2003 Ohio 7031 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2003
The trial court erred in granting Appellee Interface Electric, Inc.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Because plaintiff's claim is barred due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing the action in the common pleas court, the trial court did not err in granting judgment for defendant.
{¶ 2} Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant on November 13, 2002, from which the following facts are largely derived. Plaintiff's union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 683 ("the union"), and the Central Ohio Chapter of the National Electrical Contractor's Association, Inc., with which defendant is affiliated, entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2004. By a letter of assent signed on May 21, 2001, defendant agreed to be bound by the provisions of the agreement. In August 2001, defendant hired plaintiff through the union to work on a construction project in Franklin County. On October 26, 2001, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment.
{¶ 3} On December 5, 2001, the union filed a grievance on plaintiff's behalf with the labor-management committee that was established pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement to resolve grievances of the union and its members against employers, such as defendant. (Collective Bargaining Agreement, §
{¶ 4} On March 22, 2002, plaintiff filed an application with the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services ("ODJFS") for a determination of unemployment compensation benefit rights. Defendant opposed plaintiff's application for unemployment compensation benefits on the ground that plaintiff had been discharged for "absenteeism with failure to notify supervisor" in violation of defendant's rule or policy. (Defendant's April 15, 2002 Response to ODJFS' Request to Employer for Separation Information.) Defendant did not inform ODJFS of the labor-management committee's decision.
{¶ 5} On May 24, 2002, the director of ODJFS issued a notice of "determination of unemployment compensation benefits" denying plaintiff's benefits claim pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 6} On August 20, 2002, defendant faxed the union the "revised termination notice" prescribed by the labor-management committee's February 28, 2002 decision. On it, defendant marked a box designated "layoff" as the reason for plaintiff's termination, and indicated plaintiff was not eligible for rehire. Defendant also wrote a notation on the revised termination notice stating that plaintiff had been fired on October 26, 2001 for absenteeism, but the local labor-management committee had decided on February 28, 2002 to require defendant to change plaintiff's employment separation status from "fired" to "layoff due to reduction in force."
{¶ 7} On November 13, 2002, plaintiff filed the instant action against defendant for breach of contract, alleging defendant breached the collective bargaining agreement, and the labor-management committee decision issued pursuant to the agreement, by furnishing ODJFS with a reason for plaintiff's separation of employment from defendant that was contrary to the labor-management committee's decision. Plaintiff alleges he would have received unemployment compensation benefits if defendant had not waited several months after plaintiff filed his claim for unemployment compensation benefits to untimely issue the revised termination notice stating plaintiff was laid off due to a reduction in force. (Nov. 13, 2002 Complaint.) Plaintiff claims he is entitled to recover damages from defendant for the amount of unemployment compensation benefits he would have received if defendant had not breached the agreement and caused plaintiff to lose his unemployment benefits. (Nov. 13, 2002 Complaint.)
{¶ 8} On January 6, 2003, defendant filed its answer and asserted affirmative defenses including (1) plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and (2) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On January 24, 2003, defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C), which the trial court granted in a decision filed March 14, 2003. The court held: (1) defendant did not breach the collective bargaining agreement by an untimely submission of the revised termination notice; (2) the labor-management committee's decision on the termination of plaintiff's employment is not determinative as to his entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits; (3) plaintiff's claim is barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and (4) plaintiff presented no authority which permits a claim for the amount of unemployment compensation benefits an employee "would have been" awarded if an employer had not breached a collective bargaining agreement. On March 27, 2003, the court entered final judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing plaintiff's claim.
{¶ 9} In this appeal, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred regarding each of its holdings. We first address whether the trial court erred in granting defendant judgment on the pleadings on the basis that plaintiff's breach of contract action was barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
{¶ 10} A Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings presents only questions of law. Fontbank, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. (2000),
{¶ 11} Pursuant to the doctrine of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, a party seeking court action in an administrative matter must first "`exhaust the available avenues of administrative relief through administrative appeal.' "Nemazee v. Mt.Sinai Med. Ctr. (1990),
{¶ 12} Although failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional defect per se, under Ohio law a complainant must exhaust any administrative remedies before invoking the common pleas court's jurisdiction. Jones v. Chagrin Falls (1997),
{¶ 13} Chapter 4141 of the Ohio Revised Code governs unemployment compensation matters. The director of ODJFS issues the initial decision on a claim for benefits in a "determination of unemployment compensation benefits," as was issued in the present case. R.C.
{¶ 14} Ohio courts have held that although R.C.
{¶ 15} Where an aggrieved party timely files an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 16} R.C.
{¶ 17} Because a right to appeal is conferred by statute in R.C.
{¶ 18} Plaintiff does not allege in his complaint, or otherwise contend, that he utilized any administrative remedies available under R.C. Chapter 4141 before he filed this lawsuit in the common pleas court. As a result of plaintiff's failure to pursue an administrative appeal of the director's benefits determination denying plaintiff's application for unemployment benefits, the benefits determination became final by operation of law. See Fontis Restaurant Lounge, Inc. v.Admr., Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (Feb. 13, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 50122;Elyria Christian Academy, Inc. v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev. (Dec. 16, 1982), Franklin App. No. 82AP-349; Zier, supra. Although the benefits determination became final and binding upon plaintiff by operation of law, it was not a "final decision" as prescribed by R.C.
{¶ 19} Plaintiff nevertheless asserts on appeal, as he did in the trial court, that he was not required to exhaust administrative remedies in this case because his breach of contract claim is distinct from and not a continuation of any proceedings before ODJFS. The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument, finding "plaintiff cannot use a lawsuit alleging a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement to circumvent the requirement of filing a timely appeal of ODJFS' order" and attempt thereby to recover unemployment compensation benefits denied by ODJFS. (Mar. 14, 2003 Decision, 5-6.)
{¶ 20} The thrust of plaintiff's breach of contract claim is that (1) plaintiff would have been awarded unemployment compensation benefits if defendant had timely issued the revised termination notice that accorded with the labor-management committee's decision, and (2) plaintiff is accordingly entitled to recover from defendant the amount of the unemployment compensation benefits he was denied as a result of defendant's conduct.
{¶ 21} We first note plaintiff's assertion that he "would have been awarded" unemployment compensation benefits is purely speculative. Even if ODJFS had been informed of the labor-management committee's decision that plaintiff's termination notice should be revised to "layoff due to reduction in force," ODJFS was not required to follow the decision. "[D]eterminations arising from collective bargaining agreements do not bind [ODJFS] in any way." McCoy v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (Sept. 26, 2000), Athens App. No. 00CA12, citing Youghiogheny Ohio CoalCo. v. Oszust (1986),
{¶ 22} The labor-management committee's focus is whether contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement have been breached, and its decision is binding upon the parties for purposes of the collective bargaining agreement. Wilson, supra. In contrast, the function of ODJFS is to determine whether unemployment compensation benefits should be granted under R.C. Chapter 4141, not whether a contract has been breached. Wilson, at 101, citing Adams v. HardingMach. Co. (1989),
{¶ 23} Further, under Chapter 4141's statutory provisions, a claimant has the burden of proving entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits. Vinson v. AARP Foundation (1999),
{¶ 24} Here, plaintiff's original action filed in the common pleas court would necessarily involve a determination of the amount of unemployment compensation benefits to which plaintiff was supposedly entitled. The director of ODJFS had already decided this question, whose determination became final by operation of law because plaintiff did not appeal the determination to the review commission within 21 days after the director's determination was sent to plaintiff, as provided in R.C.
{¶ 25} Because plaintiff failed to appeal the adverse unemployment compensation benefits determination pursuant to the prescribed administrative remedies in R.C.
{¶ 26} Plaintiff's assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Lazarus and Brown, JJ., concur.