Emma Jean ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants.
No. 08-cv-535 (RCL)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
March 20, 2012
845 F. Supp. 2d 263
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.
I. Introduction
This action arises out of the devastating 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. The attack decimated the facility, killed 241 U.S. servicemen and left countless others wounded, and caused severe injuries to servicemen Dennis Jack Anderson, Jr., and Willie George Thompson. Various family members now bring suit against defendants Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran“) and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (“MOIS“). Their action is brought pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA“),
II. Liability
On December 1, 2010, this Court took judicial notice of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, which also concerns the Marine barracks bombing, see Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F.Supp.2d 68, 74-80 (D.D.C.2010), and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against Iran with respect to all issues of liability. Id. at 89 [see Dkt. # 31]. This Court then referred this action to a special master for consideration of plaintiffs’ claims for damages Id. at 88 [see Dkt. ## 31, 35-36]. Since the issue of liability has been previously settled, this Court now turns to examine the damages recommended by the special master.
III. Damages
Damages available under the FSIA-created cause of action “include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.”
“To obtain damages against defendants in an FSIA action, the plaintiff must prove that the consequences of the defendants’ conduct were ‘reasonably certain (i.e., more likely than not) to occur, and must prove the amount of the damages by a reasonable estimate consistent with this [Circuit‘s] application of the American rule on damages.‘” Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 115-16 (D.D.C.2005) (quoting Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 328 F.3d 680, 681 (D.C.Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted)). As discussed in Peterson II, plaintiffs have proven that the defendants’
The Court hereby ADOPTS, just as it did in Peterson, Valore, and Bland, all facts found by and recommendations made by the special master relating to the damages suffered by all plaintiffs in this case. Id. at 52-53; Valore, 700 F.Supp.2d at 84-87; Bland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F.Supp.2d 150 (D.D.C.2011). However, if the special master has deviated from the damages framework that this Court has applied in previous cases, “those amounts shall be altered so as to conform with the respective award amounts set forth” in the framework. Peterson II, 515 F.Supp.2d at 52-53. The final damages awarded to each plaintiff are contained in the table located within the separate Order and Judgment issued this date, and this Court discusses below any alterations it makes to the special master recommendations. The Court only discusses solatium damages and punitive damages because the only plaintiffs remaining in this case are family members of injured servicemen and not the servicemen themselves.
A. Solatium
This Court developed a standardized approach for FSIA intentional infliction of emotional distress, or solatium, claims in Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, where it surveyed past awards in the context of deceased victims of terrorism to determine that, based on averages, “[s]pouses typically receive greater damage awards than parents [or children], who, in turn, typically receive greater awards than siblings.” 466 F.Supp.2d 229, 269 (2006). Relying upon the average awards, the Heiser Court articulated a framework in which spouses of deceased victims were awarded approximately $8 million, while parents received $5 million and siblings received $2.5 million. Id.; see also Valore, 700 F.Supp.2d at 85 (observing that courts have “adopted the framework set forth in Heiser as ‘an appropriate measure of damages for the family members of victims‘“) (quoting Peterson II, 515 F.Supp.2d at 51). As this Court recently explained, in the context of distress resulting from injury to loved ones—rather than death—courts have applied a framework where “awards are ‘valued at half of the awards to family members of the deceased‘—$4 million, $2.5 million and $1.25 million to spouses, parents, and siblings, respectively.” Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 768 F.Supp.2d 16, 26 n. 10 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Valore, 700 F.Supp.2d at 85); see also Bland, 831 F.Supp.2d at 157, 2011 WL 6396527, at *4-5. Children of a deceased victim typically receive an award of $3 million, while children of a surviving victim receive $1.5 million. Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.Supp.2d 286, 301 (D.D.C.2003).
In applying this framework, however, courts must be wary that “[t]hese numbers ... are not set in stone,” Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F.Supp.2d 51, 79 (2010), and that deviations may be warranted when, inter alia, “evidence establish[es] an especially close relationship between the plaintiff and decedent, particularly in comparison to the normal interactions to be expected given the familial relationship; medical proof of severe pain, grief or suffering on behalf of the claimant [is presented]; and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack [rendered] the suffering particularly more acute or agonizing.” Oveissi, 768 F.Supp.2d at 26-27.
The special master also recommends that Melvin Oley Thompson, father of severely injured serviceman Willie George Thompson, receive an award of $2.5 million. Report of Special Master Concerning Count Three [42], at 7. Willie George Thompson suffered “a broken and cracked hip, a broken wrist, injuries to his groin and lacerations and bruises to his face” from the bombing. Id. at 4. The evidence shows that Melvin Oley Thompson “was terribly upset” upon learning about the bombing and that “the bombing had a devastating effect on his family.” Id. at 5.
After reviewing the special master reports and the evidence contained therein, this Court finds that the special master has appropriately applied the established damages framework and therefore ADOPTS the recommended solatium awards.
B. Punitive Damages
In assessing punitive damages, this Court has observed that any award must balance the concern that “[r]ecurrent awards in case after case arising out of the same facts can financially cripple a defendant, over-punishing the same conduct through repeated awards with little deterrent effect ...,” Murphy, 740 F.Supp.2d at 81, against the need to continue to deter “the brutal actions of defendants in planning, supporting and aiding the execution of [terrorist attacks],” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F.Supp.2d 163, 184 (D.D.C.2010). To accomplish this goal, this Court—relying on the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 166 L.Ed.2d 940 (2007)—held that the calculation of punitive damages in subsequent related actions should be directly tied to the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages set forth in earlier cases. Murphy, 740 F.Supp.2d at 81-82. Thus, in Murphy this Court applied the ratio of $3.44 established in Valore—an earlier FSIA case arising out of the Beirut bombing. Id. at 82-83 (citing Valore, 700 F.Supp.2d at 52); see also Bland, 831 F.Supp.2d at 158, 2011 WL 6396527, at *6. Here, the Court will again apply this same $3.44 ratio, which has been established as the standard ratio applicable to cases arising out of the Beirut bombing. Application of this ratio results in a total punitive damages award of $25,800,000.
IV. CONCLUSION
In closing, the Court applauds plaintiffs’ persistent efforts to hold Iran and MOIS accountable for their cowardly support of terrorism. The Court concludes that defendants Iran and MOIS must be punished to the fullest extent legally possible for the bombing in Beirut on October 23, 1983. This horrific act impacted countless indi-
A separate Order and Judgment consistent with these findings shall be entered this date.
SO ORDERED.
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH
Chief Judge
United States District Court