Anderson v. StateAnderson v. State
Anderson appeals his adjudication оf guilty of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
In June 1976 Anderson stole the car and wallet of an еmployee of a treatment center in Washington State where Anderson had been staying. He then embarked on a coast-to-coast spree of robbery and murder which resulted in his pleading guilty to homicide charges in Minnesota and California, his pleading nolo contendere to a similar charge in Florida, his indictment for a murder in Virginia, and his suspected involvement in homicides in several other states.
After his arrest in California in October 1976, the Brevard County Sheriff‘s Office learned that Anderson might be connеcted with the robbery-murder of a fruit stand operator in Brevard County. A Brevard County deputy interviewed Anderson in California in January 1977 and the next month, with another deputy, attended a press conference in Minnesota which Anderson called after pleading guilty to a murder charge in that state. Before leaving Minnesota, the two deputies met with Anderson and his attorney and taped their discussion regarding the possibility of Anderson‘s pleading guilty to the Brevard County homicide if the state agreed not to seek the dеath penalty.
The deputies returned to Florida, and one of them testified before a grand jury which indicted Anderson for one count of first-degree felony murder. The two deputies returned to Minnesota in May 1977 in order to bring Anderson to Florida to stand trial. One оf the deputies installed a tape recorder in their car specifically to record all conversations during the return trip, but, during the four-day auto ride, the recorder malfunctioned. Both deputies testified, however, that, commencing about the third day, Anderson talked freely and frequently of his criminal activities, including the Florida murder.
The state presented this testimony in a hearing on Anderson‘s motions to suppress both his February and May statements and to dismiss the indictment. The trial court found the statements to be аdmissible and also refused to dismiss the indictment. On the following day, instead of going to trial, Anderson changed his plea to nolo contendere conditioned on the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motions. The court accepted thе plea and proceeded with the sentencing hearing with the jury which had already been selected for the trial. After hearing both sides’ evidence, the jury recommended the death penalty, with which the court concurred.
On appeal Andersоn claims that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements he made in Minnesota and during the four-day ride to Florida. The state contends that Anderson should not be allowed to contest the trial court‘s refusal to suppress those statements bеcause, as a matter of law, a confession may not be considered dispositive of a case for purposes of a plea of nolo contendere. Brown v. State, 376 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1979). We do not,
Turning to the merits of the suppression issue, Anderson contends that the deputies violated his sixth amendment right to counsel during the trip in obtaining his statement. We agree. After adversary proсeedings have begun, an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964),
In the instant case Anderson had been indicted prior to the trip from Minnesota to Flоrida. Adversary proceedings against him, therefore, had already commenced. Moreover, the deputies knew that, during the trip, he had no counsel. Anderson‘s Minnesota attorney ceased representing him when Anderson began serving his sentencе in that state, and Anderson told the deputies that he expected to receive appointed counsel in Florida. The deputies’ acts deprived Anderson of his right to counsel.
Wе also agree that Anderson made the February statement during plea negotiations, which renders that statement inadmissible. Both
The facts of this case demonstrate that Anderson actively sought to negotiate a plea agreement and did not merely make an admission. The Februаry statement, thus, fits within the two-tiered analysis for determining whether a discussion should be characterized as a plea negotiation, as set out in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978):
[F]irst, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused‘s expectation was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 1366. The cases relied on by the state3 involved unilateral offers by the individual defendants and are factually distinguishable from the instant case. We find that Anderson‘s February statement meets the Robertson test and that the trial court erred in not suppressing that statement.
We hold that the state obtained Anderson‘s May statements in violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel and that the February plea-negotiаtions statement is also inadmissible. The trial court erred in not suppressing these statements, and Anderson should be allowed to change his plea.4 We vacate the adjudication and sentence and direct the trial court to allow Anderson to plead anew in a new trial.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and OVERTON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs with an opinion.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion, with which ADKINS, J., concurs.
McDONALD, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. In addition I find that admitting the car ride statements into evidence violates
BOYD, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the Court‘s holding that appellant‘s voluntary and spontaneous admissions of his guilt of the crime were inadmissible simply because he made the statements during a four-day automobile
Appellant had conferred with counsel in Minnesota prior to his decision to return to Florida to face the charge of murder. At the start of the journey, the officers gave appellant the Miranda warning. That is, they advised appellant of his right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. Furthermore, they warned him that anything he might say would be used as evidence against him. Appellant waived, at least temporarily, the immediate right to consult with counsel about his case, when he decided to return and embarked upon the trip back to Florida. He later waived his right to remain silent when he told the deputies about his crime. Neither his fifth nor his sixth amendment rights were violated.
The fact that the officers attempted to record appellant‘s statements on tape does not suggest, as the majority opinion implies, that they planned to interrogate him during the trip in violation of his right to have counsel present during questioning. The deputies knew from their experience that criminals sometimes spontaneously confess, and that a tape recording would add corroboration to the deputies’ testimony should the accused later deny his confession.
Before accepting appellant‘s plea of nolo contendere, thе trial court required of the state a minimal showing of the evidentiary basis for entering an adjudication of guilt upon the plea. The showing consisted of the statements appellant made during the trip from Minnesota to Florida in May, 1977, and a gasoline crеdit card receipt, bearing appellant‘s fingerprint, showing that appellant was in Brevard County on the day of the murder. However, there were also other inculpatory statements of the appellant, sufficient to establish guilt, which the court hаd ruled admissible but which were not presented as part of the factual basis for acceptance of the plea. Because the record shows that there was other evidence, in addition to that found inadmissible by the majority, showing appellant‘s guilt, the ruling on the May, 1977, statements was not “dispositive” of the case. Therefore, the majority‘s holding that the May, 1977, statements were inadmissible is not a sufficient basis to reverse the adjudication of guilt entered upon appellant‘s nolo plea. See Brown v. State, 376 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1979); First Amendment Foundation, Inc. v. State, 364 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1978); Tiller v. State, 330 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
Furthermore, I find that appellant‘s other points on appeal are equally without merit and that the sentence of death was imposed in accordance with the law.
ADKINS, J., concurs.