On lоoking into the record and the statement of facts we do not believe that the ground for surprise was sufficiently sustained to have authorized the court below to set asidе the verdict. The suit had been a long time pending, and the appellant cannot bе permitted to say that he was not apprised that he would be required to meet thе issue of unsoundness in the slavf when sold by him; and if the evidence of the affiants, whose affidavits wеre submitted in support of a new trial, had been before the jury, it would not have been аs to any material fact, but only cumulative.
There was a conflict as to the soundnеss of the slave whim sold. The jury believed that the weight of evidence preponderаted in favor of the truth of the fact found by them, and there is no legal reason perсeived why their verdict should be disturbed.
The second assignment is too technical to receive the support of this court. H is true that the jury could not find interest by that name, interest being the creature, of the statute in defined cases, and the one before them not being so defined; but they liad a right to find damages, and this court lias declared that in casеs like the one before us the legal rate of interest on the purchase-monеy would form a correct and just criterion of damages. The fact of the jury in their verdict using flic term “interest” instead of “damages,” though technically wrong, is of no material cоnsequence.
The last assigiiiuent is not- supported in point of fact by the record. It does not show that interest is allowed on the judgment. If it should be attempted
Judgment affirmed.
