*1 of a To the extent that is due City process Twin complaining single violation the date of found injury because was not a date in Risor’s that issue judge alleged pleadings, are more of an on the merits. We subject properly appeal deficiency uncertain how is relevant intervention. alleged Moreover, we find that Twin Nebraska Boiler’s inter- City and in controversy ests issue are similar. any substantially this Thus, fails to call for Twin inter- this likewise complaint City’s vention in own behalf. Twin be free City its would to represent insured, Boiler, of its Nebraska in the of the the interests appeal if it award the review so chooses. panel, matter, As an insurer is notified practical proceed- an insured because the insured would have ings against interest in its insurer’s the insured’s representation providing behalf, because the failure to such notice would provide Thus, be a of its with the insurer. policy normally, breach insurer’s the workers’ representatives participate compensa- action, tion even insurer not be a And the though the may party. date of injury usually parties surprise action, case, in this himself. including, alleged employee Thus, Twin surrounding we that the circumstances recognize Nevertheless, are there is City’s for intervention unique. request allowing no or constitutional Twin statutory authority City in a review The review was cor- panel intervene proceeding. rect in motion to intervene. Twin denying City’s
CONCLUSION reasons, For the we affirm the below. foregoing judgment
Affirmed. J. Anderson, Houston, director, appellee, David Robert appellant. Services, Nebraska of Correctional
Michael D. Nelson and Nelson Cathy *3 Law, P.C., L.L.C., L. O’Loughlin and of O’Loughlin, April for appellee. C.J., Wright, Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan,
Heavican, JJ. Miller-Lerman, McCormack, Heavican, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION Anderson, an inmate at the Nebraska State David J. of in Lancaster filed a writ habeas County, corpus Penitentiary writ, Anderson in the district for Douglas County. court after the credit for he sentence requested Services (Department) Nebraska Correctional Department were before his sentences mistakenly long Anderson released mat- that it had over the jurisdiction After expire. concluding ter, writ. The granted the district court Department Court filed a Nebraska and also petition bypass appealed reverse, We for rea- we and remand granted. which Appeals, below. We also vacate the district court’s orders sons set forth related fees and costs. for legal
II. BACKGROUND Court District was convicted in Douglas Anderson IV and Class taking, III theft unlawful felony, by of Class Anderson The court sentenced theft unlawful felony, taking. HI and 20 for the Class felony to 3 to 5 years’ imprisonment the Class IV The felony. to 5 years’ months’ imprisonment concurrently. court ordered the sentences to run 8, 2003, released mistakenly On July Department incarceration a mere 3 months into his sentence. Anderson from he have been If Anderson had remained in would custody, 14, 2004, release on with eligible July mandatory parole its date of 2005. The discovered eventually July and, 16, 2003, filed a motion for mistake on capias September and notice of in the District Court. hearing Douglas County unclear, however, whether notice of this hearing record is Anderson, he received it. Anderson sent to nor is it clear whether did claims he did not receive the notice. Either Anderson way, 24. That not at the scheduled for hearing appear September an order law directing any same district issued day, him. enforcement officers to arrest Anderson if located they not the clerk’s office did record does Although explain why, not issue that warrant for 14 months. approximately interim, however,
In the filed a motion for Douglas County declaration of forfeiture of Anderson’s bail bond for the rea- 24, 2003, failed to at the son Anderson appear September motion, 17, 2004, filed March This which was hearing. letter were mailed to Anderson at an address accompanying in the certificate of Had Anderson received service. specified documents, these he would have had reason to believe certainly was amiss with his status as a released something prisoner. clear, however, It where the obtained that address county was, fact, March or whether the address accurate. On a default Anderson’s bond. forfeiting court entered judgment 3, 2005, a little more than 9 months after bond January On *4 arrested Anderson a routine during forfeiture proceeding, police then returned to the Nebraska State traffic Anderson was stop. for the time in Lancaster After Penitentiary County. accounting that his Anderson was absent from found prison, Department 9, 2006, recalculated date was and that parole eligibility January his new release date was mandatory January then Anderson filed a writ of habeas in Douglas corpus At the District Court. initial hearing, Department waived in any objection jurisdiction Douglas County. then Anderson was from the state transported penitentiary Correctional Center Douglas County by Douglas County later, however, sheriff. Sometime Department attempted Anderson’s habeas on the that the quash corpus petition ground District Court lacked Douglas County matter subject jurisdic- tion. After an the district court concluded evidentiary hearing, that it had This conclusion based jurisdiction. was on Gillard Clark,1 which the district court read as for the standing propo- sition that can jurisdiction habeas proceedings effectively be transferred from one to another. The district county court noted that the at the waived initial Department jurisdiction and therefore hearing concluded that jurisdiction proper Douglas County.
The court then held' an to address the evidentiary hearing Here, merits of Anderson’s habeas claim. the court underlying Texel,2 cited our decision in State v. in which we held that pris- oners must serve their sentences and therefore continuously result, not consent to sentences may serving As a intermittently. the court granted Anderson’s writ. In response, Department filed a notice of our case No. appeal, S-05-1561. thereafter, the district entered
Shortly
court
two additional
order,
20, 2006,
orders. In its first
filed on
January
court
granted Anderson’s
that the
request
Department pay
Then,
10, 2006,
costs.
in an order filed on
the court
February
Anderson to
permitted
withdraw his
that the
request
orders,
fees. The
pay
legal
these
our
Department appealed
S-06-206,
case No.
and filed a
the Court of
petition
bypass
We consolidated both
Appeals.
for our review.
appeals
Clark,
(1920).
Gillard v.
HI. ASSIGNMENTS that the district court assigns the Department On appeal, over it had matter (1) jurisdiction finding subject erred by relief (2) habeas granting corpus habeas petition, Anderson, (3) January February entering initial its appeal. orders after Department perfected
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW not involve a factual A that does jurisdictional question law, a matter of determined an court as by is dispute appellate a conclusion inde court to reach which requires appellate the lower court’s decision.3 pendent It that Nebraska case law has not yet expressly appears identified the exact of review on of a habeas standard appeal hold that from other we Drawing insight jurisdictions, petition. habeas court reviews appeal petition, appellate trial court’s factual clear error and its conclusions findings for of law de novo.4
V. ANALYSIS We think it address the in the order in arguments prudent which were to us. our they we presented Accordingly, begin whether the court had analysis by addressing district jurisdic- tion and then consider the claim that Anderson Department’s was not entitled to habeas relief. We conclude our analysis by orders of district court issued after the addressing notice of Department’s appeal. 1. Jurisdictional Question claims that the district court for Douglas
The
did not have
matter
over Anderson’s
County
subject
jurisdiction
habeas
because Anderson was confined in Lancaster
petition
It is well established that if the court from which an
County.
taken lacked
court
appeal
jurisdiction,
appellate
acquires
Thus,
no
if the district court lacked
jurisdiction.5
jurisdiction
Loyd,
(2005).
State v.
Before we to the substance of die proceed jurisdictional issue, we to note our belief that the pause Department may have when it fashioned its misspoken argument. argument that the case should have been in the district court for brought Lancaster to the district County opposed Douglas to venue rather than mat perhaps challenge subject one, ter The difference jurisdiction. For significant. litigants cannot confer matter subject a tribunal jurisdiction upon contrast, or consent.6 acquiescence venue confer provisions *6 which be personal privilege may waived defendant.7 addition, In we think it clear that the Douglas County District Court had matter subject jurisdiction this case. law, Under Nebraska an for habeas relief be application may made court, one of the “any of the district judges or to any county judge.”8 Because district “any” includes judge obviously the district court for it Douglas is County, beyond dispute the district court for had matter Douglas County subject juris diction over Anderson’s habeas claim.
But while the above makes clear that and all language any district courts in Nebraska have matter subject over jurisdiction claims, habeas it does not which district courts identify county’s hear may habeas claims. This essentially question issue— venue—is the issue which lies the heart of the Department’s argument. To resolve that we turn to Gillard9 in question, which this court held that for a writ of habeas application release corpus confined under
prisoner
sentence of court must be brought
where the
is confined.
county
[Citation
And where
are instituted in another
proceedings
omitted.]
Vehicles,
Dept.
Muir v. Nebraska
Motor
260 Neb.
618 N.W.2d
(2000)
(citing Hagelstein
Swift-Eckrich,
county, duty objection juris- diction, to dismiss proceedings. Gillard, the out that Anderson
Relying points Department in the State in Lancaster Penitentiary was confined Nebraska habeas relief in the district court for County, yet sought Douglas effect, that the County. suggest Department appears district not the venue to Douglas County court for proper the merits of habeas claim. litigate While the would be correct under Gillard’s Department rule, other in Gillard general language provided narrow exception:
[Wjhere is made for a writ of habeas application corpus to the court of a other than that in which county d[i]strict confined, is and the officer in whose custody held the latter is into court and sub- brings mits to the without jurisdiction objection, then under confinement in the where action county the court has into the brought, authority inquire of his restraint.10 legality
We believe this here. Anderson exception applies Although filed his habeas in Douglas other than petition county —a the one in he which was confined—Anderson was later trans- Moreover, ferred to the Correctional Center. Douglas County submitted to the court’s at the “jurisdiction” initial to venue in hearing by failing object Douglas County. such, As under Anderson was confinement in Douglas County. *7 District Court therefore had to Douglas County authority consider the of Anderson’s restraint. legality
2. Anderson’s Claim for Habeas Relief
resolved that the
court had
Having
jurisdic
district
claim,
tion over Anderson’s habeas
we turn now to address
the merits of the habeas claim itself. The habeas
writ
corpus
a
detained
with mechanism
provides illegally
prisoners
of a custodial
of
challenging
legality
liberty.11
deprivation
relief, the
must show that he
To secure habeas corpus
10 Gillard,
1,
87,
N.W. at
179
Houston,
100,
(2007).
Tyler
or she of the writ.12 he is entitled to day-for-day that argues
Anderson he, released erroneously his sentence for toward believes that his Anderson essentially at liberty. prisoner, 8, 2003, the date of errone- from July continued to run sentence release, the date he was picked up to January ous Therefore, officers, time. he the entire were though prison to release obligated was Anderson believes 14, 2005, the date his sentence him no later than July that date and that him detaining beyond set to originally expire, was illegal.13 a line of cases Anderson invokes this making argument, sen- released received
under which erroneously prisoners releasing credit based on the belief prematurely tence interferes then a reincarcerating impermissibly or her debt his pay with the right expeditiously prisoner’s below, then this authority immediately We review society.14 on the case in what it have may present address impact section. subsequent
(a)
Relief to
Permitting
Theories
Released Prisoners
Prematurely
Pearlman,15
of
forth in the seminal case White
As set
live down his
“chance to re-establish himself and
prisoner’s
from
his
serving
if the
is frustrated
prevented
past”
This
because “a
sentenced
continuously.
sentence
later
in a
year
be released
might
year; picked up
five years
libitum,
months,
he
ad
with the result that
three
and so on
serve
Therefore,
back.”16
way
even a
of
beating
is left without
hope
should not be “permitted
that the
theory
government
12 See id.
Parratt,
N.W.2d 689
Piercy See
cases);
See,
(2003) (collecting
2d
16 Id.
[925] the cat and mouse with the delaying indefinitely play prisoner, of his debt to and his into the free society reintegration expiation remedies in community,”17numerous courts now various employ cases sentences. involving interrupted courts have three distinct theories for
Specifically,
developed
relief to a
released
The first
granting
prematurely
prisoner.18
is based on notions of due
and is often called
theory
process
the
It
that courts
“waiver-of-jurisdiction theory.”19 appears
apply
the
the
when
release
waiver-of-jurisdiction theory
from
resulted
officials and lasted “a
gross negligence by prison
cases,
of time.”20In such
the
is said to
long period
government
have waived its
to reincarcerate the
and
right
thus
prisoner
is a
remedy
exoneration of the
sentence.21
complete
prisoner’s
The rationale is that it would be
inconsistent
“unequivocally
with ‘fundamental
principles
justice’
require
sentence to be served” after such an
legal
interruption.22
Circuit,
The second
devised
the Ninth
theory,
known
as the
and is also rooted in notions of due
“estoppel theory”
Under this
from
process.23
theory,
government
estopped
when a
set of circum-
reincarcerating
prisoner
particular
stances are
those circumstances arise when
present. Essentially,
(1)
release,
knew the
government
facts
surrounding
(2) the
government intended
would rely
prisoner
upon
its
acted
actions or
in such a manner that the
had a
them,
facts,
(3)
right to
rely
ignorant of
(4)
relied on the
government’s actions
his or
her detriment.24
17
335,
Keohane,
(7th
1994).
Dunne v.
14 F.3d
336
Cir.
18See,
11;
Roach,
note
Tyler, supra
note 14.
supra
In re
19
574, 577,
ADOC,
Ariz.
951 P.2d
Schwichtenberg v.
See, also,
Roach,
supra note
Notably,
the facts” and
claim to have been
“ignorant
erroneous cannot
*9
Further, because
invoke the
therefore cannot
estoppel theory.25
due
in due
and because a
the
is rooted
theory
process,
estoppel
that is
executive action
behavior
challenge
requires
process
theory
estoppel
requires
“egregious [and]
outrageous,”26
affirmative misconduct by
some
authorities.27
final
courts use in
remedy
The third and
interrupted-detention
credit
the time
a
for
day-for-day
spent
cases is
grant prisoner
However,
federal
courts have
at
numerous
appellate
liberty.28
credit for
held that the Due Process Clause does
require
the time
at
in cases of
liberty
interrupted
spent
sentence.29
Instead,
a
doc-
credit for time
at
is
common-law
liberty
spent
often called the
doc-
trine rooted in
is
equity
“equitable
or
In contrast to the waiver-of-jurisdiction
estoppel
trine.”30
theories,
credit under the
for
eligible
equitable
release is due to
negligence
doctrine when
simple
officials.31
sentence,
for
credit
toward his
asking
day-for-day
By
of credit for
Anderson relies
doctrine
solely
equitable
He
not advance an
under
argument
time
at
does
liberty.
spent
theories,
or
nor do we find
waiver-of-jurisdiction
estoppel
commit-
evidence in the record
suggesting
ted misconduct
to the level of a due
violation
rising
process
such,
when it
released Anderson. As
deci-
today’s
prematurely
credit
sion focuses
on whether Anderson is entitled to
solely
time
at
under the
doctrine.
liberty
spent
equitable
25 Martinez,
supra note
Resolving
requires
hinted
in Tyler
at in
and left unresolved
Are
Texel
questions
entitled to
credit for
day-for-day
ever
Nebraska
prisoners
doctrine,
at
liberty
time erroneously spent
equitable
under
so,
circumstances
be
if
will such credit
forth-
and
under what
that we
turn.
coming? It is to those
now
questions
Doctrine
(b) Variations of the Equitable
whether to
doctrine
In considering
adopt
equitable
Nebraska,
that there are numerous variations
choose
we note
Circuit,
credit
example,
grants
from.
Ninth
simply
at
as the
did
liberty
so
erroneously spent
long
32
684,
See,
(1939);
136 Neb.
35 See, e.g., White, supra note 15. 36 Tyler, supra note 1947)). McDonald, (citing F.2d 861 Id. Hunter v.
not contribute to his or her In so Ninth holding, release.38 into Circuit does not take account whether-the misbe- however, courts, at haves while Several other find that liberty.39 at who while prisoners legal obligations liberty” “abscondf] are entitled liberty not to credit for time at under the spent equitable doctrine.40 courts doctrine Similarly, recognizing disagree about whether to credit to who remained silent grant prisoners released, when even knew the was though release they prema- courts, ture. A few the Ninth Circuit including Arizona Court, conclude that such “informed silence” is incon- Supreme Those courts credit for time sequential. grant even where the knew the release was erroneous and contrast, yet said to authorities.41 several nothing other have either informed courts denied credit in cases of silence42 or, conversely, granted specifically because informed officials of the mistake.43 The district court in this case found that Anderson specifically release, did cause nor is there evidence premature that Anderson committed crimes while any he errone- However, ously at liberty. legitimate remains as to question whether Anderson knew his release was yet remained silent.
38 Martinez, supra note 23.
Martinez,
Sckwichtenberg,
23).
supra
(citing
supra
See
note 19
note
See,
Tyler, supra
e.g.,
note
273 Neb. at
N.W.2d
at 557.
In re
14;
Brittain,
supra
1989);
(Colo.
note
Brown v.
ITS P.2d 570
Messerschmidt,
App.
104 Cal.
3d
Cal. Rptr.
41 See, Martinez,
23;
See, also,
Sckwichtenberg, supra
note
note 19.
29;
Warden,
Vega, supra
People
ex rel.
Bilotti
42 A.D.2d
*11
584
N.Y.S.2d
42
Holder,
2005);
Appx.
v.
136 Fed.
230
Gaines v. Florida
Diaz
Com’n,
(Fla.
State,
2007); Pugh
Parole
2d
App.
962 So.
1040
v.
also,
See,
Roach,
(Miss. 1990).
2d
supra
563 So.
601
In re
note 14
J.,
(Chambers,
concurring).
43 White,
Merritt,
15;
supra
(D.D.C.
note
United States v.
Supp.
F.
State,
1979); Hartley
(1973)
Ala. App.
(quoting
time will not
served in bits and
Of
it is also
pieces.”48
“[tjhose
true that
a debt
tried
convicted of crimes owe
to
and that
that
society”
“[sjociety is entitled to have
debt paid.”49
So whatever
interest
society’s
that
seeing
government
does not
cat and
at
mouse
has
least
play
prisoners, society
with
as much “interest in
that its criminals are
knowing
serving
sentenced,
which they
to
have been
punishment
regardless
. . .
error
negligent
attributable to
government.”50
That leaves us with the other interest served
by
equitable
doctrine: The
of “a
...
to
his
right
debt to
prisoner
pay
society
stretch,
in one
not in bits and
this lan-
Drawing upon
pieces.”51
reminds us
guage, Anderson
that he “had the
to serve his
right
sentence in one
of incarceration under Nebraska
single period
course,
Of
a
who
prisoner
genuinely
right
cherishes
law.”52
sentence,
be,
to a continuous
as Anderson
to
should at
purports
least
attention to the mistake
made” before
being
being
“call[]
from the
“ejected
penitentiary,”53
contrast,
a
who remains in informed silence
when erroneously released and then asks for
relief
equitable
reincarceration is not
upon
by
motivated
to a
truly
right
Rather,
continuous sentence.
such a
is motivated
by
more than
nothing
desire to avoid
unsurprising
as much jail
It
little
to
possible.
imagination
takes
see that prison-
ers who know their release is
might nevertheless
remain
in the
silent
that the mistake will go unnoticed
hope
mistake,
officials.
when officials discover the
Predictably,
these
prisoners try
obtain credit for time
at
large by
that
mistaken
arguing
release —a mistake
declined
they
them
a
deprived
of the
continuous sen-
point
right
out—
seems
us, however,
It
tence.
that the
plain
doctrine
equitable
48 Texel,
2,
814,
supra
at
note
433 N.W.2d
544.
at
38,
supra
(Chambers,
note
Like or her causes his own pre relief is where required at governmental release from thwarts attempts mature prison, misbehaves But we also believe liberty. or while recapture, of a knowledge gov it is clear had “[w]here *13 it, made to does equity mistake and no effort correct ernment such, that for time at As we hold liberty.”54 not demand credit and of a mistake governmental who had knowledge prisoners who actively no to correct it—like prisoners made effort yet or crimes while or a release commit cause prolong premature deserve sentence credit under at liberty —do in the loss Such a has essentially doctrine. prisoner acquiesced or her to a continuous sentence. of his right
To credit time at lib spent to for right preserve a knows or her release is erroneous must who his erty, prisoner a authorities of mistake. notify make reasonable to attempt need not “continue to authori Although badger ties,” a voicing reasonable well include attempt may objec a at the release authorities short time contacting tion time of or in his her status.55 later order to or clarify that a determined informed silence Having disqualifies pris- from at we next receiving liberty, oner determine how courts whether the address lower should pris- fact, was, It been knew the release in has oner that premature. knew that whether determining elsewhere argued be or impossible.”56 the release was would “difficult nature modem sentenc- The is that argument complex identify make it difficult schemes would ing prisoners being are recognize they release date therefore precise released prematurely.57
54 39-40, Roach, Wash. at P.3d at 139 supra In re note 2d See J., (Chambers, concurring). 55 Merritt, supra F. Supp. at 807. note P.2d at 454. supra note Ariz. Schwichtenberg, J., See, also, (Chambers, concurring). See id. concerns, to these we note that responding “[a]mong citizens, free our most cherished as American are the rights, choice, movements, as to to be free to go
dom our where wish, when we and the to control and use our right worldly as fit.”58 we see Given the of those possessions significance interests, we believe that unless the sentence has been exten time, modified such as earned release work sively by things release, commutation, or a date know the prisoner ought some, of his or her release with We therefore hold precision. that the carries the that the burden show complex date, or her release or some ity calculating cognitive him or her from the release was deficiency, realizing prevented time, At the same government has what essen premature. to a tially amounts burden of production provide with and all records any relevant this Such records inquiry. order, would include of the any original copies sentencing time, release, aswell records related to earned release any work commutations, and other such materials. any record this conclusively case does not resolve whether Anderson tried to inform officials his release prema- ture. We therefore find it to remand this cause for the necessary trial court to determine whether Anderson tried to offi- inform *14 and, not, cials of their mistake if whether Anderson reasonably did not his sentence to know was set expire. remand,
On the district court is directed to make findings regarding circumstances the 14-month from surrounding lag the date the district court authorized Anderson’s recapture the date the warrant was issued. actually the district Specifically, is to court determine whether Anderson had should or have had 24, 2003, notice of the on the September hearing Department’s motion for The capias. should also evidence parties present with motion regard Douglas County’s to declare a forfeiture of Anderson’s bond. If notice of either mailed hearing was residence, to Anderson’s it be could evidence that Anderson knew his release was from that forward. We point that the has reemphasize Department duty any provide records and documents be relevant to this may inquiry. Brown, 737, 739, Ga. Boockholdt v. 164 S.E.2d evidence as remand, also should present parties On immedi- Anderson was not issued the arrest warrant why the district judge September authorized by after it was ately has a provide responsibility 2003. Since Department issue, court’s the district inquiry relevant to this records any as to whether a determination should include this regard to notify, and diligent an organized plan was the of delay part Anderson, find, or was instead product and reapprehend If officials. by public or negligent affirmative— misconduct— the if latter, any, determine what impact, the district shall Anderson credit for of denying have on equities this should authorized, but was the 14 months after the warrant or all of any should analysis this Obviously, before it was issued. the rationale poli- in a manner consistent with be conducted in this cies opinion. expressed Following Propriety of Orders Appeal Department’s Notice resolution is whether for our remaining
The
issue
only
grant-
when it issued orders
authority
district court exceeded its
of court costs and granting
for payment
Anderson’s
ing
request
fees.
legal
motion to withdraw prior request
refresh,
orders,
20 and
January
February
these
filed on
To
10, 2006,
had
issued
the were
respectively,
after
court’s
the district
filed notice of its intent
appeal
already
habeas relief.
decision to
Anderson
grant
divested of jurisdic
that a trial court is
It is well settled
of a final order.59
question
tion when a party perfects appeal
habeas relief to
petitioner
an order granting
here is whether
that the order grant
Anderson argues
a final order.
qualifies
there
a final order because
was not
the writ of habeas corpus
ing
to resolve. The Department
left for the court
matters
were still
habeas relief
Anderson
granting
court’s order
the district
argues
final,
agree.
order. We
appealable
Missouri
See,
*15
Hellbusch,
Billups River Nat. Resources
Scott,
389,
Dist.,
N.W.2d 657
VI. CONCLUSION We conclude District Court Douglas County had over jurisdiction Anderson’s habeas Anderson was petition. confined in at the Douglas time of the initial hearing case, in this and the waived at the jurisdiction initial hearing.
We further conclude district court erred in granting habeas claim. The doctrine of sentence for time should not cases where apply (1) release, caused or (2) prolonged committed crimes while at (3) or knew the release liberty, failed mistake premature yet bring government’s determine, record, attention. Because we cannot based this whether Anderson to inform authorities of their attempted mis- take, we find it to remand the to the necessary cause district remand, court. On is to determine whether Anderson made a reasonable to inform of their authorities mistake attempt and, not, if whether did Anderson legitimately know above, release was As premature. expressed court is also directed to make factual findings conclusions regarding circumstances the 14-month surrounding between the period Tail, Olson, Application Tail v. Neb. N.W.2d 0. 61 Olson,Supra note 6 *16 arrest for Anderson authorized an warrant
time the district court and when it issued. court lacked jurisdiction hold that the district
Finally, we its after the Department perfected when it issued two orders grant petition. of the court’s decision to appeal are vacated. hereby those orders Accordingly, No. S-05-1561 Judgment reversed, in proceedings. further cause remanded in No. S-06-206 vacated. Judgment JJ., concur the result. Connolly Gerrard, J., concurring. Wright, The is is entitled concur. issue whether Anderson I at a for time result of being prematurely released. This is an doctrine. notify authority
If the obligated proper he his release was the State has an obli- when knows premature, when it discovers the error. State is gation act The permitted error, one but not two. discovered its mistake and warrant sought warrant, District Court. The Douglas signed did
but the clerk’s office not issue warrant approxi- 14 months. mately fair, what is the State cannot be twice neg-
When considering the State discovered the ligent at the Once expense. prisoner’s release, it had to act duty premature promptly. cannot establish valid reason warrant why
If the State court, after it was signed by was not issued immediately to credit for the time the State Anderson should be entitled failed act. no evidence that Anderson knowingly There is release, nor there evidence that he com- caused his must shine on liberty. mitted crimes while he was any Equity both sides of the coin.