47 Ga. App. 380 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1933
Harvey J. Kennedy brought an action for libel against T. M. Forbes, D. W. Anderson, and several other persons, alleging that the defendants were members of the Cotton Manufacturers’ Association of Georgia, an unincorporated association, whose object was to promote the textile industry within this State, and that the defendants, through their agent and secretary, T. M. Forbes, published a letter referring to the plaintiff (who was an attorney at law, and at the time of the publication a candidate for Congress) which was libelous per se and which injured and damaged him in stated ways and amount. The defendants demurred to the petition; an amendment to the petition was allowed over the objections of the defendants; the original and additional demurrers were urged to the petition as amended, and all the demurrers, general and special, were overruled. The defendants excepted to the judgments allowing the amendment to the petition and overruling the demurrers to the amended petition.
The alleged libelous letter is as follows: “It was announced in the Atlanta papers a few days ago that Mr. ITarvey Kennedy, of Barnesville, who is a member of the Georgia legislature, has announced his candidacy for election to Congress from the sixth district to fill the vacancy created by the recent death of Congressman Eutherford. I have no intention of presuming to suggest how you should vote in this matter, but I think you should know that during the regular session of the Georgia legislature in 1931, Mr. Kennedy was very closely allied with the labor unions, and used his influence in every way possible to secure the enactment of bills sponsored by organized labor. On the last night of the regular session it was Mr. Kennedy who led the fight to bring up some of the bills to which we were vigorously opposed, and in discussing these measures it was clearly evident that his attitude toward industry is anything but fair. It occurs to me that it would not be helpful to have a man with Mr. Kennedy’s views in Congress, so I am passing this information along to you for whatever it may be worth, and requesting that you treat it in the strictest confidence. Sincerely yours, T. M. Forbes, Secretary.”. The petition alleged that the association, in furtherence of its object to promote the textile industry within this State, advised its members and the public, by publications and the like, of anything which might be considered inimical to their interest, and that Forbes, in writing the letter, was acting within the scope of his authority.
The words complained of in the instant case, as in the Watters case, when read in the light of the publication as a whole, imputed nothing involving moral turpitude to the plaintiff and cast no imputation upon his character as a citizen or as a member of the legislature. We can say in this case, as Justice Lamar said in the Watters case: Anyone reading the communication must have seen that the plaintiff was not charged with overstepping his rights or doing anything unlawful. The publication in the instant case was not per se libelous, and the petition failed to set out any proper or legitimate item of special damages. The allegations as to special damage were, first, the expense incurred by the plaintiff in answering the charges made in the publication; and secondly, his defeat in the election for congressman. As to the first item: “Necessary expenses consequent upon the injury done are legitimate items of damage in personal injury cases only, and the rule is entirely inapplicable in a slander [or libel] suit.” Sammons v. Wilson, 20 Ga. App. 241 (2) (92 S. E. 950). As to the second item: Loss of office by a candidate can not be said to be the natural, immediate, and legal consequence of an alleged libelous charge and due exclusively to it. Special damages for loss of office have no proper place in a suit for libel brought by a candidate, for the reason that such damages alleged are too remote and speculative to justify serious consideration. Taylor v. Moseley, 170 Ky. 592(4), 599 (186 S. W. 634, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1125).
Having ruled that the instant publication contained no language which was libelous per se, and that the petition failed to set out any proper or legitimate item of special damage, we shall now consider whether the petition contained any sufficient innuendo. If defamatory words not libelous per se are to be held actionable because of a covert meaning, “it is necessary for the pleader to aver that the author of the libel intended them to be understood, and that they were in fact understood by those who read them, in their covert
In view of the foregoing rulings which hold that, for the reasons therein given, the amended petition failed to set out a cause of action, it is unnecessary to consider the question whether the alleged defamatory publication was a privileged communication.
Conceding (but not deciding) that the amendment to the petition was properly allowed, the petition as so amended did not set out a cause of action against any of the defendants, and the court erred in overruling the general demurrers.
Judgment reversed.