Anderson v. StateAnderson v. State
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Abigail M. LeGrow, Valihura, Traynor
ORDER
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Steven Anderson pleaded no contest to first-degree unlawful sexual contact. The charges stemmed from an incident involving a nine-year-old child, B.M., who was visiting her relative‘s farm in Townsend, Delaware when she encountered Anderson, who was a farm employee. Anderson told B.M. that she was “a pretty girl” and asked her for a hug. Anderson hugged B.M. and then placed his hand on her right buttock, which made her uncomfortable.
(2) During the hearing at which Anderson entered his plea, the Superior Court reviewed the plea paperwork with the parties and conducted a colloquy with
(3) At the November 22, 2024 sentencing, the State recommended that the court impose a five-year prison sentence. The State argued that Anderson showed “uniquely poor judgment and lack of boundaries” and that he had been drinking when he committed the offense. The State also pointed out that the victim was a young child and that Anderson had a prior conviction for third-degree rape. As further support for its five-year sentencing recommendation, the State cited the need for “correctional treatment,” Anderson‘s “self-admitted substance abuse,” and his “other mental health issues [that] could be addressed in confinement.”2
(4) B.M.‘s mother then read a victim-impact statement written by B.M. In her statement, B.M. recalled that Anderson asked her for a hug, she felt pressured to do so, and she “froze in fear when he grabbed [her] privates.”3 B.M. was “terrified
(5) Defense counsel explained that Anderson‘s last offense was committed twenty years earlier and that he lived on the farm for ten years without incurring any new criminal charges. Anderson‘s counsel conceded that he had a substance use disorder and admitted that he had violated some of the terms of probation in the past. But defense counsel disagreed with the State‘s reliance on the repetitive criminal conduct aggravating factor, reiterating that “[h]is last offense is 20 years old.”6
(6) The Superior Court sentenced Anderson as follows:
In State of Delaware v. Steven Anderson, Case Number 2311000773, unlawful sexual conduct first degree, considering the following aggravating factors, it is still repetitive criminal conduct with the prior offense in 2003; the need for correctional treatment; and, most significantly, the offense against a young child.
There was some alcohol allegedly involved, and I understand that there is some mental health issues as well, but I think the aggravating factors here outweigh the mitigating factors in my judgment. For those reasons, I am going to sentence you to eight years at Level V, suspended after five years for two years at Level III. No contact with [B.M] or unsupervised minors. Undergo substance-abuse evaluation, mental-health evaluation, follow treatment, and complete the sex-offender counseling program.7
(7) The Superior Court‘s five-year unsuspended Level V sentence exceeded the SENTAC presumptive sentence of eighteen months at Level V but did not exceed the statutory maximum of eight years. Anderson filed a timely appeal.
(8) On appeal, Anderson argues that the trial court erred by relying on the repetitive criminal conduct aggravating factor because SENTAC defines “repetitive” criminal history as a “conviction or adjudication for the same or similar offense on two or more occasions,” and Anderson had only one prior conviction.8 The State concedes in its answering brief that the Superior Court “misapplied the SENTAC factor regarding repetitive criminal conduct.”9 The State, however, urges us to hold that the error was harmless because the sentencing court also cited other aggravating factors that justified exceeding the presumptive sentence.
(10) The parties agree that the Superior Court imposed a sentence that exceeded the presumptive sentence but fell within the statutory limits.15 The
(11) Notwithstanding our limited review, Anderson raises two issues concerning the Superior Court‘s misapplication of SENTAC‘s “repetitive” crime aggravating factor. First, he briefly cites “fairness” and due process concerns based on our decisions in Mayes v. State17 and Hamilton v. State,18 as well as the Second Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Robin,19 all of which consider whether a sentencing court violates due process when it relies on bare allegations of crimes or misinformation during sentencing. In this case, however, the trial court relied on the (undisputed) fact of Anderson‘s prior conviction and not mere allegations of an
(12) The remaining issue on appeal is narrow: is the trial court‘s misapplication of one aggravating factor a basis to reverse a sentence that exceeds the SENTAC presumptive sentence?23 We recently held in two similar cases that a sentencing judge‘s misapplication of one SENTAC aggravating factor was harmless error when the sentencing judge relied on several other aggravating factors to justify an enhanced sentence.24
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
Justice