PHYLLIS ANDERSON, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF ESTATE OF KATHERINE GRASBERG, AND OTHERS v. ALFRED GRASBERG, ALSO KNOWN AS ALF T. GRASBERG, INCOMPETENT, BY JOHN H. GRASBERG, GUARDIAN.
No. 36,793
Supreme Court of Minnesota
June 29, 1956
78 N. W. (2d) 450
Stetson & Jacobson and Robert W. Nyquist, for respondents.
MURPHY, JUSTICE.
Defendant, an incompetent, by his guardian, appeals from a judgment decreeing that he was legally sane on June 10, 1952, thereby making the killing of his wife felonious; and decreeing as a result that one-half of the real property held by him and his wife in joint tenancy before her death, and the income therefrom, is to be held in trust for her lawful representative and heirs at law, who are plaintiffs herein. The case was heard and determined upon facts submitted to the trial court upon the written stipulation of counsel.1
Defendant Alfred Thomas Grasberg, who is now 44 years of age, and Katherine Grasberg were married on September 24, 1949. Katherine had previously been married to one Hjalmer Anderson with whom she had had two daughters. They are both plaintiffs in this action as heirs and next of kin of the deсeased and one also as special administratrix of the estate of Katherine Grasberg. Katherine and Alfred lived together on a farm in East Side Township of Mille Lacs County about 3 1/2 miles from the village of Isle. Prior to their marriage defendant had owned this farm property consisting of approximately 121 acres which became their homestead. On October 24, 1951, Alfred had the title to the property placed in both himself and Katherine as joint tenants and not as tenants in common so that title would pass by survivorship to the other upon the death of either without probate proceedings. Katherine had not paid any part of the purchase price of the property.
On the morning of June 10, 1952, Alfred and Katherine had an altercation over whether Alfred had or had not asked her the night before how much crеam they had got from some milk which had recently been taken from a fresh cow. Then, after doing some chores, Alfred drove to the creamery at Isle between 8 and 9 a. m. and after making some purchases went to the liquor store between 9 and 9:30 a. m. where he remained for about five hours during which, although the exact number is not clear, he had not more than seven to nine mixed whiskey drinks.
While at the liquor store, Alfred brooded over all the past quarrels he had had with Katherine and thought of doing away with her at his
After driving back to the farm about 2:45 p. m. he found his wife sleeping on the davenport in the living room. He felt ill and, without waking her, went to the bedroom where he slept for about an hour. Upon awakening he was nauseated and, after relieving himself, had a cold lunch which he found on the dining-room table. At that point, about 4 p. m., and after having mulled the early morning‘s quarrel over in his mind, he went up on the landing where he kept his .32-calibre rifle and brought it downstairs. He then loaded the rifle, took partial aim at his wife sleeping on the davenport, and pulled the trigger killing her instantly. Not being able to find the keys to his truck, the defendant then walked to the highway where he gave a passing motorist a dollar bill and told him to notify the sheriff. He then decided to walk toward town to meet the sheriff and, after getting a ride, stopped at a resort along the highway where he had three bottles of beer. He then retraced his steps to his farm, stopping off at a second resort along the way to have another bottle of beer. When he arrived home about 7 p. m., the sheriff, a doctor, and two other men had arrived and were carrying out his wife‘s body. Alfred told the authorities that he had killed his wife and told them where the gun was that he had used.
In a statement taken from the defendant shortly after the killing, he said that the reason he shot his wife was “because of the quarrels and because I felt that she was always nagging me and that I had to stop the quаrrels and nagging.” In a second statement taken upon interrogation the following day, the defendant said that he had killed his wife so as to clear his mind about several things. These things included his beliefs that he had been framed into the
On June 18, 1952, defendant requested the county attorney of Mille Lacs County to come to the Stearns County jail where he was being detained. He there stated that “my number is up” and that because he was tired of lying around jail he wanted action, whereupon he gave the county attorney a piece of paper bearing the following writing:
“Isle, Minn.
“June 18, 1952.“a request
“The hour is near. This is straight from my Heart, so I‘ll make my decesion my best possible choice that I can see. I would like to be shot next Tuesday eve. at 4 o‘clock, June 24th. but first would like liberty until then to go around and see my wife‘s grave. also to be with my Dad, my dog, my sister, and little Ruth. Have my pick-up to drive around unmolested, you understand. Would like to have firing squad made up of Legion members from Isle Post 405. The firing to take place on Isle Ball Park. Would like very much to have this granted. Wire President Truman. Wire the Governor. On my word of honor will keep this promise so help me God.
“All my life I‘ve been watched and sinned to much to be a good Christian and when I sinned in the Navy the F.B.I. had me watched and followed so my number is up.
“Signed
“Alf Thomas Grasberg
“Isle, Minn.“action
“action immediately.“P.S. I took a life and am willing to give mine in rеturn for my Country.
“I broke all the commandments in the Bible. God have mercy on my sole.”
An indictment against the defendant for first degree murder was returned by the Mille Lacs County grand jury on October 13, 1952. At the arraignment on October 15, defendant pleaded not guilty. Prior to the return of the indictment, the court, upon the request of both counsel for defendant and the state, had ordered the defendant to be examined by Dr. Burtrum C. Schiele of the University of Minnesota Hospitals in an effort to determine defendant‘s mental condition. This examination was carried out and the matter came on for hearing on November 3, 1952. After Dr. Schiele testified, the court found the defendant to be insane with homicidal tendencies and therefore incapable of standing trial2 and ordered him committed to the state asylum for the dangerous insane at St. Peter, where he is presently interned for safekeeping and treatment until such time as he would be able to stand trial.
On March 2, 1955, a different trial court, in the civil action here, upon the facts and exhibits as stipulated by counsel and without additional testimony being taken, concluded that the defendant was legally sane at the time he killed his wife. As a result of this finding, and while recognizing the survivorship principles of joint tenancy, the trial court, in presuming that death would have occurred simultaneously for Alfred and Katherine had he not feloniously taken her life, ordered that Alfred hold one-half of the real property formerly
Both parties cite the recent case of Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N. W. (2d) 385, 32 A. L. R. (2d) 1090. In that case, whiсh arose on demurrers, a wife as joint owner of a joint and several bank account with her husband allegedly caused his death by coercing him to walk through deep snow on a cold and windy day while knowing of her husband‘s heart condition and knowing that any exertion might be fatal to him. It was held that the wife‘s alleged action constituted a felonious killing and that as a result a constructive trust should be imposed upon the balance of the bank account for the benefit of the estate of the deceased husband. In imposing the constructive trust upon the total remainder in the account, the court recognized3 the widely divergent allocations by other courts of property which had been held in tenancies by the entireties or joint tenancies in similar cases4 but based its decision upon the nature of the bank account there involved, for it was several as well as joint thus entitling either joint owner to withdraw the whole amount at any time.
In addition, it was pointed out in the Vesey case that
We are thus brought to the major issues presented by this appeal, namely: (1) Should insanity temper the rule of the Vesey case that a killer may not profit by the killing of his joint tenant; and (2) assuming the answer is in the affirmative, was the defendant Alfred Grasberg insane at the time he killed his wife, Katherine.
In giving effect to the equitable doctrine that a person should not profit by his own wrong, a constructive trust may be imposed whenever the legal title to property is obtained under such circumstances that it would be unconscionable for the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest.7 When the killer is insane, however, examination is necessary to determine whether thе basis upon which the doctrine rests still exists. Insanity has been recognized in all civilized countries as a defense against punishment for crime, and this has been so because, if the perpetrator is so mentally diseased that he does not have the intent or animus in the commission of the crime, the act lacks the elements which constitute the crime the law seeks to punish.8 These general principles would seem to apply with equal vigor in determining whether the survivor has committed a legal wrong in killing his joint tenant, for if his mind was so diseased that it was the disease and not his own will which caused the act to be committed, it cannot fairly be said
Matter of Eckardt, 184 Misc. 748, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 484, presented a case in which a wife, who was found to be insane, killed her husband with whom she held real property in a tenancy by the entirety. In addition to holding that the wife could share in her husband‘s estate and take the proceeds from a life insurance policy, the surrogate court held that because of the wife‘s insanity she committed no legal wrong; that the principle barring one from profiting from his own wrong did not apply; and that therefore she acquired full ownership of the real property held by her and her husband as tenants by the entirety. In addition to this case, similar holdings may be found in cases where the rule against permitting a person tо take a distributive share of his victim‘s intestate estate has not been applied where the killer was insane at the time of the killing. Thus, in In re Pitts [1931] 1 Ch. 546, the estate of an insane husband who murdered his wife and son and then committed suicide was permitted to take the husband‘s distributive share of the victims’ estates. The same rule was applied in In re Estate of Mason, 23 Br. Col. L. R. 329, 31 Dom. L. R. 305; In re Houghton [1915] 2 Ch. 173; and Petrillo v. Hanley, 29 Pa. D. & C. 512. In Hoffman‘s Estate, 39 Pa. D. & C. 208, a similar result was reached under a statute preventing any person finally adjudged guilty of first or second degree murder from inheriting or taking any part of the property of the person killed.10
The next questions to be determined are (1) what degree of insanity will vitiate the equitable principle that one should not profit from his own wrong, and (2) does the mental condition of defendant Grasberg at the time he killed his wife, Katherine, come within that standard.
In determining that Alfred was not insane at the time of the killing, the trial court made the following finding of fact:
“* * * He [Alfred] knew at all times that it was unlawful to kill Katherine. He knew that he would be punished by imprisonment if
The court followed the rules laid down in McNaghten‘s Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 209, 210, which determined that a person “is nevertheless punishable according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing such crime that he was acting contrary to law“; and “that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” See, State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 370, 43 N. W. 62, 64. This so-called “right-and-wrong” test has been attacked as being obsolete because it ignores the great advances made in the science of psychiatry which recognize “that a man is an integrated personality and that reason, which is only one element in that personality, is not the sole determinant of his conduct.” Durham v. United States, 94 App. D. C. 228, 237, 214 F. (2d) 862, 871, 45 A. L. R. (2d) 1430, 1441, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 573. The evidence on the question of the defendant‘s insanity consisted of the testimony of the court-appointed witness, Dr. Burtrum C. Schiele, taken in the criminal proceeding,14 a letter to the trial judge by Dr. Schiele, a letter to plaintiff‘s counsel from a Dr. N. J. Berkwitz, and the statements of seven lay persons who had observed the defendant on the day of the killing.
Dr. Schiele, director of the Psychiatric Service at the University of Minnesota Hospitals, with some 15 years’ experience at the university as a psychiаtrist and whose time was almost exclusively devoted to the study of psychiatric cases, testified as to the prior medical history of the defendant, and after examining the defendant pursuant to the criminal trial court‘s orders gave his diagnosis of the defendant‘s mental condition. It is significant that one year before the killing, on the advice of his sister, the defendant went to
On the court‘s order the defendant was admitted to the University of Minnesota Hospitals on the morning of October 20, 1952, and discharged on the afternoon of October 22, 1952. During that time the defendant was given thorough physical, mental, and psychological examinations by a number of the staff and was under constant observation by the personnel. Dr. Schiele personally conducted examinations on the latter two days, and after Grasberg‘s discharge the staff had a conference during which they arrived at their conclusions. In his letter to the trial judge in the criminal proceeding Dr. Schiele stated that they had diagnosed the defendant‘s condition as paranoid schizophrenia; that he suffered from delusions of reference and persecution; and that they deemed him legally insane at that time as well as on the day of the killing.
In testifying before the judge, Dr. Schiele indicated that the defendant had a typical history of paranoid personality going back to some point in early life. While in the Navy the defendant had been worried about a sexual experience of which others had knowledge and he felt that other men were watching him and talking and laughing about it. He also heard voices calling him derisive names. Then he began to feel that the F. B. I. was watching and following him. He said that after his marriage he began to suspect his wife was doping him, and, in addition, he told how he observed his wife flashing signals with a flashlight and mirror to people on the highway at night. He had made other observations which had indicated to him that strange and suspicious things were going on, for example, the clothes on the clothes rack in the morning were rearranged
Dr. N. J. Berkwitz, a psychiatrist and neurologist, did not personally examine the defendant but, at the request of counsel for plaintiffs, drew his conclusions from the transcript of the criminal proceedings; statements from the lay witnesses which, for the most part, indicated that the defendant appeared normal on the day of the killing; and the statements taken from the defendant after his arrest. He agreed with Dr. Schiele that the defendant “has had a definite paranoid trend” which dated back at least to the time he served in the Navy in 1945 and 1946. Dr. Berkwitz stated in his letter of November 12, 1953, to plaintiffs’ counsel:
“* * * he developed marked hatred towards persons who would not agree with him or thwart him. It is obvious that he had projected his feelings of inferiority and guilt towards his wife and as time рassed he developed a marked hatred and hostility towards her.”
However, it was Dr. Berkwitz‘s opinion that on the day of the killing the defendant “knew the difference between right and wrong and had full realization of its legal consequences.” He went on to say, “There is ample evidence that definite premeditation existed in his mind as he had mulled his plans prior to the commission of the crime.”
Counsel for plaintiffs contend that the record supports the trial court‘s finding that the defendant was not “laboring under such a defect of reason * * * as not to know the nature of his act, or that it was wrong,” and cites State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N. W. 62,
“* * * [A] person * * * shall not be excused from criminal liability except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from one of these causes [viz., idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity], as not to know the nature of his act, or that it was wrong.” (Italics supplied.)17
Counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, contends that the evidence compels a finding that the defendant was legally insane under this standard at the time when he killed his wife and that thus the killing was not “felonious” under the ruling in the Vesey case.
Since the term “felony” is defined by
In testifying in the criminal proceeding, Dr. Schiele described the condition which the defendant had as follows:
“Q. Would you amplify your statement by stating, at least in general terms, what are the characteristics of this [paranoid schizophrenia] condition?
“A. There are quite a few variations, but in general, a paranoid schizophrenia is a slowly developing condition in which a person‘s emotional life is pretty well tied up with suspicions and doubts and fears and uncertainties, many times which plague him for years and years before they become evident to other people. He is no longer—
spite of the commission of a “felony,” the wife could take the proceeds because her crime was not “intentional and wrongful” which was the requirement before the statute was enacted, and that thus her act though wrongful was not a “felonious taking” within the meaning of the Oregon disinheritance and forfeiture statute.
The court speculated as to whether the offense of manslaughter would come within the purview of the Oregon disinheritance statute and said (105 F. Supp. 811):
“Would the Oregon courts hold that a son whose reckless driving caused his parents’ death, could not inherit from the parents? I think not. Would the Oregon courts hold that a wife, whose negligent driving of the family automobile caused hеr husband‘s death, forfeited her claim as beneficiary under her husband‘s life insurance policies? I feel sure they would not rule that way.”
* * * * *
“Q. May we reasonably expect a person suffering from this condition to commit acts of violence?
“A. I think they are more apt to than normal people, but a great many thousands of them don‘t.
“Q. And this in many cases is prompted, I presume, by their delusions of persecution?
“A. That‘s right.
“Q. They feel impelled to do what they do although they know that what they do is forbidden?
“A. I think so.
“Q. That is, a man may know that it is against the law to do an act, but he feels some superior force commanding him to do the thing that he does? Does that express it?
“A. In many cases, yes. I think that is true here.” (Italics supplied.)
From this testimony it becomes obvious that the use of the “right-and-wrong” test of insanity, which has been replaced in at least one jurisdiction insofar as criminal responsibility is concerned,20 would not be appropriate in this case where the defendant apparently knew that what he did was wrong, and yet it was his mental disease and
“Reference to Elizabeth Johnson‘s commitment papers * * * reveals that she suffers from ‘schizophrenia, paranoiac type‘. The commitment further discloses that she is homicidal, deluded, hallucinated and of criminal tendency. It shows that she believes she is being persecuted by people who own a ‘gadget’ which is used to control and torment her. * * *
* * * * *
“* * * it cannot be said that Elizabeth Johnson ‘wilfully’ slew her husband. Her act involved no degree of conscious wrong. It was so much the act of her disease and so little her own deed that it might well have been committed by a third person.”
While the court there had a problem of defining “wilful” under a statute, we have a like problem here in determining whether the defendant had the intent to рerform a wrongful act. In the absence of this requisite intent, there is lacking the basis upon which the court should act in interrupting the normal course of recognized property rights and relationships.
The fact that Alfred committed the act knowing it was wrong with full realization of its consequences should not be considered in a vacuum apart from the disease which produced the act. We feel that the better rule to be applied to the case before us is that the slayer will not be barred from taking the property where his unlawful act was the product of mental disease. In light of the present-day medical knowledge of the nature of mental diseases, it is not realistic to apply the arbitrary right-and-wrong test to the facts in this case.21
The record is replete with evidence supporting both doctors’ testimony that defendant was afflicted with a serious mental disease at the time when he killed his wife, and we find that there was a sufficient causal relation between the disease and the killing to warrant a finding that it was the defendant‘s insanity and not his own
Reversed.
DELL, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).
On the issue of the defendant‘s insanity, I think we have before us nothing but a pure question of fact which the lower court, on the evidence, was justified in deciding as it did.
Exceptionally able and experienced counsel for defendant in his brief states:
“Consequently the question here is whether or not the defendant was legally insane within the meaning of the statute [
M. S. A. 610.10 ] as so interpreted in the Scott case.” (State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N. W. 62.)
The case was tried and decided in the lower court on this principle of law, namely: Was defendant laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature of his act or that it was wrong? It was briefed and argued here on the same principle and I do not think we should go beyond that principle of law since to do so makes the test too fine and the consequences too grave and serious. If there is to be a change in the law, and this I do not advocate, it should come in a case where the issue is squarely presented and adequately briefed and argued—not as here where both parties and the court proceeded on the same theory under the princiрle above stated.
On June 11, 1952, the day after the killing, the defendant was interrogated by the county attorney and the questions and answers were taken down by a court reporter and transcribed. The transcript accounts for 46 pages of the printed record. A careful reading of it, in my opinion, fails to disclose any apparent mental weakness or deficiency. It appears to be coherent and the likely story of a premeditated murder. From it, in sequence, the following appears: Defendant‘s deceased wife, in 1949, was the wife of Hjalmer Anderson. They were divorced in August of that year and in September, the following month, she married the defendant. While the wife of
Seven people, acquaintances of his, who talked to and observed him that day either in the liquor store or at a resort described his actions and conversation as perfectly normal. One man had known him for nine years and another since defendant was a boy. The man who knew him from boyhood talked to him in the liquor store while they consumed three drinks of whiskey.
Taking the record as a whole it seems to me that the court was justified in finding that at the time the defendant killed his wife he was not suffering from such defect of reason or impairment of his mental faculties as to excuse his acts. The fact that he had paranoid trends is not in itself controlling for, as Dr. Berkwitz points out, it is common knowledge that many people have paranoid trends and yet are legally sane and accountable for what they do. And whether four months after the killing he was insane so as to be incapable of standing trial is beside the point. The question is what was his condition at the time of the killing? Viewing the record as a whole and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, it seems to me that the court could reasonably find that the defendant planned the murder, that he had a motive for it, that he knew what he was doing was not right but wrong, and that, in fact, his reason-
THOMAS GALLAGHER, JUSTICE (dissenting).
I concur in the dissent.