated objection on the grounds of improper impeachment, the prosecution was allowed to ask three more questions about the prior incident which again prompted an objection by defense counsel. During the entire context of the cross-examination it is clear that the trial court was reasonably apprised of the basis for defense counsel‘s objections and even after the first nine questions might have issued a curative instruction. The prosecution did not establish that Delafield had been actually convicted, so there is no basis for arguing that an inquiry into the factual circumstances would be proper as proof of bias or interest. Arboledo v. State, 524 So.2d 403, 408 (Fla. 1988) (an arrest is not admissible grounds for impeachment under
Reversal is required under Jackson v. State, 498 So.2d 906, 909 (Fla. 1986), because the state did not establish that Delafield had been convicted of a crime and also improperly inquired into the specifics of the alleged offense. See also Fulton v. State, 335 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1976) (holding evidence of pending charges against a witness is inadmissible for impeachment purposes).
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
DANIEL and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.