Flаintiff Cedric Anderson brought this action against defendant Shannon Myers, who is his parole officer, and defendants Michael Hogan and Lois Fatten, who are Myers’s supervisors. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants because plаintiff failed to comply with the requirements of the prison litigation reform act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq. Plaintiff appeals as of right. We affirm.
We review de novo the grant or denial of summary disposition to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Maiden v Rozwood,
Our primary task in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp,
The PLRA sets forth сertain requirements that apply when a “prisoner” brings a “civil action concerning prison conditions.” See, e.g., MCL 600.5503(1) (“A prisoner shall not file an action concerning prison conditions until the prisoner has exhausted all available administrative remedies.”); MCL 600.5507(2) (“A prisoner who brings a civil action . . . concerning prison conditions shall, upon commencement of the аction . . . , disclose the number of civil actions . . . that the prisoner has previously initiated.”). The PLRA defines “prisoner” to be “a рerson subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to a prison . . . .” MCL 600.5531(e). Further, the PLRA defines a “civil action concerning prison conditions” as “any civil proceeding seeking damages or equitable relief arising with respect to аny conditions of confinement or the effects of an act or admission of government officials, employees, or agents in the performance of their duties . . . .” MCL 600.5531(a).
Plaintiff argues that his complaint alleges “intentional tortious behavior” and that, therefore, the PLRA does not apply because such conduct cannot be considered to be “in the pеrformance of [defendants’] duties ....” We disagree.
The gravamen of plaintiffs action is determined by considering his entire clаim, and he may not avoid the *716 requirements of the PLRA by artful pleading. See Maiden, supra at 135. The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is that Myers treated him unfairly in her supervision of his parоle and that Patten and Hogan failed to stop her. For example, plaintiff alleges that Myers restricted him from seeing сertain people without any good reason and that she was overly zealous in her surveillance of plaintiff, thus defaming him in his neighborhood. In other words, the gist of plaintiffs complaint is that he did not like the way Myers performed her duties as his parolе officer. Thus, plaintiffs complaint arises out of “acts” done by Myers in the “performance of [her] duties” as a parole officer, and this case falls squarely within that portion of the definition of a “civil action concerning prison cоnditions” under the PLRA. MCL 600.5531(a). 1
Plaintiff also notes that he was not an “inmate” at the time his causes of action arose. He asserts that he was a parolee, “which made it impossible for him to be able to comply” with the PLRA. Plaintiff does not further expand оn that idea, and we fail to discern how someone who is on parole, rather than incarcerated, might be disabled frоm complying with the various requirements of the PLRA. 2 To the extent that plaintiff *717 is arguing that the applicability of the PLRA turns on his status at the time the cause of action arose, i.e., when Myers allegedly mistreated plaintiff while he was on parole, his argument is misguided. The applicability оf the PLRA provisions on which defendants rely does not depend on an individual’s status as a “prisoner” at the time the cause оf action arose, but on the individual’s status when an action is filed. See, e.g., MCL 600.5503(1) and 600.5507(2). Plaintiff does not dispute that he was imprisoned аt the time he filed this lawsuit.
Further, we do not conclude today that, even if plaintiff were still on parole at the time he filed his action, the PLRA would be inapplicable. A “prisoner” subject to the terms of the PLRA includes “a person subject to incarceration . . . [who has been] convicted of [or] sentenced for. .. violations of state or local law. . ..” MCL 600.5531(e). An argument could certainly be made that a person on parole fits within that definition. Further, the definition applies to “a persоn subject to ... detention ....”
Id.
As defendants note, as far back as
In Re Eddinger,
We affirm.
Notes
Further, we note that the definition of a “civil action concerning prison conditions” is in the disjunctive, including civil proceedings arising with respect to “any conditions of confinement” or with rеspect to “the effects of an act [done by a government agent]... in the performance of... [the agent’s] duties ....” MCL 600.5531(a). Plaintiff does not make any argument that Myers’s actions did not constitute “conditions of confinement” for purposes of this dеfinition, and we offer no comment on that issue.
We decline to address plaintiffs argument that he was unable to comply with thе PLRA because Hogan and Patten allegedly violated “Policy Directive 03.02.130” by refusing to provide him with a grievance form. This argument is not included in the statement of questions presented, MCE 7.212(C)(5);
Preston v Dep’t of Treasury,
190 Mich App
*717
491, 498;