Anderson v. StateAnderson v. State
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Ellington
A Crisр County jury found Michael Anderson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary,
1. Anderson contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to delay the commencement of a retrial. Spеcifically, Anderson claims (and the State concedes) that his case first went to trial оn May 20, 2004 and concluded on May 21, 2004.
We cannot disregard these оmissions, as Anderson suggests, on the assumption that “no Appellant in his right mind would proceed to triаl less than three days after he has been identified by a witness as being at the scene of a crime without having the opportunity to investigate the claims made against him.”
Where appellant asserts error and no objection is made at the trial it cannot be made the basis of appellate review, either as a ground of a motion for new trial, or as a ground of enumerated error on direct appeal. Appellate сourts review enumerations for correction of errors of law committed by the trial court — where motions or objections are properly presented for a ruling by the triаl court. Enumerated errors which raise issues for the first time in a motion for new trial or on aрpeal present nothing for review.
(Footnote omitted.) Ayers v. State, 251 Ga. App. 623, 625-626 (5) (555 SE2d 4) (2001). Because Anderson’s motion for a continuanсe was not made a part of the record in the court below, Anderson failed to рreserve any error in this regard for our appellate review. Phillips v. State, 279 Ga. 704 (620 SE2d 367) (2005).
2. Anderson contends that evidence discovered after the verdict demanded a new trial. Specifically, Anderson points to testimony of one of his co-defendants at the motion for a new trial hearing that the co-defendant gave false testimony inculpating Anderson in the burglary at both Anderson’s first trial and at the retrial and that prosecutors coached and coerced him to do so. “[M]otions for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidencе are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and a refusal to grant the motiоn will not be reversed unless that discretion is abused.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 209 Ga. App. 314, 316-317 (2) (433 SE2d 321) (1993).
In this case there is no evidence that the recanting co-defendant has been convicted of perjury. In such a case, Georgia law provides that
[declarations made after the trial are entitled to much less regard than sworn testimony delivered at the trial. .. . The оnly exception to the rule against setting aside a verdict without proof of a material witness’ conviction for perjury, is where there can be no doubt of any kind that the State’s witness’ testimony in every material part is purest fabrication.
(Footnote omitted.) Head v. State, 256 Ga. App. 624, 628 (2) (569 SE2d 548) (2002). An example of the kind of evidence that proves the witness’ previous testimony was the purest fabrication is “extrinsic proof that the witness’ testimony was physically impossible”; * in such a case, the trial court can determine the truth without having to determine the witness’ credibility. A recantation, on the other hand, merely impeaches thе witness’ prior testimony. Id. A trial court should deny a motion for new trial which is based on statements, еven under oath, by a material witness for the State who gave inculpatory evidence at the trial that his trial testimony was false. Id.
Judgment affirmed.
Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur.
Notes
Head v. State, 256 Ga. App. at 628 (2), citing Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451, 452-453 (1) (307 SE2d 471) (1983).