Priоr to November 15,1951, plaintiff was the holder of a permit issued by the public utilities commissioner of Oregon to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle of property anywhere for hire in irregular route service “within and from and to 50 road miles of Merrill, Oregon”. On that day the defendant commissioner, after a hearing in Klamath Falls, Klamath County, Oregon, at which the plaintiff was represented by counsel, entered an order restricting such permit. This was done, according to the recitals of the оrder, pursuant to authority (granted the commissioner in § 10, ch 488, Oregon Laws 1949, amending § 15, ch 467, Oregon Laws 1947) to suspend or cancel permits оr licenses when
“The permittee or licensee has refused, or has failed, except for reasons beyond his contrоl, to exercise the operating rights and furnish service authorized by permit or granted by license for a period exceeding one year or the commissioner may in his discretion restrict the permit or license to conform with operations cоnducted.”
For present purposes it is unnecessary to state the particulars of the restricting order.
*25 Thereafter plаintiff commenced this suit in Klamath County for the purpose of enjoining enforcement of the order. In her complaint she set fоrth the foregoing facts and alleged that the order was arbitrary and discriminatory for various reasons stated.
Defendant, appearing specially, moved that service of the summons and complaint be quashed, and the court entered an order allowing the motion on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction of the subject matter.
From this order plaintiff has appealed.
The question is entirely one of venue. Plaintiff contends that she is authorized to sue in Klamath County under 112-4, 119 and 112-454, OCLA, while defendant says that the venue is fixed by § 32, ch 467, Oregon Laws 1947, as amended by ch 102, Orеgon Laws 1951, which designates Marion County as the only county of venue for such proceedings.
Section 112-454 provides that a public utility, or other person or corporation, aggrieved by an order of the commissioner, “may commence a suit in the сircuit court of the county in which the hearing was held against the commissioner as defendant to vacate and set aside any such order”, etc. This section, originally enacted in 1911 (General Laws of Oregon 1911, ch 279, § 54), was a part of an act vesting in the Railrоad Commission of Oregon, predecessor of the public utilities commissioner, the power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate the public utilities of the state.
Section 112-4,119 is a codification of § 9, ch 320, Laws of 1939, known as “The Uniform Practice Act of thе Public Utilities Commissioner.” It prescribes that such a suit “may be commenced by any party so aggrieved in the circuit court of the stаte of Oregon for Marion county, in the circuit court of the county in *26 which any hearing is held in the proceedings in which said order is made, or in the circuit court of the state of Oregon for the county in which is located the principal office of any dеfendant in any such proceedings before the commissioner, and jurisdiction of any such suit hereby is conferred upon the cirсuit court of the state of Oregon for any of the counties above specified to hear and determine such suit.” As the title оf the Act indicates, and as one of its provisions, now § 112-4,113, expressly states, it is intended to apply to and govern all hearings upon any matter or issue coming before the commissioner under any act by him to be administered.
In 1947 the legislature passed an act to be known as the “Motor Transportation Code”. Oregon Laws 1947, ch 467. This is a special act applying to a particular class of carriers and containing provisions for their supervision and regulation by the public utilities commissoner. Section 32, as amended by ch 102, Oregon Laws 1951, provides:
“Parties to any proceeding before the commissioner may, when aggrieved by any dеfinitive order made by said officer, prosecute suit or proceeding against the commissioner in the Circuit Court for Marion Cоunty to modify, vacate, or set aside such definitive order and any supporting findings or conclusions, and the parties or any of thеm to said litigation, being aggrieved by the decision of the circuit court therein, may appeal to the Supreme Court. In bringing and рrosecuting such litigation, the procedure provided for in titles 112 and 113, O.C.L.A., hereby is adopted and will be followed.”
We think that it is this statute which determines the venue in this case. We are not concerned with § 112-454 (the 1911 Act), for clearly it has been super
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seded by the latеr provision about venue in the Uniform Practice Act of 1939. The controlling principle, as stated in 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d еd) 490, § 2022, is that where a “later special or local statute is not irreconcilable with the general statute to the degreе that both statutes cannot have a coterminous operation, the general statute will not be repealed, but the special or local statute will exist as an exception to its terms.” This principle was recognized and applied in
Earle v. Holman,
It is argued in the plaintiff’s brief that it is frequently a source of great inconvenience and expense to be compelled to come to Marion County to engage in litigation of this kind. This may well be, but the argument is one to be addressed to the legislature and not to the courts.
The order appealed from is affirmed.