Appellee Carla Anderson brought a quo warranto proceeding challenging appellant Gail Flake’s eligibility for the office of DeKalb Superior Court Judge in the Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit.
1
Anderson, a DeKalb County voter and taxpayer, alleges that Judge Flake is ineligible for the DeKalb County office because she does not fulfill the requirement that judges of the superior courts reside in the geographic district in which they are selected to serve. Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. II (d) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. In the first appearance of this case in our Court we reversed the grant of Judge Flake’s motion to dismiss Anderson’s quo warranto petition.
Anderson v. Flake,
1. Anderson contends that an answer must be filed in a quo warranto proceeding. We address this contention, even though the holding of the trial court does not necessitate it, because the issue involving whether an answer is required in a quo warranto action is an important one to resolve as this case “demonstrates a confused state of the law” in this regard.
Walker v. Hamilton,
Generally, the provisions of the Civil Practice Act (CPA) apply *142 “to all special statutory proceedings except to the extent that specific rules of practice and procedure in conflict [t] herewith are expressly prescribed by law.” OCGA § 9-11-81. An action seeking a writ of quo warranto filed pursuant to OCGA § 9-6-60 is one of the special statutory proceedings referenced in OCGA § 9-11-81. Anderson v. Flake, supra at 500 (1), n. 7. The statutes relating to quo warranto proceedings do not expressly provide that a respondent in the proceeding must file an answer under the provision of OCGA § 9-11-12, nor do they provide to the contrary. In the absence of an express provision in the quo warranto statute that conflicts with the CPA, the CPA applies.
Prior cases have held that quo warranto proceedings are governed by the rules of pleading applicable to civil cases:
In this State there is no statute specifically prescribing the procedure in a quo warranto proceeding .... Where a [writ of quo warranto] is filed ... it is considered a purely civil remedy, to be governed by the rules of pleading that are applicable in other civil actions. [Cits.]
Milton v. Mitchell,
“[S]ince a quo warranto proceeding by its very nature seeks a judgment against the person of the respondent,”
Gary v. Ogletree,
2. Anderson contends that she was entitled to a default judgment because Judge Flake failed to file a timely answer and thereafter failed to satisfy the conditions precedent for opening default.
*143
OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). OCGA § 9-11-55 (b) allows a prejudgment default to be opened on one of three grounds if four conditions are met. Compliance with the four conditions is a condition precedent and once met the question of whether to open the default on one of the three grounds rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Stewart v. Turner,
3. Article VI, Sec. VII, Par. II (d) requires all judges to reside “in the geographical area in which they are selected to serve.” Judge Flake’s affidavit regarding her residency, affidavits from neighbors that Judge Flake lived at a residence in Stone Mountain, and various other forms of documentation established her residency in DeKalb County.
3
Because the plain, palpable and undisputed evidence presented by Judge Flake showed that Judge Flake had satisfied the residency requirements of the county in which she was elected to serve as a superior court judge, the trial court was authorized to grant her motion for summary judgment. See
Robinson v. Kroger Co.,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Judge Flake was reelected in 1996.
Judge Flake filed an answer in conjunction with her request to open default.
These documents included Judge Flake’s voter registration and voter record, banking information, driver’s license, homestead exemption on property in DeKalb County, and vehicle registrations.