130 Minn. 416 | Minn. | 1915
When plaintiff was sis years old, her mother, a widow, married Kobert Whidden. One older and one younger sister also became members of Whidden’s household. He supported and educated bis step-daughters until they married, and both before and since their marriage has treated them as if they bad been bis natural children. They in turn have regarded him as a father. Plaintiff went by bis name before becoming Mrs. Anderson. During tbe greater part of her 16 years of married life sbe lived near her mother and Mr. Whidden. Tbe intercourse between tbe two families was characterized with that intimacy and helpfulness which is common between parents and children. In 1906 Mr. Wbidden became a member of tbe defendant, a fraternal benefit association incorporated under tbe laws of Illinois and duly authorized to do business in this state. His beneficiary was bis wife. Sbe died witbin a year. Thereupon a new certificate was issued, naming his oldest step-daughter, Mrs.
The defendant insists that the contract is an Illinois contract and must be construed in accord with the statutes and decisions of that state. Plaintiff claims it to be a Minnesota contract, and Coverdale v. Royal Arcanum, 193 Ill. 91, seems so to hold. Por the purposes of this decision we may accept defendant’s position as correct. Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. ed. —. The statute of Illinois under which defendant is incorporated provides [R. S. 1913, c. 73, § 258]: “Payments of death benefits shall only be paid to the families, heirs, blood relations, affianced husband or
The first contention of defendant is that under the statute quoted plaintiff was ineligible as beneficiary except as a dependent. To this we cannot assent. We think she and Whidden were members of the same family and as such she was a proper beneficiary. It must be conceded that the beneficiary fund cannot be paid to persons not coming within the classes designated in the law under which defendant is organized. “The corporation has no authority to create a fund for other persons than the classes specified in the law, nor can a member direct the fund to be paid to a person outside such classes.” Alexander v. Parker, 144 Ill. 355, 33 N. E. 183, 19 L.R.A. 187. Of course, when plaintiff as a child was received into Whidden’s household, there could not have been any doubt about her then being a lawful beneficiary. It is not enough that she once was a member of his family, she must have been such not only when the certificate issued but also at the time of his death. Baldwin v. Begley, 185 Ill. 180, 56 N. E. 1065; Murphy v. Nowak, 223 Ill. 301, 79 N. E. 112, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 393; Royal Arcanum v. McKnight, 238 Ill. 349; Tyler v. Odd Fellows’ Mut. Relief Assn. 145 Mass. 134, 13 N. E. 360.
We think the evidence conclusive that, at Whidden’s death, he and plaintiff were members of one family in the restricted sense of being related by affinity, having the same home, and constituting one household, to the support of which he considered himself obligated. They were such when plaintiff was made- beneficiary.
The law is well settled that, while a beneficial fraternal society may not extend its beneficiary classes beyond the statutory limitation, it may, by its articles of incorporation or by-laws, restrict the same. Norwegian Old People’s Home Society v. Wilson, supra; National Union v. Keefe, 263 Ill. 453, 105 N. E. 319. Does the by-law of defendant here set out exclude the designation of plaintiff, she and the insured being members of the same family? We do not think it intended as restrictive, but rather as descriptive of those of the “family” who might be named beneficiaries of a member. The by-law provides that an adopted child may be such. This by-law should receive a liberal construction so as to aid the benevolent purposes for which defendant exists. American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580, 5 N. E. 634. In Renner v. Supreme Lodge of the Bohemian S. B. C. 89 Wis. 401, 62 N. W. 802, after stating this to be the rule the court proceeds: “It is said that a leading pur
Again assuming the by-law to be more restrictive than the statute, there is good reason for holding that defendant is estopped from asserting that the by-law excludes plaintiff, or, in other words, the by-law has been waived if it ever was intended to exclude such as she. A by-law may be waived. In Bush v. Modern Woodmen of America [Iowa], 152 N. W. 31, it is said: “It is almost the universal holding that a society of this kind can waive the enforcement of a requirement embodied in the by-law, but it is elementary that a corporation such as this has no power to create a fund for persons other than the class specified in the law authorizing its organization and maintenance.” Our own decisions go even farther. Hanson v. Minnesota S. R. Assn. 59 Minn. 123, 60 N. W. 1091; Gruber v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. 79 Minn. 59, 81 N. W. 743. Defendant’s general agent who.assisted Whidden in changing the certificate so as to designate plaintiff the beneficiary knew the exact situation between her and the insured. The relation between the two never changed until the' death of the insured. And the defendant for more than five years, with full knowledge of the facts which went to show whether or not
The conclusion we have reached on the questions thus far discussed makes it unnecessary to determine the one of dependency, for the by-law provides that where the beneficiary named is an adopted child there need be no proof of dependency. But we may say in passing that under such decisions as McCarthy v. New England Order of Protection, 153 Mass. 314, 26 N. E. 866, 11 L.R.A. 144, 25 Am. St. 637, wé think the evidence ample upon that proposition, and the assignments of error relating to its submission to the jury without material error. We think the jury was entitled to the whole history of what the beneficiary and the insured had been to each other, so as to determine whether or not there existed a moral and equitable obligation upon Mr. Whidden to help support plaintiff at the time of his death. She certainly needed his aid.
Some cases upon which defendant places reliance should be noted: Royal League v. Shields, 251 Ill. 250, 96 N. E. 45, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 208, turned entirely upon the question of dependency. The designated beneficiary was not related by blood or marriage to the insured, and they had never been members of the same household. Three judges of the seven thought dependency established. The case of Murphy v. Nowak, 223 Ill. 301, 79 N. E. 112, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 393, turned upon this provision of the society’s by-law: “No benefit shall be payable to any person or persons of class 2, section 83, unless the dependency therein specified to be shown exists at the time of the member’s death.” The beneficiary came under said class. The Catholic Order of Foresters, the society in which the deceased there was a member, was organized “to establish a widows’ and orphans’ fund for the benefit of dependents of deceased members.” The court cays: “From this language it would seem clear that the fund was only to be paid to ‘dependents of deceased members,’ — that is, to a beneficiary who was dependent upon the member at the time of the death of the member.” On this basis the designated equitable beneficiary, a person who as a child was taken by the assured from an orphan asylum ánd reared by him, was held not en
As before stated, the beneficiary was the step-daughter, and the evidence is conclusive that the insured not only became a member of the household, but deemed it bis duty to provide for the family and did so to the extent of bis ability. And using the language of the court in Bush v. Modern Woodman of America, supra: “She now claims it under the designation given by Mr. Bean (Whidden). Her identity has been established as tbe person to whom Bean (Whidden) desired this payment to be made. She does not admit that she is not a dependent. She is not seeking to recover under some other
We think under any proper view of the evidence plaintiff was entitled to recover.
Affirmed.