Anderson v. DainackAnderson v. Dainack
Esmeralda Anderson, Respondent, v Denise Dainack et al., Appellants. [834 NYS2d 564]—
Peters, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered January 24, 2006 in Sullivan County, upon a verdict rendered in favor
In December 2001, plaintiff was at the end of an exit ramp from Route 17 in Sullivan County when she was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by defendant Denise Dainack. Plaintiff experienced pain in her lower back and neck the following day, and reported first to the emergency room and then to her family physician. Over the course of the next few months, the pain continued, warranting her referral to physical therapy and a pain center. When plaintiff’s pain persisted, she treated with a neurologist in January and February 2003 and with Paul Sinew, a chiropractor, between May 2003 and December 2003.
Plaintiff commenced this action in October 2004, claiming a serious injury under
Supreme Court’s preclusion of photographs and testimony concerning the condition of the vehicles after the accident due to possible prejudice by the jury against plaintiff was within its discretionary authority (see Saulpaugh v Krafte, 5 AD3d 934, 934-935 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 610 [2004]). However, we have stated that even when liability is not at issue, “proof as to the happening of an accident is probative and admissible as it describes the force of an impact or other incident that would help in determining the nature or extent of injuries and thus relate to the question of damages” (Rodriguez v Zampella, 42 AD2d 805, 806 [1973]; see also Homsey v Castellana, 289 AD2d 201, 201 [2001]). While we would encourage a trial court to allow such photographs and testimony and then instruct the jury that the absence of damage would not preclude the possibility that plaintiff sustained an injury, where, as here, defendants were permitted to elicit testimony that the vehicles were a very short distance apart—between one and eight feet—and that defendant’s car slowly rolled into plaintiff’s car, we find no error (see
Next addressing Supreme Court’s ruling that prevented
Here, defendants’ expert conducted his own examination of plaintiff and reviewed a number of plaintiff’s medical records beyond the disputed IME. For this reason, he had a sufficient basis for his opinion of which the disputed IME was but “a link in the chain of data upon which [he could have] relied” (Borden v Brady, supra at 984; see Ciocca v Park, 21 AD3d 671, 672-673 [2005], affd 5 NY3d 835 [2005]). Finding that this error would not have substantially influenced the outcome of the trial (see
While we fail to find any merit to defendants’ contention that plaintiff did not prove that she sustained a serious injury under
settled that
We recognize that “a variance between the pleadings and the proof ‘may be disregarded unless it can be said to have misled an adversary and occasioned prejudice’ ” (Hummel v Vicaretti, 152 AD2d 779, 780 [1989], lv dismissed 75 NY2d 809 [1990], quoting Sharkey v Locust Val. Mar., 96 AD2d 1093, 1094 [1983], appeal dismissed 61 NY2d 669 [1983]). Here, however, only defendants raised the issue in their cross-examination of plaintiff’s expert for the purpose of undermining plaintiff’s theory of the accident. While this approach has been permitted by the Fourth Department (see Mazurek v Home Depot U.S.A., 303 AD2d 960, 961 [2003]; Martin v Volvo Cars of N. Am., 241 AD2d 941, 943 [1997]), we have not adopted it when there is a wholesale failure by the plaintiff to plead and prove that theory. For this reason, it was error for Supreme Court to have instructed the jury on these theories. Finding such error to have prejudiced a substantial right of defendants (see
Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for a new trial on the issue of injury and damages, with costs to abide the event.